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S. HRG. 99-400 PT. 4

CRISIS OF WILL IN THE WARSAW PACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE, WEST EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

SEPTEMBER 19, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

PART 4 OF 5

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

55-811 O WASHINGTON : 1986

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CRISIS OF WILL IN THE WARSAW PACT

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1985

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 1:43 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I will call this meeting to order.

This is part of the European Affairs Subcommittee hearings on NATO.

We are pleased to welcome you to the fifth session of our series of seven hearings on United States-European relations.

The overall title of the series is a provocative one: Is NATO Still the Centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it Be?

We have had several hearings during which several Senators have participated. Many of the issues that we have considered are most crucial to the United States and our European allies through the 1990's, whether they are bilateral, NATO-related, or East-West.

The title of this afternoon's session is "The Crisis of Will in the Warsaw Pact." It follows a very fruitful discussion on difficulties in NATO this morning.

Our first guest this afternoon is Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute. He is a good friend.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt headed the Office of Research and Analysis for the U.S.S.R. and East European-Communist Affairs at the State Department. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a noted author and speaker on a variety of Soviet and East European affairs and we welcome him.

STATEMENT OF HELMUT SONNENFELDT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing. As I think you are aware, I have only just gotten off an airplane from a trip and, therefore, do not have a written text.

I would like to compliment you for conducting these hearings. I think they are extremely important and timely. I would simply comment by way of introduction that my answer to the question that is posed for the hearing is that NATO, indeed, is still at least a centerpiece of American foreign policy, and it should be and I believe will continue to be for many years to come.

I think it is an admirable idea not to confine these hearings exclusively to the Western side of the equation, but to extend them also to the region of the Warsaw Pact.

Of course, one must not fall into the trap of the mirror image or of excessively close analogies. NATO has never been and never will be a hegemonial institution. It is made up of free, pluralistic societies and, consequently, NATO itself and the many institutions in the West reflect diversity, pluralism, and, above all, the democratic foundations on which all the members of these Western institutions are based.

This cannot be said of the Warsaw Pact, for, despite the many cross currents in the East and the considerable diversity that has never been totally submerged, the Warsaw Pact and its companion economic organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON, are, indeed, hegemonic organizations. The Soviet Union clearly is the dominant actor and has a very considerable power to dictate the structure, the priorities, the policies of these institutions.

This does not mean that there is an absence of elements of coalition politics in Eastern Europe and in the Warsaw Pact in particular. That is, indeed, the aspect of the Warsaw Pact that gives rise to your question or to your title for this particular part of your hearings; namely, whether there is something like a crisis of will that can be discerned or possibly even encouraged in the Warsaw Pact.

I would not have chosen that particular phrase in regard to the Warsaw Pact, but I don't think we need to take it too literally.

It has long been clear, I believe, that the system that was created in Eastern Europe—and I include in Eastern Europe Southeastern Europe as well—at the end of and immediately after the Second World War by Stalinist Russia was, fundamentally, an unnatural system. It attempted to wipe away national traditions, cultural and other differences of great depth. It attempted to impose an economic straitjacket on a region, parts of which had long been associated with many other groupings that did not, in any real sense, fit into a Soviet economic structure.

Indeed, almost everything that followed the installation of Communist regimes by the Soviet Union in these countries had to be imposed by domestic coercion as well as through Soviet pressure, coercion, and, very often, the presence of Soviet military forces and other individuals and groups subject to Soviet discipline.

But, very early in the creation of this Eastern structure, it became apparent that parts of it were unnatural to the point that it could not even be sustained for a few years. I refer to the departure of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination in 1948 and 1949, followed a good many years later by the departure of Albania.

But we have seen also over these 40 years, particularly in the last 30 years, the recurrent manifestations of public resistance to Soviet domination and to inclusion in the Soviet empire. Time and again, rebellions of various sorts have broken out in these countries and have had to be put down either directly by Soviet intervention, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, or indirectly, or by an exercise of domestic police and military power, as in Poland, in recent years.

So, I think a fundamental point about Eastern Europe and, if you will, about the Soviet empire in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, is that it is not a natural structure, that it is not a product of a normal and orderly historical evolution, and that it does not command the fundamental support of the populations of the region, even though for many years it may operate with the toleration or the acquiescence of the populations of these countries.

In this situation, the regimes in these countries over the years have oscillated. On the one hand, there are efforts to sink their own roots in their countries and societies by appealing to national sentiment and national aspirations, and by trying to restore at least some of the foreign orientations that these countries had in the past in their cultural relationships, their economic relationships, and so on. On the other hand, there is an obedience to direction from Moscow because, when all is said and done, these regimes remain regimes of Communists, and Communist parties continue to be, for the most part, the dominant political factor, the dominant coercive factors in the countries in question.

That may not be the case in Poland at the moment, but there the army takes the place of the Communist Party.

Taken as a whole, therefore, and keeping these introductory remarks brief, I think that it has long been a mistake to regard Eastern Europe and particularly the Warsaw Pact as a monolith. It is a mistake to regard Eastern Europe, the individual regimes there and the structures such as the Warsaw Pact and COMECON as simple instruments of Soviet policy.

They are, indeed, to some extent instruments of Soviet policy, but they cannot be wielded totally at the discretion and the whim of the Soviet Union. They cannot be employed totally and exclusively in the pursuit of Soviet purposes and Soviet interests.

Some weight, and this varies over time and over issues, has to be given to interests and concerns that are particular to the individual countries concerned.

This has meant many things over the years which, together, underline the fact that Eastern Europe is not a monolith and is not simply a part of the Soviet empire as if it were a series of Soviet Union republics.

For example, in economic relationships between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, it has not proved possible for the Soviet Union simply to milk these countries of their natural resources and their economic efforts. Indeed, in many respects, the Soviet Union puts more economic resources into them than it obtains from them.

But it has also meant that over the years the Soviet Union has had to acquiesce in, perhaps sometimes even to encourage, economic relationships between these countries and the outside world, most notably the countries of Western Europe, both those neutral and those allied with the United States in NATO.

This has had ambiguous effects from the standpoint of the Soviet Union.

On the one hand, these economic relationships of the East European countries with the outside world relieve the Soviet Union of excessive demands on its own resources. That is a positive factor for the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, it creates within and among these countries special ties to the outside world and special interests in preserving these ties.

Similar phenomena can be observed in cultural relations and in many other respects as well.

In the military realm, the Soviet Union has attempted to make the Warsaw Pact as much an instrument of Soviet policy and Soviet concerns as possible. And yet, I think even here one can discern a great many cross currents and a great many imperfections in the degree of Soviet domination.

It is not clear, for example, at least to me, that the Soviet Union could expect to rely on the armies, air forces and navies of the East European countries in all circumstances.

The Soviet Union has never been prepared to make available to the armed forces of these countries the same types and levels, in terms of technological characteristics, of equipment that is available to many units of the Soviet Union's own armed forces.

Questions of strategy, basic military policy and doctrine for the Warsaw Pact remain, by and large, the province of Soviet planners, the Soviet general staff, and, ultimately, the Soviet Politburo.

But many of those aspects of Soviet military policy and military doctrine are not seen among Eastern Europeans as necessarily fitting their own interests and needs. For example, during the period in which the Soviet Union appeared to place overwhelming emphasis on the inevitability of a war in Europe becoming nuclear, it was not so clear that the East Europeans shared that view, since they inevitably would have become a nuclear battlefield.

More recently, there have been signs again of renewed Soviet emphasis on the possibilities of conventional war, and even on the possibility of limited uses of nuclear weaponry. But this—and here there is perhaps a rough, though not exact, parallel to NATO—involves large efforts in order to build up and restructure and improve conventional forces, something that the East Europeans are not particularly inclined to do because of their own economic problems.

Moreover, the more the possibility and feasibility of a conventional war, are discussed and raised by the Soviet Union as the dominant Warsaw Pact strategy, the more the Soviets and their allies have to weigh the possibility of a long war. But, in a long war, the questions of reliability and stability in Eastern Europe become even greater than they would in the case of a shorter war.

I believe all of these are issues within the Soviet world and have to be given weight by Soviet planners and Soviet political leaders. Incidentally, in my view, it is extremely important for Western analysts and for Western governments to examine the evidence in regard to these matters very closely and to determine, where possible, what might be done to encourage some of these complexities, concerns, and uncertainties in the Warsaw Pact and among and within the countries of Eastern Europe.

I have touched only very lightly on some of the issues we might explore further in this hearing.

I would simply close these introductory remarks with the observation that Western policy with respect to this part of the world has never been the product of a complete consensus. At the ex-

tremes, there are those who believe that nothing can change, that Soviet domination in one form or another is inevitable for a long time to come. And at the other end, there are those who believe that the only way real change can occur is through an explosion, through either an internal explosion or as a result of open warfare.

I believe that neither of these extremes is a valid presumption, a valid assumption, or a valid basis on which Western policy and American policy can proceed.

I think change has taken place in Eastern Europe in the 40 years since Soviet domination was established. Diversity has reasserted itself—it was never totally wiped away in any case. Relationships have been established with various degrees of intensity, breadth, and depth between non-Communist countries and those countries of Eastern Europe that are ruled by Communist parties within the Soviet political orbit. And, as I have indicated, there are many dilemmas and uncertainties that face Soviet leaders, including the new leadership now coming into power in the Soviet Union in how to organize and arrange matters in this empire established in the post-World War II era.

CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE THAT THE WEST CAN ENCOURAGE

But, change there has been, and change there continues to be. I believe, as a general proposition, that it is in the interests of the United States and of the West to encourage that change, to encourage diverse views, to encourage the tendencies of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe to look for opportunities for more relationships and contacts with the West, to encourage the quite evident desire for peace and relaxation of frictions, tensions, and divisions that exists all through the region of Eastern Europe.

Some of that became quite manifest during the crisis which the Soviets manufactured over the deployment of the intermediate range nuclear forces in Western Europe 2 years ago, when there were clear indications of uneasiness, resentment, and bitterness in Eastern Europe.

It is those tendencies, it seems to me, that we have to continue to examine with the greatest care and encourage, where we can, through what we do overselves, jointly or in harmony with our friends and allies in Western Europe, though we don't have to be totally congruent. There, I believe, lies the route for Western policy, rather than either the counsel of despair, which holds that nothing can be changed, or the counsel of recklessness, which holds that only an explosion and a cataclysmic series of events will improve the lot of the populations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

I believe those alternatives we should and must reject.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

THE WARSAW PACT

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much for that fine statement.

For purposes of clarity, let me define the membership of the Warsaw Pact with you. I know that the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are members, but I am

uncertain if Albania and Bulgaria are still members, or if they were members originally. Is Yugoslavia a member?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Romania is a member of it. Bulgaria is a member of it, but Yugoslavia is not and Albania is not.

Senator PRESSLER. How have those two countries escaped joining it? They are within the Soviet bloc. Was Albania originally a signatory to it?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Albania was a signatory in 1955, but left in, I believe, 1968. It became an ally of China, and during the peak of the split between China and the Soviet Union, Albania left all the institutions created by the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia had its quarrel with the Soviet Union before the Warsaw Pact came into existence, and, therefore, the question never really arose, although there are some indications that the Soviets were trying to induce the Yugoslavs to establish some special relationship with the Warsaw Pact after the tentative reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1955. But Yugoslavia has rejected that and has remained nonaligned.

Senator PRESSLER. So, Albania and Yugoslavia have managed to succeed in staying out of an institution that the Soviets value highly. This is unusual, as we usually think that behind the Iron Curtain the Soviets pretty much call the shots. Of course, perhaps Albania's friendship with China allowed it to achieve some degree of independence.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Albania's friendship with China, in the meantime, has also wilted.

The Albanians are rather individualistic, and it has not proved easy for any external power to maintain total dominance in Albania.

Senator PRESSLER. Let us discuss very briefly some of the member countries and how much they participate in the Warsaw Pact. Is the Warsaw Pact merely an excuse to have Russian troops stationed in Eastern Europe? What about Bulgaria? Are there Russian troops there?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I believe I am correct in saying that the only countries in which Soviet units are stationed in substantial numbers are East Germany, Czechoslovakia since 1968, Hungary, basically since the war but in particular since 1956, and Poland. Soviet forces were withdrawn from Romania in connection with the Austrian state treaty of 1955, and there are no major Soviet units permanently stationed in Bulgaria, although there are all kinds of facilities and liaison groups and there are occasional maneuvers.

Senator PRESSLER. So, Soviet troops are stationed in four countries besides the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact consists of seven countries, four of which have Soviet troops actively stationed there.

What about Hungary? Is the Hungarian Government an eager and willing participant?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, it is hard to say that Hungary is "eager", or "willing." It has really little alternative.

I think an interesting thing about Hungary, though, is since the Soviet reinvasion or reoccupation of Hungary at the time of the revolution there in 1956, the Hungarian Communist leadership, under Kadar, has managed to make some rather impressive

changes in the character of the regime, in the organization of the economy, and in several other aspects of Hungarian life—culture, contact with the outside world, and so on.

I think that may very well have proven possible because the Soviets were willing to see it happen, since they had the insurance of their troops there. I think the Hungarians have rather skillfully used the presence of Soviet forces on their territory to achieve a good many of the aims for which people revolted in 1956—not all the aims, but some of them.

So, I think that while the Hungarians probably would prefer not to have any Soviet forces there, they are not too obtrusive. They keep them pretty much out of sight.

Undoubtedly, the people would prefer not to have them there if they had their choice. But, they have used them to some extent rather skillfully for their own purposes.

Senator PRESSLER. You mentioned that the Soviets have deployed SS-21's, 22's, and 23's in Czechoslovakia. Are those weapons also in East Germany, but not in Poland? Or are they in Poland also?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I am not aware of them in Poland.

Of course, they are mobile systems, the ones you are referring to, and they could, theoretically, be anywhere.

Senator PRESSLER. What about Hungary?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. This is a matter that probably Government people would have to testify to, but I don't recall seeing any reference to these modernized systems in Hungary. They are, of course, modernized versions of what are known as SCUDS, FROGS, and SS-12's. It may well be that the Soviet forces in Hungary have had SCUDS and FROGS, but whether they have the successor systems, I don't know.

There has also been some reporting occasionally about the installation of SS-22's in Bulgaria.

Those systems are hard to distinguish, I understand, from their predecessor SS-12, or Scaleboard weapons, and, therefore, it is not entirely clear. But, the ranges of the SS-22's, in particular, would suggest that stationing them in Bulgaria would open some targeting possibilities for those systems in Italy, Sicily and elsewhere that might be of interest to the Soviets.

Senator PRESSLER. Do they have those weapons in Bulgaria? Would the Soviets like to place them there?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I am simply not informed. There have been reports to that effect.

Senator PRESSLER. OK. Fine.

Are there Soviet missiles in Hungary, Yugoslavia, or Romania, even though Yugoslavia is not a member of the pact?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, certainly not in Yugoslavia, which, in any event, is not part of the Warsaw Pact and wouldn't accept Soviet weapons. The Romanians appear to have fended off anything of that sort pretty successfully.

Senator PRESSLER. Turning to East Germany for one minute, I was fascinated with the decision to embrace Martin Luther on the 500th anniversary of his birth. The German Democratic Republic celebrated him, whereas West Germany lost most of the public relations value to the East. It was an interesting decision for a Communist country.

On another matter, the East Germans seem to be the Soviet's best ally in the Warsaw Pact.

Is that a correct assumption?

Would you analyze East Germany and how it functions in the Warsaw Pact?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, the East Germans probably are the single most influential and, in many respects, powerful member of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator PRESSLER. Aside from the Soviet Union.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Outside the Soviet Union; yes.

Their military forces are considered to be quite effective and well trained, although there are periodic defections from them to the West.

The East German's geographic location, is, of course, a key interest to the Soviet Union because that is where the arrow points at the West. It is essentially the point of furthest advance after the Second World War, right to the center of Europe, and that has now been the case for the last 40 years.

So, it is more than any other Russian rulers have ever achieved, even those who managed to get as far as Paris in the Napoleonic Wars, but they returned.

The Soviets have probably their own best forces, best trained and best equipped forces, in the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany.

There have been signs in recent years that the East German population is restless and is, in particular, subject to the impressions that it obtains through access to television, travel, and visits from the Federal Republic of Germany.

I think, in order to take account of this, the East German regime has, in recent years under Honecker, been prepared to experiment with more active relations and contacts with the Federal Republic in particular, but with some other Western countries as well.

I think the Soviets have been ambivalent about that.

On the one hand, they do not mind seeing the East Germans creating hopes in West Germany of some ultimate progress toward unity in Germany, because the Soviets believe that that will distract the West Germans from their Western connections.

On the other hand, the Soviets clearly do not want to encourage such sentiments excessively in East Germany, because they wish to retain their dominant position politically and militarily in the center of Europe.

Probably these tendencies have given some rise in Soviet assessments to questions concerning the ultimate reliability of the forces of the East German Peoples Army.

I would suppose this to be the case. I would not have any very concrete evidence.

And, as I indicated in my preliminary remarks, this might be a special Soviet concern as they think through scenarios involving longer wars, fighting that would last weeks and months rather than just a few days.

But, short of such factors, I would rate the East German Armed Forces as probably the best in the Warsaw Pact, apart from those of the Soviet Union.

Senator PRESSLER. Is the Warsaw Pact analogous to NATO?

Do the countries of the Warsaw Pact put troops and money in on any kind of formula, or does the Soviet Union finance most of the effort?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. They undoubtedly pay into the Warsaw Pact and undoubtedly bear some of the costs for the stationing of Soviet forces on their territories.

I am not familiar with the formula that may be operating in this regard. I have no doubt, given the meticulousness with which Soviet bureaucrats and apparachiks deal with such matters, that there are formulas.

I don't think necessarily that they involve only cash payments. They undoubtedly involve services of various kinds as well as industrial and other kinds of deliveries.

But, the Soviet Union does not bear the full costs of the maintenance of its forces in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. In terms of crisis command and control, the Soviets have forgone the use of both the combined armed forces and the combined command in favor of direct control by Soviet officers.

Given this precedent, how reliable do you consider the Warsaw Pact to be in the event of a crisis outside of Eastern Europe, and how would this affect our calculation of needed force ratios on the central front?

In addition, would you please explain how the command structure works in the Warsaw Pact in times of crisis?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, there is a command structure in which the members of the Warsaw Pact from Eastern Europe participate. Theoretically, at least, the commanding officers of the Warsaw Pact forces in each East European country are the ministers of defense of those countries. They also serve as deputy commanders in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces.

But, there can be very little doubt that the real command of the Warsaw Pact forces rests with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet general staff. There are Soviet liaison people in high places all throughout the military establishments of the East European countries.

So, I would guess that, in a real crisis situation, and even more in a war situation, the command authority, the command and control, would revert, essentially, to Soviet channels and Soviet individuals.

Now, in my opinion this would create some problems in terms of actually commanding the minute to minute, hour to hour, day to day operations of the national forces that are part of the Warsaw Pact. This could well prove to be a flaw in the military posture of the Warsaw Pact if a conflict, or for that matter a crisis, extended over a substantial period of time. But, I think that in any short-term situation, the Soviets can probably manage with the kinds of channels and arrangements that they have made.

Senator PRESSLER. I thank you very much.

Other Senators may well have questions to submit to you, but I think you have given us some very excellent testimony, and I thank you very much.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you.

Excuse me. Did you want me to stay with the others or am I discharged?

Senator PRESSLER. You are discharged unless you want to stay and add something later.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, I have a little time, and if I may, I will listen and I might chime in at some point.

Senator PRESSLER. All right.

Next I will call forth a panel on Eastern Europe. It will consist of Dr. Jiri Valenta, director, Soviet-East European and strategic studies, University of Miami, and Dr. Dale Herspring, congressional fellow, House Armed Services Committee.

Dr. Valenta received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins in 1975, with previous studies in economics and nuclear technology in Prague. Before his current position, Dr. Valenta was Coordinator of Soviet and East European studies in the Department of National Security Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He has been the recipient of numerous fellowships, including those from the University of Berne, Johns Hopkins, the Brookings Institute, and the Rockefeller Center in Italy.

He is the author of numerous books on subjects such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Soviet decisionmaking for national security, Soviet-Cuban policy, and Soviet involvement in the developing world.

We welcome Dr. Valenta to the Senate.

STATEMENT OF JIRI VALENTA, DIRECTOR, SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Mr. VALENTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the task before us, after hearing the cogent presentation of Mr. Sonnenfeldt, is to go a bit more into detail about the problems facing the Warsaw Pact alliance in the coming years, and also about how we should respond to them, be it during times of crisis or be it during peaceful developments.

Let me start with a quote from a statement of Adam Michnik, one of the founding fathers of Solidarity, who, in a way, provides an answer to the second question; that is, what should be done on the part of the United States to formulate a policy toward Eastern Europe.

Let me quote Michnik, Mr. Chairman. He said:

> The conviction always existed in Poland that the West would betray us. This was so in the time of the partition of Poland, in the time of Napoleon during the national uprisings, and during the time of Yalta. Before December 13, 1981, no one in Poland expected that the West could help us in political catastrophies. What happened thereafter has surprised me. The Western sanctions against the Jaruzelski government have generally been considered to be an act of solidarity with the Polish people and their activities. I believe that the sanctions, if they were intended that way by Western politicians, have fulfilled their role throughout the entire time.

This is an interesting perception which sets the right tone for our discussion. But before turning to American foreign policy, let us go back to the first question which we want to answer today, the problems in the Warsaw Pact.

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF SECURITY

I believe there are several crucial points which we should discuss today which pertains to and include the Warsaw Pact. The first of them is the Soviet concept of security in the Warsaw Pact. I would suggest that it is predicated, unlike the United States' concept of security vis-a-vis its neighbors, on the maintenance of Leninist politico-ideological and economic systems compatible with the Soviets' own internal system.

In other words, Soviet security is much more broadly defined than our own concept of security, in the Caribbean basin and Latin America. While we mainly care about the physical threat to our security, the Soviets worry also about politico-ideological threats.

Second, the Leninist system, which the Soviets try to maintain in Eastern Europe, is unsuited to most of the East European nations, which, in varying degrees, differ historically and culturally from the Soviet Union.

The third point, of course, is that this kind of basic security incompatibility of the system with the societies of Eastern Europe has led and I think will very likely lead in the future, to difficulties. Though we cannot say today when and how, to periodic revolutionary attempts to adapt the East European Communist societies to each country's historical and cultural heritage.

The fourth point is that Soviet's inability to recognize the basic problem, which I suggested in items one, two, and three, has led to the various armed conflicts in Europe since World War II—the Hungarian intervention, the East German intervention, the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the indirect interventions in Poland.

Such interventions in the future might occasion still larger conflicts with inestimable consequences for the United States.

This leads to the fifth point about American foreign policy. The United States has sought to promote evolutionary change of a democratic, nationalistic nature in Eastern Europe since 1949. Unfortunately, however, I would argue that only modest systematic changes have occurred, and these were not necessarily the fruits of U.S. foreign policy.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that the need to reassess traditional U.S. policy toward the region is becoming more apparent than ever, given the basic problems which I have suggested.

Let me make a few observations about some of the points which I have made. The first point about the Soviet concept of security is obvious. The main Soviet security concern in Eastern Europe, in the Warsaw Pact, contrary to prevailing belief, is ideological deviation, the political deviation of neighboring countries and its spillover into the Soviet Union. That seems to be the main problem, if you look at the Polish crisis, to take one example, and is surely the case in the Czech crisis. Polish developments did not directly threaten Soviet physical security. In fact, Polish Solidarity clearly stated that it was not going to interfere with the overall Soviet security system in Poland. Yet, Soviet-backed intervention by Polish security forces followed.

The problem of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact is the other allies' organic rejection of the Leninist system, which is

simply unsuitable to the various historical and cultural traditions in this region. Contrary to these traditions, the Soviet political system is rooted in the despotism of Tatar and Czarist rule, the messianic pretentions of Byzantium, and the descendant Leninist dogma of centralized autocratic government.

This point has been made very accurately by a Yugoslav writer in a very important book published recently. In "Communism's Crossroads," Mr. Stanic suggests that the Soviets' continued insistence that their system be accepted as "the only workable system," even though their "historical, civilizational, national, social, and economic conditions" are "quite different" from those in Eastern Europe, is causing the basic problems and the intermittent periods of conflict and intervention.

THE SOVIET'S HEGEMONIC POLICIES: THE MAIN IMPEDIMENT TO A STRONG WARSAW PACT

The Soviet Union, with its hegemonic policies, continues to be the main obstacle to what you might call organic, healthy relations within the Soviet alliance. There have been numerous demonstrations of this in the past, Mr. Chairman, in particular the Soviet interventions we have already mentioned. These were either conducted by the Soviet Army, or by such proxies as local national armies or security forces.

This is very ironic because the military interventions which were supposed to enhance the security of those nations actually helped to make the nationalistic armies of the Warsaw Pact rather unreliable. Some would argue that the Czech Army, after the intervention of 1968, is rather unreliable in any warlike situation. Others would also point to the Soviet backed coup in Poland as in some way humiliating and preoccupying the Polish Army. The Polish Army, as you know, is the key East European Army in the warfare strategy of the Warsaw Pact military coalition, but it can hardly be relied on in any operation outside Polish territory.

FUTURE CRISES

Let me talk about possible future crises. We have had many crises in Europe, and it was the U.S.S.R., not the United States, which interjected the military interventions in Europe after the Second World War, a point which is often forgotten. As to future crises, it is hard to predict them, as I said in the beginning of my presentation, but they are bound to occur.

I would, of course, warn against any predictions or perhaps optimistic or pessimistic illusions about the impending disintegration of the Soviet empire. This will not happen, and surely the Kremlin does not believe this will happen.

The renewal of Soviet defense treaties with the Warsaw Pact countries in the spring of this year suggested that the Soviets would like to have things in Eastern Europe stay the way they are for a long time to come. There has been no significant change in those treaties, from the long duration of the renewal period of the treaties to the continuing, basically unequal status of each East European ally implied therein.

EXPLOSIVE CONFLICTS IN EASTERN EUROPE?

Nevertheless, I would not exclude explosive conflicts, if the history of the pact serves as a guide. Let me just state some basic problems which support this belief. One problem, of course, is politico-ideological stagnation. Nothing new has happened in Eastern Europe and nothing new is happening.

There is also moral decay. My colleagues will surely talk about the socio-economic problems, but there are also problems of tacit disagreement over security and foreign policy matters which emerge in some muted degree even among such close allies as East Germany and the Soviet Union. It remains to be seen how long the Soviet Union will be able to maintain its inflexible position in Eastern Europe.

While Soviet subsidies to Eastern Europe gradually declined from 1980 to 1985, so did the terms of Soviet-East European trade. Economic stagnation continues or worsens, while arms spending of the Warsaw Pact nations remains the same or increases. For example, in Hungary, 15 percent of the GNP is spent today on the defense budget.

This is coupled, of course, with the process of succession, both in the U.S.S.R. and in Eastern Europe. I do not believe, according to the prevailing school of thought, that Mikhail Gorbachev has fully consolidated his position. We yet have to see if he will become the truly unchallenged leader of the Kremlin. I think that the handling of the Polish crisis over the Father Popiuleszko affair clearly suggested some divisions within the Polish leadership, but also perhaps in the Kremlin.

These new problems are combined with the deeply rooted systemic problems I already talked about, and I believe that they will feed instability, and under propitious conditions, will spark new crises.

We should also be concerned about the successions and potential crises in Albania and Yugoslavia, which are not members of the Warsaw Pact. There are varied signs of instability which could aid the continuous Soviet desire to bring these two countries into the pact.

For Yugoslavia, we have a U.S. policy aimed at preservation of the neutral integrity of the nation, and perhaps we should develop something similar toward Albania. I think there is an opportunity for this now that the long-time leader has died.

WHAT SHOULD U.S. POLICY BE?

Very briefly, what should be our overall policy? I suggested a reassessment at the beginning of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The main reason for this reassessment is that there have been only modest systemic changes in Eastern Europe in the last 40 years. There is a second, perhaps even more important reason. The Soviets' continuing assertive behavior in the various regions, including the United States periphery, the Caribbean Basin, which even the Soviets call the United States' strategic backyard, brings about a new strategic situation and perhaps some thought should be given to it.

I believe that the promotion of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe remains a worthwhile objective. But, I also believe that we

should define the nature of the changes that we are seeking to accomplish. We have not done so very well in the past.

I also believe that we should differentiate even more sharply among the Warsaw Pact allies, and also perhaps link the Soviet policies in the Caribbean with our policies in Eastern Europe. That is a matter which should be examined carefully and cautiously.

The United States should clearly spell out its original objective in Eastern Europe, which, as you know, Mr. Chairman, has been the creation of neutral buffer states not hostile to the U.S.S.R., yet with political systems based on self-determination.

We have somehow forgotten the original objective. Indeed, it would be naive to think that this goal is obtainable in the foreseeable future, as this objective of American foreign policy is basically incongruent with Soviet objectives in the region.

Meanwhile, however, the Soviets are clearly stating their most desirable long-term objectives at the United States periphery: creation of anti-American, pro-Soviet regimes, like in Cuba, and Nicaragua. And, before October 1983, if we can believe the Grenada papers, even in a tiny country like Grenada the Soviets had ambitions.

We should, indeed, promote evolutionary policies in Eastern Europe, but we should more sharply differentiate among the Warsaw Pact allies. The Polish example and Mr. Michnik's statement illustrate that we have some leverage, at least in some nations. The U.S. economic sanctions vis-a-vis Poland did not help to restore the legality of Solidarity, but they did seriously hurt the repressive Polish regime, as admitted by that regime.

In the judgment of Solidarity activists, also, they helped to mitigate against even harsher policies against Solidarity favored by the hardliners in the Polish party. As Mr. Michnik also said, "I am today free because of those sanctions." At least in his view, those sanctions worked. They should not be lightly tossed aside.

I also believe that the sanctions were a clear manifestation of the U.S. policy of peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe, a much more creative policy than the one following the Czechoslovak invasion, where we did not do anything, and accepted subsequent crushing of the Czechoslovak peaceful revolution as an accomplished fact.

I also believe that we should devise policy guidelines for effective, preventive diplomacy in the face of an impending Warsaw Pact crises. I believe they are in the picture. I don't know what their nature will be, and I think it is not very prudent to speculate where they might happen at this time, Mr. Chairman.

We should also avoid conveying the impression of indifference, as we did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nevertheless, we should likewise foreswear the empty rhetoric of the crusade for democracy, which instilled unfounded hopes before the Hungarian crisis of 1956.

I believe that a creative preventive approach of this kind was seen during the Polish crisis, where both administrations broke with the past and "stuck their necks out," particularly the Carter administration with its policies of mounting a worldwide campaign focusing attention on Poland and disseminating information about the Soviet military buildup. Mr. Chairman, both alerted the world and

Solidarity leaders, and perhaps helped to mitigate, as Doctor Zbigniew Brzezinski believes, against the invasion of Poland.

This is a serious issue which should be further examined.

Surely the Polish crisis suggests that we have a number of instruments which can be used effectively. We can be more active without endangering the peace, even though our interests in Eastern Europe are not vital.

We should also aim at preventing a nationalist explosion in Yugoslavia and Albania, as I suggested before.

Finally, and this is perhaps the most important point, we should not give up completely or under all circumstances the strategy of exacerbating instability in countries of the Soviet strategic backyard.

The promotion of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe is not an end in itself. But, by carefully calculating and reassessing this option, we should presume the equal right, like the Soviets do in Nicaragua and the Cubans in El Salvador, to selectively aid and abet anti-Soviet forces in case of crisis by a variety of means, not excluding military aid.

We hope that this will not be necessary. But, I think we should communicate to Secretary Gorbachev at the coming meeting in Geneva that arms control is not an end in itself, that crisis control and prevention of regional conflicts are also important, and that progress in the solution of these conflicts is one of the necessary conditions to expanded arms control talks and the avoidance of superpower conflicts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Valenta's prepared statement follows:]

SOVIET "SECURITY" AND COMING CRISES IN THE WARSAW PACT: TOWARD A REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICIES

(By Jiri Valenta)

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"The conviction always existed in Poland that the West would betray us. This was so in the time of the partition of Poland, in the time of Napoleon during the national uprisings, and during the time of Yalta. Before 13 December 1981, no one in Poland expected that the West could help us in political catastrophes. What happened thereafter has surprised me. The Western sanctions against the Jaruzelski government have generally been considered to be an act of solidarity with the Polish people and their activities. I believe that the sanctions, if they were intended that way by Western politicians, have fulfilled their role throughout the entire time."

(Adam Michnik, one of the founders of the Polish Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) in an interview with *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), November 12, 1984, p. 153.)

In the late 1980s the Warsaw Pact organization could undergo significant changes which in turn could influence Soviet regional and international behavior. The new Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev could succeed in further consolidating Soviet hegemony within the bloc or it could face serious systemic problems similar

to those caused by the Polish crisis of early 1980 which seriously challenged Soviet hegemony. Developments inside the Warsaw Pact might also affect Soviet capacity and willingness to pursue outside global interests and imperial ambitions.

Although country and regional trends are difficult to foresee, the issue of Warsaw Pact cohesion can be given context and focus by considering the following hypotheses: (1) The Soviet concept of security, as it pertains to and includes the Warsaw Pact, is predicated, unlike the U.S. concept of security vis-a-vis its neighbors, on the maintenance of a Lenninist politico-ideological and economic system compatible with the Soviets' own internal system; (2) This Leninist system is unsuited to the Eastern European nations which, in varying degrees, differ historically and culturally from the Soviet Union; (3) The incompatibility of the system with the societies of Eastern Europe has led and will very likely lead in the future to periodic revolutionary attempts to adapt the Communist societies of Eastern Europe to each country's historical and cultural heritage; (4) Soviet inability to recognize the basic incongruency of their system in the East European environment has led to various armed conflicts in Europe since World War II and in the future could trigger a large-scale conflict in Poland or elsewhere in the region, with incalculable consequences; (5) For years U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe has sought to promote evolutionary change of a democratic, nationalistic nature. However, in the Post-Khruschev era only modest systemic changes have occurred and these were not necessarily the fruits of U.S. policy. The need to reasses traditional U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe becomes more apparent when one examines these five salient conditions which define the East European predicament.

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "SECURITY"

The Soviet concept of security vis-a-vis Eastern Europe is much broader than the parallel concept of security vis-a-vis the Caribbean Basin. Experiences of East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968-69 and Poland both in 1956 and 1980–81 demonstrate the broad dimensions of the Soviet concept of security, which includes the maintenance of rigid politico-ideological systems compatible with the Soviets' own internal system.

In contrast to the *real* security concerns of the U.S. regarding hostile military alliances (real or potential) at its periphery, the foremost Soviet preoccupation in Eastern Europe has become primarily ideological deviation and its possible spillover from neighboring countries into the Soviet Union. Unlike American policymakers, Soviet leaders are concerned that a more humanitarian, democratic form of government, e.g. the "socialism with a human face" envisioned by Czechoslovak party leader Alexander Dubeck in the 1960s or the free trade union Solidarity in 1980, might "infect" other Warsaw Pact countries and ultimately Soviet citizens in the non-Russian national republics of the Soviet West, thereby weakening the Leninist system from within.

Soviet perceived "security" stakes were most clearly profiled in Czechoslovakia (1968–69) and in Poland (1980–81). In both cases the Kremlin was not concerned that either country would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact as Hungary did under the leadership of Communist prime minister Imre Nagy in 1956. (Actually, it can be argued that Imre Nagy, who knew Soviet rules of the game, pulled Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact not as a deliberate policy intended to provoke the Soviets, but rather as an act of desperation taken in the face of increasing Soviet intimidation and military deployment on Hungarian territory.) Having learned from the Hungarian experience, both Mr. Dubcek and the Solidarity leaders had pledged to respect the Soviets' two iron-clad rules concerning a) Soviet external security requirements and b) the leading role of the Communist parties inside their countries. Nonetheless, democratization of the party and the abolition of censorship inside Czechoslovakia were considered intolerable deviations from Leninism—as was legalization of the free trade unions inside Poland.

THE ORGANIC REJECTION OF LENINIST SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Zbigniew Brzezinski aptly suggests that the crucial security phenomenon in Eastern Europe can be best described with a phrase borrowed from contemporary medicine, i.e., the "organic rejection of alien [Leninist] systems grafted upon societies with altogether different historical and cultural traditions." [1] Similar terminology

[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski's address at the Meeting for Members and Their Sons and Daughters, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, December 20, 1984.

was used by former counselor of the Department of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt who warned a congressional committee in 1976 of the danger of complacency over the lack of an "organic" relationship between the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact nations.[2]

The Kremlin doesn't understand, or does not care to heed the fact that Leninism is radically unsuited to the Warsaw Pact nations. Leaving the complex case of Yugoslavia aside, this is particularly true of the Central European nations: Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. The Soviet political system is rooted in the despotism of Tatar and Czarist rule, the messianic pretentions of Byzantium, and the descendant Leninist dogma of centralized autocratic government.

The East European countries, in contrast, have inherited a predominently Western political and cultural tradition and, at one time or another, all have practiced some form of constitutional government. Thus, during the crises in Poland (1956 and 1980–81), Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) an attempt was made, if only briefly and unsuccessfully, to adapt communism to the social and cultural fabric of a region which, until recently, was known as East-Central Europe. It was not accidental, therefore, that revolutionary ferment occurred here and, with the exception of Yugoslavia (a special case), to a much lesser degree in the more eastern, Balkan countries.

In spite of differences, the roots of all the above crises lay in the organic incompatibility of the Leninist system with the East-Central European environment. In each episode the population had become progressively dissatisfied with existing political and economic conditions, especially the suppression of individual liberties and the Sovietization of the way of life. Such primarily internal factors led to power struggles and polarization of the leadership between reformers and discredited politicians and, subsequently, the rumblings of revolutionary type change. The roots of East European crisis, as Yugoslav writer and former Moscow correspondent of the Ljubljana daily *Delo* Janez Stanic explained in an important book, *Communism's Crossroads*, lies in the Soviets' continued insistence that their system has to be accepted as "the only workable one" even though their "historical, civilizational, national, social and economic conditions" are "quite different" from those in Eastern Europe. It is this continuous Soviet stubbornness and rigidity which generate "greater or lesser degrees of tension" in the Pact and subsequent security problems. The Soviet Union, with its hegemonic policies, continues to be the main obstacle to organic, relations within the Soviet alliance system.[3]

SOVIET INTERVENTIONISM AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

As demonstrated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, more recently in Poland, the continuing existence of Leninist systems in Eastern Europe is vital to the Soviets' concept of Warsaw Pact security. When confronted with developments that challenge their broadly defined perception of security, as occurred in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Soviet leaders argue that that they have a right to use military force, if necessary to protect their interests. Another drastic solution available to them is to pressure the guilty country's military and security leaders to intervene on their own and thereby preempt a threatened Soviet invasion. This happened in Poland on December 13, 1981.

One thing that can be ascertained from the events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland is that the Soviet response to such developments is not automatic. Another is that the Soviets are determined not to permit either Finlandization or even pluralistic communism in Eastern Europe. Direct and indirect Soviet interventions demonstrate the narrow limits of autonomy set by the Soviet leadership and continue to serve as warnings to others who in the future may step beyond these confines.

The irony herein is that Soviet insistence on ideological orthodoxy undermines Eastern Europe's effectiveness as a military buffer and thereby its real security value to the USSR. The repressive "normalization" of Czechoslovakia in the 1970s rendered the Czechoslovak Army, which had been traditionally friendly to the Russians, rather unreliable. Similarly, the Soviet backed coup in Poland humiliated and preoccupied the Polish Army—and the Polish Army is the key East European army in the warfare strategy of the Warsaw Pact military coalition. Given the ongoing instability in Poland, it is still questionable whether the Soviets can rely on the Polish Army's participation in any operation outside Polish territory.

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[2] "State Department Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeld," New York Times, April 6, 1976, pp. 1 and 14.

[3] Janez Stanic is a former Yugoslav correspondent of Ljublana daily *Delo* in Moscow. Excerpt from books are found in *Radio Free Europe Research*, January 19, 1981.

True, while Moscow displayed an equal degree of sensitivity toward the emergency of pluralism in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, it chose different means of intervening and different policies during the so-called "normalization" periods following the interventions. The post-invasion periods in Hungary and Czechloslovakia have marked differences, with greater importance attached to the preservation of political orthodoxy in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary. The course of "normalization" in Poland is ongoing and has yet to be qualified. However, so far Soviet behavior during and after each crisis in Eastern Europe suggests that while Moscow is willing to be tactically flexible (allowing, for example, Kadarization, e.g. Kadar's unique system for economic liberalization in Hungary), it is unwilling to modify its strategic thinking about Eastern Europe or to redefine its politico-ideological concept of East European security.

What we know about Soviet-East European relations are bound to the conclusion that popular outbursts and inter-bloc conflicts are bound to occur again. However, we should not harbor overly optimistic illusions about the "impending disintegration" of the Soviet empire. It will thrive for a long time to come, in spite of challenges from dissatisfied East European "allies." To be sure, this was the consensus of the Kremlin when in the spring of 1985 it renewed Soviet defense treaties with the Warsaw Pact countries for another 20 years. The long duration of the renewal period of the treaties and the continuing unequal status of the East European allies, implied in treaty terms, reflect Soviet unwillingness to allow any change in the relationship.

Developments within the Warsaw Pact can only be described in terms of a gradual stagnation or what some would even describe as putrification. However, this process is proceeding slowly. To be sure, the path will be marked by unexpected challenges, perhaps even of an explosive nature, if the history of the Pact serves as a guide. One cannot, of course, predict when, where and how these challenges will occur. Yet the Warsaw Pact appears to be approaching in a period of multi-dimensional troubles, if not severe crisis.

First, there exist already obvious symptoms of politico-ideological stagnation coupled with moral decay, serious socio-economic problems, and in some countries hidden political conflict. Though the organized dissident movement is very limited in most of Eastern Europe, Soviet hegemony is resented (in different degrees) in most of the nations of the region, perhaps with the exception of pro-Russian Bulgaria. As much if not more resented is the pro-Soviet orintation of the ruling nomenklatura in most of these countries.

The most remarkable aspect of developments before and following the Polish crisis in the 1980s has been the absence of new ideas or new ideological concepts on the part of the Soviet and East European establishment, in sharp contrast to the period preceding it during the 1960s. The concept of so-called real socialism is certainly not innovative. It serves only as an ideological justification for the already existing Leninist system and its adjustment to national peculiarities. The very term itself actually implies that the concept of socialism is given once and for all and that it cannot be reformed and probably not even perfected.

Ideological stagnation, as noted, is coupled with moral decay, which is present in different degrees in all of the Warsaw Pact countries. The decay is manifested by cynicism, contempt for other human beings, opportunism, and wide-spread corruption. Earlier hopes for reform and a renaissance of communism are clearly gone, except possibly in Hungary.

In addition, the Soviet leaders are confronted with serious economic difficulties and stagnation in most of the countries in the region. To be sure, economic difficulties are of a different nature in each East European country. A burgeoning hard currency debt to the West exists only in Poland. Yet most of the nations have not succeeded in dramatically reducing their debt through the program of austerity and import restrictions imposed in the wake of the Polish crisis. The region's hard currency debt to the West grew between 1980 and 1985 from 54.2 billion to $62.5 billion. Indeed, most economists would argue that continuing stagnation and stalled economic growth in Eastern Europe are serious enough to contribute to greater instability in the region. Like the nations at the U.S. periphery in Latin America, some of the East European nations (surely Poland and Romania, but perhaps also Hungary) may be facing a reduced standard of living which in turn may become the catalyst for worker unrest.

There is a clear economic price which the Soviets must pay for the continued politico-ideological conformity and stability in the Warsaw Pact and they will probably continue to pay as long as they can afford to do so. Yet their ability to pay may decline significantly in the late 1980s. Indeed, Soviet subsidies to Eastern Europe have gradually declined in 1980–85 as have the terms of Soviet-East European trade.

The economic stagnation continues while arms spending of the Warsaw Pact nations does not decline. For example, in Hungary 10 percent of the GNP was said to be spent on the defense budget.[4]

Chernenko's swift succession by Gorbachev has introduced another major element of ambiguity into Soviet behavior in the coming years. The succession was preceded and coupled with factional infighting in some East European leaderships (Poland and Hungary) and so far it has not ceased. The Popiuleszko affair and its handling by the Polish leadership has put in relief the brutality of the secret police in a communist state but also the bitter struggle going on inside the Polish government. It appears that the murder of Father Popiuleszko was likely hatched by a pro-Soviet group in the Polish leadership with the ultimate objective being to discredit General Jaruzelski's associates. Mikhail Gorbachev's ongoing consolidation of power (he is not yet the unchallenged leader in the Kremlin as it is generally assumed) may be accompanied by an augmentation of infighting within the East European leaderships and by the forthcoming succession of Kadar in Hungary, Husak in Czechoslovakia and Zhivkov in Bulgaria. These new problems, combined with the already deep rooted systemic problems inherent in the Warsaw Pact nations ill-suited systems, will continue to feed instability and, under propitious conditions, spark new crisis situations.

TOWARDS A REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS EASTERN EUROPE

As noted, the U.S. policy of promoting evolutionary change in Eastern Europe by peaceful (political and economic) means has produced only modest systemic changes. In light of this and the Soviets' continuing assertive behavior in various world regions, including the U.S. periphery (the Caribbean Basin or what the Soviets consider the U.S. "strategic backyard"), these policies should be reexamined. While the promotion of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe remains a worthwhile objective, U.S. policymakers should clearly define the nature of the changes they are seeking and be prepared to pursue these changes over a long period.

U.S. policy has tried to promote a gradual modification of the pro-Soviet Leninist security system in Eastern Europe into a grouping of more independent, democratic though not anti-Soviet states. The ultimate aim of this policy, which originated after the Soviet-Yugoslav break of 1948–49, was to encourage the appearance of "non-totalitarian administration" willing to participate "in the free world community," in other words, what has become known as the Finlandization of Eastern Europe. Essentially this policy has not changed, even during the era of John Foster Dulles' rhetoric about "rolling back Communism" and the "liberation of captive nations" in the 1950s. Today it is necessary to 1) restate this goal; 2) sharply differentiate among the East European regimes in terms of policy; 3) anticipate so as to help prevent crises in the region; and 4) link U.S. policies in Eastern Europe with those of the USSR and Cuba in the Caribbean Basin.

Rooted in the Wilsonian heritage of self-determination, the U.S. policy of promoting evolutionary, democratic change in Eastern Europe found support among the large immigrant communities, some of whom had known democracy in Eastern Europe before the war. (Recall that the most democratic country in the region before World War II was Czechoslovakia whose political system was modelled on the U.S. system.) However, after the war U.S. policies in Eastern Europe became at least in part a function of overall Soviet-American relations, as well as a function of U.S. policies toward Western Europe. The United States has not tried to use military power to further its objectives in Eastern Europe, primarily because the vital national interests of this country have not been perceived as being directly threatened by Soviet domination of the region. Strong diplomacy backed by military power was not even used in 1945–48 to make the USSR live up to the Yalta agreement promising democratic elections in Eastern Europe. Some analysts argue that such a policy (strong diplomacy backed by military power) worked in other areas at the Soviet periphery (Iran and Finland) at that time because the U.S. had a nuclear monopoly. Such policies, which helped to achieve "Finlandization" in Finland and forced the Soviets to withdraw from northern Iran, also could have been used effectively in Eastern Europe.[5]

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[4] Interview with former Hungarian prime minister Andras Hegedus, Corriere Della Serra, Milan, July 26, 1984, p. 8. Also see Charles Gati, "Soviet Empire, Alive but Not Well," Problems of Communism, March-August 1985, pp. 73–85.

[5] An interview with Adam Ulam, Radio Free Europe Research (RAD) Background Report, 14 (Eastern Europe), February 21, 1985.

In the past U.S. behavior has belied a clear linkage between assertive global behavior by the Soviets and U.S. policy in Eastern Europe. Thus, during the Korean War (summer of 1950 to the end of 1952) the United States conducted secret paramiltary operations in Poland consisting of air-dropping agents and military equipment to the anti-Communist opposition movement.[6] On the other hand, during detente in the 1970s the United States to a large degree subordinated its policies in Eastern Europe to the overall policy of detente with the USSR and even recognized legitimate security interests of the USSR in the region.

Promotion of evolutionary change in Eastern has been official U.S. policy for 36 years. With time this policy began to differentiate among the Soviet Warsaw Pact countries based on the criteria of foreign policy independence (from the USSR) and domestic liberalization. Later, however, policymakers seemed to lose sight of this original objective and failed to differentiate sharply enough among the various Soviet allies. Had this policy been more clearly articulated, U.S. policymakers could have more easily devised a policy of preventive diplomacy prior to and during the the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968. Moreover, the United States ceased to see U.S. Policies in Eastern Europe as being linked to U.S.-Soviet competition in other regions, e.g., U.S. policies in Eastern Europe became a set of tactics begging a strategic dimension.

How can U.S. Policy be improved in the coming years and how can policymakers better exploit future opportunities available in the region?

A. *The U.S. should clearly spell out its original objective in Eastern Europe:* Finlandization, e.g., creation of a neutral buffer of states non-hostile to the USSR but having political systems based on self-determination. To be sure, this objective is incompatible with the Soviets' broadly defined security interests in the region today. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. should be shy about stating its own most desirable long-term objectives at the Soviet periphery in Eastern Europe; the Soviets are clearly stating their most desirable long-term objectives at the U.S. periphery in the Caribbean Basin: creation of anti-American, pro-Soviet regimes like in Cuba, Nicaragua and (before October 1983) Grenada (see *Grenada Papers).*

While clearly stating long-term objectives in Eastern Europe, the U.S. should knowledge that these are not easily obtainable and that it is prepared in the long term to be engaged with the Soviet Union in serious dialogue about finding an eventual formula for the diffusion of internal and external sources of crisis in the two countries' respective peripheries.

B. *The U.S. should continue to promote evolutionary policies in Eastern Europe while differentiating among the Warsaw Pact allies.* An unselective U.S. policy aimed at exacerbating Soviet problems in Eastern Europe, using punitive measures to undermine the legitimacy of the Leninist system would not be sustainable among the American electorate or U.S. NATO allies. It would also alienate the East European people. The U.S. should pursue policies of very sharp differentation among the Warsaw Pact allies. America should severely penalize regimes which support pro-Soviet foreign policies in Third World areas (Bulgaria and East Germany) or which engage in domestic oppression (the Polish regime in the early 1980s, Czechoslovakia).

Positive incentives for cooperation should be held up side by side with penalties for intransigence. The view that economic sanctions are ineffective weapons for furthering U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe is incorrect. Take Poland, for example. True, U.S. economic sanctions did not help to restore legality to Solidarity, but they did seriously hurt the repressive Polish regime and, in the judgment of Solidarity activists, they helped to mitigate against even harsher policies against Solidarity favored by hardliners in the Polish party.[8] Moreover, to many Poles and the Solidarity underground, the sanctions were a clear manifestation of the U.S. policy of peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe. They also signalled that if General Wojciech Jaruzelski was seriously willing to pursue a more pragmatic, moderate course in Poland, leading to a compromise with Solidarity, the U.S. should be prepared to move forward with further conciliatory measures.

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[6] Raymond Garthoff, "Eastern Europe in the Context of U.S.-Soviet Relations," in Sarah Terry (ed.), *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1984, p. 319.

[7] See Jiri Valenta and Herbert Ellison, *Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Crisis and the U.S./OECS Intervention, Boulder, Co., Westview 1985.*

[8] An interview with Polish Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Corriere della Serra (Milan), November 9, 1984, p.13, and an interview with Polish Deputy Premier Roman Malinovski, La Stampa, October 30, 1984, p. 5. Official Polish sources admitted that the U.S. sanctions measurably hurt the Polish economy, Rzeczpospolita, August 4, 1983, p. 3. Also, an interview with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Obodowski, Los Angeles Times, June 14, 1983.

True the effectiveness of a policy of sharp differentiation pre-supposes economic leverage vis-a-vis a targeted nation. To be truly effective the United States should have some leverage (like it has in Poland, and in Hungary and Romania to a lesser degree). It does not have such leverage vis-a-vis the most conformist regimes (Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia). However, Washington has at its disposal various instruments of diplomacy for expressing displeasure with East European regimes which actively support assertive Soviet-Cuban policies in Third World nations in the Western Hemisphere such as Nicaragua.

C. *The United States should devise policy guidelines for effective preventive diplomacy in the face of impending Warsaw Pact crisis.* Even more effectively than in the past the United States must concentrate on preventing spasms of violence on the Soviet periphery that can at the very least seriously damage East-West relations and possibly spark wider military conflicts. Prior to and during future crises, Washington should forswear the empty rhetoric of the crusade for democracy, since it may create the impression, as in Hungary in 1956, that the U.S. is willing to do more than it actually is able to do in Eastern Europe. But U.S. policymakers should also strive to avoid conveying the impression of indifference as they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Washington does not have a military option in Eastern Europe but it does have a number of economic, diplomatic and intelligence instruments at its disposal. For example, the Carter administration's policies of mounting a worldwide campaign focusing attention on Poland and its dissemination of information about the Soviet military build-up alerted the world and Solidarity leaders about Soviet preparations for possible indecision and perhaps contributed to the Soviet decision in December 1980 not to invade Poland.[9] Drawing on lessons of this most recent Polish crisis, the U.S. government, in close coordination with its allies, should design a flexible strategy of positive and negative incentives to promote peaceful changes and prevent future crises in Eastern Europe.

While concentrating on the Warsaw Pact members, U.S. policymakers should not ignore the traditional Soviet desire to bring the East European countries of Yugoslavia and Albania into the Pact. U.S. policies should be aimed at preventing a nationalist explosion in Yugoslavia and/or a Yugoslav-Albanian conflict over the Kosovo province, as both conflicts could surely be expected to be exploited by the Soviets. The United States should do its utmost to preserve the neutrality of both nations by peaceful engagement.

D. *The United States should pursue a policy of linkages.* The promotion of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe is not an end in itself. The United States should not give up completely and under all circumstances the strategy of exacerbating instability in all countries of the Soviet strategic backyard. Were Moscow to continue pursuing its anti-American, revolutionary objectives in the Caribbean Basin, the U.S. traditional sphere of influence, as it is doing via Cuba in Nicaragua., El Salvador and (before October 1983) Grenada, the United States should presume the equal right to selectively aid and abet anti-Soviet forces by a variety of means, not excluding military aid to the most pro-Soviet countries of the Warsaw Pact, particularly during crisis situations. Mr. Gorbachev should be made aware that there are limits on U.S. patience regarding Soviet orchestrated military aid for anti-U.S. forces in the Caribbean Basin.

The coming summit at Geneva between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev should not only focus on the issues of arms control but also crisis control, particularly the prevention of regional conflicts at the superpowers' peripheries (in the case of the USSR, both Eastern Europe and Afghanistan). Progress in the solution of these conflicts is one of the necessary conditions to any strategic arms control agreement.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

Our second panelist this afternoon is Mr. Dale Herspring, a Congressional Fellow now at the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Herspring received his Ph.D. in 1972 from the University of Southern California. He was a Fulbright Fellow in Germany. He received a Free University of Berlin Fellowship and has been a Foreign Service Officer of the U.S. Department of State since 1971. While in the State Department, Mr. Herspring was Deputy Director of the Office of East European Affairs and Polish Officer in

[9] See Jiri Valenta, "The Explosive Soviet Periphery," Foreign Policy, Summer 1983, pp. 84-100.

charge. Mr. Herspring has also served in Poland and Moscow. He is currently adjunct professor in the Department of Government in Russian Area Studies at Georgetown University and adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

We welcome you and look forward to your statement.

STATEMENT OF DALE R. HERSPRING, CONGRESSIONAL FELLOW, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Mr. HERSPRING. Thank you.

Let me begin by noting that the comments I make this afternoon are my own. They do not represent the views of either the State Department or the House Armed Services Committee.

Further, I would like to point out that all of the information in my statement is drawn from a longer article——

Senator PRESSLER. From what article?

Mr. HERSPRING [continuing]. From a longer article which I have given to Ms. Hansen:

The Soviet Union and East European Militaries: The Diminishing Asset, Robbin Laird and Erik Hoffman. *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: Aldine, 1986), Pp. 549–569.

Furthermore, I would like to point out that a number of people may disagree with some of the conclusions I have reached, some of my colleagues here, some in Government. This is something I have done privately on my own.

Despite the key importance Moscow has assigned to the East European armies in Warsaw Pact strategy—they comprise about 60 percent of pact ground forces—and the important role they are expected to play in helping to maintain political order in the region, I would argue that recent trends suggest that their value to Moscow is diminishing in the first area and limited in the second.

On the external or foreign front, the increasing qualitative disparities between East European and Soviet weapon systems, as well as nagging, if not increasing, questions concerning their political reliability, are not only undermining Moscow's strategy of "coalition warfare" vis-a-vis NATO, but may force the Kremlin to make some significant changes in its strategy for fighting a war in Europe.

Internally, despite the actions taken by the Polish military on December 13, 1981 to help maintain Communist rule in Poland, a careful analysis of the Polish experience over the past 4 or 5 years as well as the East European record in general, suggests that the Government/party's ability to utilize the armed forces in an internal crisis is much more limited than is generally assumed in the West.

THE WARSAW PACT: AN INSTRUMENT FOR ASSERTING SOVIET HEGEMONY OVER EASTERN EUROPE

Although ostensibly created as a "Socialist military coalition," to counter "possible aggression," at the time of its establishment in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was primarily an instrument for asserting Soviet hegemony over the East Europeans.

From a military standpoint, the pact was a paper organization at that time. Not only were there serious shortcomings in equipment,

training, and coordination among the various militaries, there were serious problems with the political reliability of these armies. For example, the East German military refused to participate in putting down uprisings in East Berlin in 1953, important segments of the Hungarian military sided with the rebels in Budapest in 1956, and segments of the Polish Army not only refused to put down riots in Poznan in the same year, but the army also played a key role in enabling the Polish party leadership to stand up to Khrushchev and company at Okecie Airport in determining that Gomulka would be appointed party leader. The latter event occurred at a time when there were large numbers of Soviet officers in the Polish Armed Forces.

In 1960, the Soviets began to pay increased attention to the pact as a military organization. New equipment was introduced, joint exercises were stepped up, and greater attention was paid to making the pact's high level military organs function smoothly.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY UNDERMINED

However, despite these developments, Soviet hopes to make effective use of the pact as a supplement to Soviet forces was undermined in the 1960's by events in Romania and Czechoslovakia.

In late 1964, the Romanians took a number of steps which lessened their utility to the Soviets. The term of military service was reduced from 24 to 16 months, leading to a cut of 40,000 men in the Romanian Armed Forces. In addition, the Romanians argued that pact military expenditures were excessive, and succeeded in obtaining a reduction in the size of the Soviet military liaison mission in Bucharest, demanded a consultative voice in pact matters related to nuclear weapons, refused to permit pact troop maneuvers on Romanian soil, declined to participate in joint maneuvers with combat troops in other countries, and, finally, proposed that the position of the pact's military chief be rotated among member states.

Events in Czechoslovakia were even more disquieting from a Soviet standpoint. In 1968, elements of the Czechoslovak military began to openly express dissatisfaction with Moscow's domination of the pact's leadership councils, and sided with Dubcek in his efforts to "democratize" Czechoslovakia. While the Czechoslovak Army did not openly resist Soviet forces when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968—and here one might add that they were ordered to stay in their barracks—the level of dissatisfaction within the military was so great that major purges were carried out. Most observers believe that the Czechoslovak Army has still not recovered from this setback.

Despite the Romanian and Czechoslovak setbacks, it could be argued that Moscow's ability to utilize four of their six allies—the Romanians opted out—in the invasion of Czechoslovakia shows that the situation was not a total loss from the Soviet point of view.

However, in evaluating the value of this action, it should be emphasized that actual combat operations did not occur. At best, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, showed that the Soviet Union is able to mobilize some of its allies to peacefully interfere in the internal affairs of one of

them. Even then, there were reports of problems with most of the East European forces while they were in Czechoslovakia.

Feeling, however, that an East European military contribution to Soviet forces was important in spite of the Romanian deviation and Czechoslovak events, the Soviets began to intensify pressures for pact integration in the seventies. New structures were introduced to coordinate pact political and military activities, joint military maneuvers were stepped up, and efforts were made to upgrade East European military forces.

Unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, the East Europeans, with the notable exception of the East Germans, failed to allocate sufficient funds to cover the costs of contemporary weapons systems. In fact, a close look at the East European military inventory during the seventies shows that much of it was antiquated. For example, while the Soviets were moving ahead to introduce the latest planes, tanks, and ships into their European forces, the East European forces were doing little to upgrade their militaries.

In addition to problems getting the East Europeans to allocate funds for modern weapons systems, events in Poland during the seventies were also a source of concern.

For example, concerns over the reliability of the Polish military played a major role in Gierek's decision in 1976 to back down on the issue of price increases, which had led to work stoppages, according to a number of Polish sources.

SINCE 1980: INCREASED MILITRY PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS

From the Soviet perspective, events over the past 5 years have only served to increase the problems Moscow faces in attempting to utilize East European forces for its own ends.

First, on the equipment front, the East Europeans appear to be falling even further behind the Soviets. For example, at a time when Soviet forces will soon have Mig-29's and SU-27's, the predominant aircraft among the East Europeans remains the Mig-21 and the SU-7, although there are some Mig-23's and SU-20's beginning to make their appearances.

The situation in the army is no better.

The T-54/55, a 30-year-old weapon system, remains the standard tank. And, on the naval front, with the exception of the East Germans, the situation may be even worse, especially in the Baltic, where the Polish Navy appears to be continuing to sink into obsolescence.

The actions of the Polish military over the past 5 years have also been far from reassuring to the Soviets. To begin with, during the August 1980 events, the Polish military remained neutral and refused to become involved in what it viewed to be an internal political struggle. Furthermore, throughout the 15-month period preceding the declaration of martial law, the Polish military stayed in the background.

While we will probably never know exactly who was behind the declaration of martial law on December 13—that is, to what degree it was a Polish decision or the result of intense Soviet pressure—contrary to the general Western perception, military involvement was minimal.

Regular military units were often not even aware of the declaration of martial law. Furthermore, I am not aware of a single incident in which regular military units were involved in the use of force against civilians. The task of implementing the more onerous aspects of martial law fell on the shoulders of the security services, and particularly the infamous ZOMO's.

Warsaw went out of its way to avoid utilizing military units in a confrontational situation because it was unsure of how the soldiers would react if called upon to lock, load and fire upon fellow Poles.

Even during the administration of martial law, the key role was played by high-level Polish officers who have assumed senior positions, worked as troubleshooters, or participated in inspection teams.

As a result, if the Warsaw Government is not confident of the reliability of its own forces, how can Moscow be certain how they would respond in a crisis?

SOVIET OPTIONS DIFFICULT

The Soviet dilemma will be discussed next.

The increasing technical gap between Soviet and East European weapons systems, together with continuing questions concerning the latter's political reliability in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, present Soviet military planners with a number of problems.

The first is how to compensate for the East Europeans.

The stationing of five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the Prague Spring uprising helps compensate for shortcomings in East European forces. But the situation has worsened since then. One way of dealing with it would be to station a greater number of Soviet troops in the region. Alternatively, Moscow could also allocate some of its divisions from the Western regions of the Soviet Union for the European theater in a crisis.

Both options have drawbacks. The first would probably be resisted by the East Europeans and be a matter of concern to the West Europeans. It would greatly complicate Moscow's efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies.

The second alternative would create problems in a crisis situation since the mobilization and movement of such forces would provide NATO with increased warning time.

Second, should Moscow place greater reliance on nuclear weapons?

Such a step would only increase the danger of a central system exchange. In addition, it would also certainly become known in the West and have a negative impact on Moscow's attempts to influence events in Western Europe.

Furthermore, and here I have in mind the book by Soviet military theorist, Col. Gen. M. A. Garcev, recent Soviet writings suggest that Moscow may believe the chances for a conventional war in Europe, which does not necessarily have to go nuclear, have increased.

Third, this situation forces the Soviets to place greater reliance on a short and successful conflict.

While there is no doubt that the Soviets, in my opinion, at least, can successfully mobilize the East Europeans for a NATO-pact con-

flict, and assure their participation, potential problems with reliability place a premium on short, successful campaigns.

Should the Soviets suffer reverses, or become bogged down, problems with East European troops could quickly emerge. As a result, Soviet military planners would be under pressure to pick exactly the right time and place to insure the quick success of any operation against NATO.

Another problem is ensuring the integration of pact weapons systems.

The increasingly obsolete East European weapons systems increasingly will make combined operations more difficult. Moscow could, of course, eliminate the discrepancy between its forces and those of its allies by supplying them with modern weapons free of charge. As one East European specialist told me, however, Moscow is unlikely to do so for a number of reasons, and here I quote my East European colleague:

> First, the Soviets want to make money off the sale of weapons and we don't have the hard currency. Second, they don't think we will do our part in an East-West conflict and don't want to waste the weapons. Third, they don't trust us and are afraid some of our pilots, for example, will defect to the West with the latest equipment.

Next, there is the difficulty of maintaining supply lines.

Given the strong anti-Soviet sentiments throughout Eastern Europe, Moscow must also contend with potential problems in ensuring the security of its rear echelons in an East-West conflict. This is particularly true of Poland, where anti-Soviet feelings are strong and through which Soviet forces in East Germany are normally supplied. The Soviets could, as they did during the Solidarity period, try to send supplies by sea. But, given West German naval and undersea capabilities, such an approach is fraught with dangers and uncertainties.

Finally, how to keep peace in Eastern Europe? The recent Polish experience shows that while the military can be useful in helping to maintain order, serious questions remain not only about its readiness to carry out Moscow's will, but concerning its ability to keep the situation under control if serious bloodshed erupts.

This means Moscow must continue to be prepared to use its own forces in a policing role in peacetime and, second, that disturbances in rear areas could also cause serious logistical problems and instability when Soviet troops are engaged elsewhere.

In conclusion, observers in the West have traditionally devoted a considerable amount of time and attention to NATO's deficiencies, both political and military. While such attention is appropriate, there has been a tendency on the part of most Western analysts to either ignore the pact's problems or, at a minimum, to downplay them.

As I have tried to show, the problems are real and getting worse—at least from the Soviet perspective. I suspect that, despite all of their own problems, not many NATO generals would be prepared to trade their own forces for those on the other side.

It has often been observed that the Soviet soldier is not 10 feet tall. As I have tried to show, neither is the pact. In fact, recent events would suggest that relative to Soviet forces, the figurative height of East European forces is decreasing.

While it is not clear what steps the Soviets will take to deal with this situation, it is obvious to me, at least, that they have a problem, the resolution of which will affect the conduct of any future NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

[Mr. Herspring's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DALE R. HERSPRING

The Soviet Union and the East European Militaries:
The Diminishing Asset*

Despite the key importance Moscow has assigned the East European armies in Warsaw Pact strategy and the important role they have been expected to play in helping maintain political order, recent trends suggest that their value to Moscow is diminishing in the first area and limited in the second.

On the external front, the increasing qualitative disparities between East European and Soviet weapons systems as well as nagging -- if not increasing -- questions concerning their political reliability, are not only undermining Moscow's strategy of "coalition warfare" vis-a-vis NATO, but may be forcing the Kremlin to make some significant changes in its strategy for fighting a war in Europe.

Internally, despite the actions taken by the Polish military on December 13, 1981 to help maintain communist rule in Poland, a careful analysis of the Polish experience over the past four or five years as well as the East European historical record in general suggests that the government/party's ability to utilize the armed forces in an internal crisis is much more limited than is generally assumed in the West.

Conceptually, the role/function of East European militaries can be divided into two broad categories: external, or the deployment of the armed forces against foreign enemies, and internal or the use of the military to maintain or strengthen political stability, especially during periods of systemic crisis.

For purposes of this article, the external role of the military refers

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primarily to Moscow's perception of the utility of the East European militaries in an East-West conflict in Europe, although mention will also be made of their value as a tool for maintaining discipline within the "Socialist Commonwealth." The internal role of the military refers to the armed forces as an institution which can be relied upon to step in to help maintain systemic order and control by the party in a crisis situation. As the following historical analysis will demonstrate, the role and function of the East European militaries -- and their consequent value to the Soviets -- has changed over time in both of these areas.

The Historical Evolution of the East European Armies

1944-1948: The Seizure of Power

While Soviet and East European military historians have argued that the origins of most of the East European armies can be traced back to the common struggle against the Germans during the Second World War,[1] in fact, with the exception of the Polish and Czechoslovak armies, most of the others -- i.e., Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians as well as Germans -- fought on the Eastern Front against the USSR.[2] Furthermore, even in the case of the Polish military, the memories of the Katyn Forest massacre,[3] Stalin's partition of the country, and Moscow's relatively harsh treatment of those Poles who fell under its control all contributed to an intensification of historical animosities on the part of Poles. As a consequence, Moscow hesitated to introduce a strong system of political controls in the Polish army when it was first created. For example, large numbers of non-party members were utilized within the political apparatus. One official source reports that only about 13% of all political-educational officers were members of the party in December 1944.[4] And only 56% of officers assigned to the Main Political Administration (MPA) -- the most central and politically sensitive component of the political apparatus -- belonged to the Communist Party.[5]

Even after the close of World War II, hostility toward the USSR and communism was strong enough throughout the region that the Soviets hesitated to fully Sovietize the East European militaries. In the Polish case, for example, while the MPA continued to function, its importance as a politicizing agent actually decreased. The political officers' school was closed in 1946, and by 1949 only 50% of all political officer positions were filled in the armed forces.[6] Political indoctrination efforts were aimed at imparting a basic understanding of Marxism-Leninism but were not required, and measures traditionally employed as control devices in communist militaries such as self-criticism were largely ignored.

Despite this go-slow policy toward Sovietizing the militaries, Moscow did begin to take steps which,were aimed at neutralizing the militaries while at the same time laying the groundwork for building a sense of loyalty toward the newly evolving socialist systems. Thus, hostile elements were removed from the officer corps and replaced by individuals with the proper class background. As a prominent Polish sociologist put it, "for understandable reasons, socio-political criteria took precedence during the period when the army was created -- even at the expense of many purely professional criteria."[7]

Little thought was given during this period to the possible deployment of these forces against an external foe. Their equipment was insufficient and antiquated -- often of World War II vintage -- training rudimentary, cadre unqualified, and neither the Soviets nor the East European leaderships showed any concern with removing the armed forces from their emasculated condition. From Moscow's point of view, the task was ~~the~~ to neutralize the armed forces and if this meant making them militarily irrelevant, so be it.

1948-1952: Stalinism

With the imposition of Stalinism in Eastern Europe in 1948, all aspects of the various political systems were expected to imitate the Soviet model.

This included the armed forces. As a result, national command positions were immediately filled with communist or pro-communist officers -- often individuals with little or no military experience. The "neutral" officers appointed to senior positions only a few short years earlier were quickly shunted aside. Furthermore, the process of recruiting new officers from hitherto disadvantaged classes (i.e., the worker or peasant classes) was intensified. Thus by 1950 the percentage of officers with a worker or peasant background was 82% in Bulgaria and 60% in Hungary; by 1952 it was 67.7% in Czechoslovakia, and by the end of 1953 it was 50.3% for Poland.[8]

In addition to personnel policies, other areas of military life were also affected by the Sovietization of the East European militaries. Soviet doctrine, training patterns and internal organization was also introduced. Even the traditionally unique East European uniforms were modified to the point where they were almost indistinguishable from those worn by the Soviets.

To ensure East European military subordination to Soviet command, a number of direct channels of control were introduced by the Soviets. To wit, thousands of military officers were assigned to the East European militaries as "advisors," although in some cases they were actually incorporated into the national armies as regular officers. The most conspicious example of the latter was in Poland where Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovosky became Warsaw's Defense Minister.[9]

Moscow also moved at this time to intensify politicization within the militaries. In Poland, for example, the political officers' school was reopened, and the number of political officer positions was increased. The post of deputy commander for political affairs was introduced at the company level, thereby bringing the political apparatus down to the main working level. Furthermore, throughout Eastern Europe the MPA was given responsibility for the politicization process and its actions came under increased scrutiny by the

Party leadership. In addition, the Party organization was revitalized and the basic party organization was introduced at the regimental level. Party meetings and discussions now began to be held on a regular basis.

Concurrent with Sovietization of the East European militaries, the Kremlin also began to devote attention to building-up Eastern Europe's military capabilities. By 1949, for example, military conscription had been introduced throughout the region (except for the GDR), and by 1953 the East European armies had expanded to 1.5 million men, organized into roughly 65 divisions.[10] In addition, Soviet equipment began to replace the East Europeans largely outdated armament inventory. As a Bulgarian source noted in reference to this period:

> The troops gradually received new protective weapons (the selfloading rifle "Simonov," "Kalaschnikov" submachine guns), better developed air defense systems, jet aircraft, modern tanks, etc.[11]

While from the Soviet standpoint there was little reason to trust in the internal or external reliability of the various East European militaries at this time, Moscow could at least take comfort in the fact that the basis for a more dependable military had been laid. Furthermore, insofar as a future East-West conflict is concerned, Stalin "may have intended their build-up as a supplement to that of the Red Army itself, which was designed to alter the military balance in Europe to the advantage of the Soviet Union."[12]

1953-1959: Post-Stalinism and the Founding of the Pact

The aftermath of Stalin's death was a period of major transition for the East European armies. To begin with, most of the more extreme forms of Sovietization were eliminated. For example, traditional East European military uniforms and songs were reintroduced. In addition, status of forces agreements were concluded with Poland (1956), Hungary (1957), Romania (1957) and East Germany (1957) thereby regularizing the presence of Soviet troops -- and in the case of Poland guaranteeing their "noninterference" in Polish domestic affairs.[13] The Soviets also agreed to a Romanian request and in 1958 withdrew all Soviet

forces from that country.

From a military standpoint, the most important form of "renationalization" concerned the recall of large numbers of Soviet "advisors" and military officers from the East European militaries. This was most evident in Poland where Marshal Rokossovski and almost all of his fellow officers were "thanked" for their services and returned to the Soviet Union. They were replaced by "native" communist officers, many of whom had been purged and imprisoned during the Stalinist period.

In addition to the renationalization of the armed forces, the role of the political apparatus was also deemphasized. In Poland, for example, the post of deputy commander for political affairs at the company level was abolished and the time allocated to ideological indoctrination courses shortened. The communist youth organization was also abolished and the focus of party activity shifted from the political apparatus to the party organization. Since only half the officers and even fewer enlisted personnel were party members, the net result was to weaken party influence within the military.

Although ostensibly created as a loosely organized "socialist military coalition," to counter "possible aggression,"[14] the Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955, was equally important to the Kremlin as an institutionalized substitute for Stalin's personalized system of asserting Soviet hegemony over the East European militaries. From the military standpoint, for example, Article 5 of the Treaty provided for a joint military command, and one was established in Moscow in 1956. Nevertheless, in military terms it remained a paper organization during this period. For example, the primary Soviet history of the Pact lists only one major military exercise during this period -- involving naval, air and ground forces from the USSR and Bulgaria.[15] As Thomas Wolfe put it, "the Soviet Union made no effort to weld the Warsaw Pact into an integrated military alliance," during its early years.[16]

Despite Moscow's neglect of the Pact during its first five years, important changes occurred in the East European militaries. To begin with, East European forces were cut back by 464,000 men.[17] Concurrently, vigorous efforts were made to improve the educational qualifications of the remaining officers and non-commissioned officers. For example, in Poland the proportion of officers with academic degrees rose from 12 percent in 1956 to 20 percent by 1962, in Czechoslovakia from 4.8 percent in 1956 to 14.4 percent in 1963, and in Bulgaria by 1960 between 15 and 20 percent had academic degrees.[18]

With regard to equipment, the motorization of infantry units was pushed, new armored units established, and tactical forces were modified to permit operations under conditions of nuclear war. T-54s gradually replaced T-34s, MIG-17s were added and improved communication and transportation systems were introduced.[19]

Despite the modernization of East European forces, and the creation of the Pact, their utility to the Kremlin in a strictly military sense was severely limited at this time. The lack of qualified personnel, training deficiencies, especially in the area of combined operations and the disparity in equipment held by front-line Soviet forces and East European armies meant that their use in conjunction with Soviet forces in an East-West confrontation would be problematical.

If equipment and training shortcomings presented the Kremlin with problems at this time, they were nothing when compared with the questions raised concerning the overall political reliability of East European forces. To begin with, the uprising in East Berlin in 1953 was put down by Soviet forces, due in large part to Soviet concerns over the reliability of East German paramilitary forces. Likewise, during the Hungarian Revolt in 1956, some units fought against the Soviets "with valor, courage, and heroism reminescent of the best traditions of Hungarian military history,"[20] while the army as a whole stayed out of the fight.

Furthermore, in the aftermath of Moscow's supression of the revolt, the army was decimated by a purge which left large gaps in the ranks of the officer and NCO corps.

From the Soviet standpoint, the events in Poland in 1956 presented an even more dangerous challenge. Not only do the Poles occupy a strategic piece of real estate, and possess the largest non-Soviet Pact forces, but most senior ranks in the Polish military were at that time occupied by Soviet officers. When troops in Poznan refused to put down demonstrations in June, Polish authorities were forced to call in security forces from Warsaw. Furthermore, in October shortly after Gomulka assumed power, Polish forces played a critical role in ensuring a "Polish solution" to the leadership question. Khrushchev and his compatriots arrived at Okecie airport unannounced and uninvited, in an effort to oust Gomulka. At the same time, Soviet troops in Poland left their barracks and began to move on Warsaw. Meanwhile, Polish forces took up defensive positions around the city making it clear they were prepared to fight if necessary. The threat of resistance by Polish forces at a critical juncture appears to have played an important role in Khrushchev's decision to backdown and accept Gomulka. For Moscow the message was ominous. Not even the presence of Soviet officers in the senior ranks of the Polish military could ensure loyalty on the part of the Polish military. If anything, these three events made it clear to the Kremlin that serious problems would have to be overcome before the East Europeans could be considered reliable.

1960-1968 - The Build-up and Czechoslovakia

The significant increase in attention paid by the Soviets to the Pact as a military organization after 1960 appears to have been primarily associated with Khrushchev's plan for shifting reliance in Soviet defense planning and doctrine away from traditional emphasis on ground forces toward greater importance for strategic nuclear forces. He apparently felt he could justify -- at least

partially -- the cutbacks he planned in Soviet ground forces by getting East European military forces to assume a larger role in Pact strategy.

To implement this new strategy, major steps were undertaken to upgrade East European forces shortly after Marshal Grechko took over as Pact Commander-in-chief in 1960. To begin with, a new Pact doctrine called "coaltion warfare" was developed. This doctrine assigned the East Europeans a key role in an East-West conflict. In such a conflict they would be expected to participate jointly with Soviet forces in rapid offensive military operations against NATO. As a result of this new doctrine, East European forces were assigned increasingly important roles. The Poles, for example, were eventually given their own front commanded by a Polish general (the so-called Northern Front), while East German and Czechoslovak forces were assigned important roles in conjunction with Soviet forces on the Central and Southern fronts respectively.

To make this new doctrine workable, East European military equipment was further upgraded. The process of replacing the World War II vintage T-34 with the more modern T-54/55 was completed and MIG-21 and SU-7 aircraft as well as anti-tank missiles and self-propelled guns were introduced into Pact inventories. Some East European forces also began to be supplied with nuclear capable delivery vehicles (although the weapons themselves were kept in Soviet hands). Standardization of weapons systems was also pushed and a nascent East German aircraft industry was dismantled in 1961 and Poland rennounced further work on advanced jet aircraft in 1967.[21] Considerable effort was also devoted to improving the qualifications of officers. By the end of this period, for example, the percentage of officers with an academic degree in Poland had risen from 18 to 30 and in the GDR from approximately 6 to 13.[22]

A major change also occurred in the area of multilateral training exercises. Where there had been only one in the Pact's first five years, there were 19 between 1960 and 1968. Furthermore, while some of the early exercises could

be viewed primarily as propaganda devices, by the mid-sixties they had taken on an increasingly important military meaning.

Finally, increased attention was also given to the Pact's high level military organs. They began to meet on an annual basis and while details on the agenda of their meetings are lacking, information available from Soviet and Polish sources suggest they were primarily concerned with operational matters such as the coming year's training program.[23] Broader defense related questions appear to have been dealt with by the Pact's highest political organ, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). For example, "conditions" in the Warsaw Pact forces were discussed at the 1963 PCC meeting.[24]

The increased attention given to training, equipment and personnel as well as the greater concern being paid to the Pact's defense organs gave the impression that the Soviet Union was assigning greater weight to the role of the East European militaries. There were two developments, however, which raised serious questions on Moscow's part concerning the Pact's overall military utility.

In late 1964, the Romanians unilaterally reduced their term of service from 24 to 16 months. This led to a cut of 40,000 men from the Romanian armed forces. In addition, the Romanians argued that Pact military expenditures were excessive, succeeded in obtaining a reduction in the size of the Soviet military liaison mission in Bucharest, demanded a consultative voice in matters related to nuclear weapons, refused to permit Pact troop maneuvers on Romanian soil, declined to participate in joint maneuvers with combat troops in other countries, and finally proposed that the position of the Pact's military chief rotate among member states.[25] These actions not only undercut Moscow's efforts at upgrading and improving cooperation among Pact members, they also raised serious questions about the utility of Romanian forces in the Southern Region in the event of a war. These developments, as well as the

Northern Tier's more strategic location -- may help explain the greater attention paid by the Soviets to forces in the Northern Tier.

Following on the Romanian deviation came an even more unsettling development insofar as the Soviets were concerned. In 1968 with the rise of reformist elements in Czechoslovakia, certain elements of the Czechoslovak military -- concentrated to a large degree in the political apparatus -- began to express openly dissatisfaction with Moscow's domination of the Pact's leadership councils and side with Dubcek in his efforts to "democratize" Czechoslovakia. For example, insofar as the domestic Czechoslovak front was concerned, it has been argued by one Western analyst that conservative officers, opposed to the liberal internal policies advocated by Dubcek, may have planned to intervene in an effort to save the Novotony regime.[26] In fact, a letter sent to the crucial December 1967 Central Committee meeting apparently contained an implied threat by the army to intervene on Novotony's behalf, and certain units of the army were actually placed on alert, while a number of officers planned to "intervene if the Party's deliberations went against Novotany."[27] The plot was reportedly neutralized by younger pro-Dubcek elements in the officer corps. Despite its inaction during the Soviet invasion -- it was ordered not to resist -- shortly after the Husak regime was installed, the Klement Gottwald Political Military Academy was closed and a large scale purge of pro-Dubcek forces followed. According to one source, as a result of the purge and reorganization of the officer corps, personnel in some branches were 10-30 percent below normal. In the air force, for example, it was admitted to be 20 percent below normal, making it impossible in the first years of 1970 to even hold proper training and evaluation exercises.[28]

Despite all of ~~its~~ Moscow's efforts to up-grade the East European forces, the

Romanian and Czechoslovak events suggest that serious problems remained insofar as the reliability of these two Pact members were concerned. Not only did the Romanian military support Ceausescu in his defiance of Moscow, important elements of the Czechoslovak army criticized Soviet leadership techniques in the Pact, and supported liberal elements in the country at a critical juncture.

It could, however, be argued that in spite of the foregoing, the period was not a total loss to the Kremlin. After all, the Soviets were able to convince five of their six allies (the Romanians opted out) to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. This could be argued as evidence to show that the East Europeans are reliable in an intra-Pact policing role. In this writer's opinion, the importance of this event has tended to be overestimated in the West. Ross Johnson put it best when he noted:

> The invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the Soviet Union could mobilize some of its East European allies to interfere in the internal affairs of one of them; it did not demonstrate, however, that East European forces could contribute effectively to military operations against one of their number.[29]

There are rumors, for example, that the East German forces aroused considerable resentment on the part of the local populace and had to be quickly withdrawn; that serious morale problems existed among Polish troops (who were embarrassed at being involved, even against a traditional enemy); and that the Hungarians had little heart for the exercise.[30] With the exception of the Soviets, who had morale problems of their own, only the Bulgarians appear to have supported the action. And this against a largely passive population. Thus even an apparent victory in Moscow's efforts to utilize the Pact for its own ends left unanswered important questions concerning the reliability of East European troops when asked to carry out Soviet orders.

1969-1979 - Reassement and Reorganization

Despite Soviet concern over Pact reliability in the aftermath of the

Czechoslovak events, Moscow still felt the East European contribution important. Consequently, efforts were made to strengthen Pact unity. The most important change in this regard was the introduction of modifications in Pact structure. Although raised within Pact councils as early as 1966, they were not formally announced until the March 1969 PCC meeting in Budapest. First, a Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) was created as the Pact's supreme military consultative organ. The CDM appears to have taken over some of the broader policyoriented functions previously dealt with by the PCC. As one Soviet source put it, the CDM "works out joint recommendations and proposals for organizing the defense" of the Warsaw Pact and deals "with other questions requiring joint agreement."[31]

The Budapest meeting also established a Military Council, which appears to be subordinate to the Pact's joint command. This council seems to be responsible for some of the planning and quality control functions formerly assigned to the defense ministers and chiefs of staff. For instance, in discussing the work of the Military Council, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, the current commander in chief of Pact forces, has stated that it analyzes "the results of combat and operational activities for the preceding year and determines the tasks of the armies and fleets for the coming year."[32]

The third organ that emerged as a result of the 1969 reforms - the Technical Council - does not appear to have a precursor. Not much is known about this body except that it deals with "the development and modernization of weapons and technology, the coordination of the efforts of the unified armies in the area of scientific research and experimental design work of a defensive nature."[33] Yet the relative frequency with which it is mentioned in Soviet and East European writings on the Pact suggests that it plays an important integrative role. To quote Marshal Kulikov, "its creation speeded up the outfitting of the armies and the Warsaw Pact states with new types of weapons and equipment."[34]

As a consequence of these changes, responsibilities in the military sphere became more differentiated. Very broad political-military issues are discussed within the PCC, whose meetings usually include defense ministers as well as foreign ministers. Specific multilateral military issues are handled within the CDM, and the Joint Command oversees the implementation of "decisions by the Communist and Workers' Parties of the (Member) States."[35] The actual planning and organizing of military activities such as "maneuvers, exercises, and war games" are carried out by the Staff of the Joint Command.[36]

Since it was established, the CDM has met annually. The Military Council convenes twice a year on the average -- once during the spring and once toward the end of the year. There is no information on how frequently the Technical Council meets.

While formally at least giving the East Europeans a greater role in Pact decisionmaking -- a Deputy Minister of Defense serves as Pact Deputy Commander and relays directives from the Pact chief to the national command -- most observers agree that in fact key authority remains in the hands of the Soviets.[37] In a wartime situation, for example, East European forces would not be commanded through the Pact, but directly from a Soviet front or theater headquarters. If anything, the new structural changes improved Moscow's ability to coordinate and integrate Pact efforts in the military sphere.

Another manifestation of the mounting effort at Pact integration in the military sphere was the sudden increase in Pact military maneuvers. During the first 14 years of its existence, the Pact held only 20 military exercises, but there were 21 in the period from 1969 to 1972 -- 11 of them in 1969 alone.[38] This striking increase in military exercises appears to have been designed primarily to give Pact forces extensive training on a multilateral level, a prerequisite for efficient deployment of Pact forces under the doctrine of

coalition warfare. Such a conclusion is borne out by the great number of certain types of exercises largely ignored in the past. During 1969-1971, for example, five air defense/air force exercises took place, whereas there had been only one previously. Similarly, four rear-services exercises were held between 1969-and 1972.

Apparently satisfied that the groundwork for multilateral cooperation had been laid, Pact officials let the number of multilateral maneuvers drop off after 1972. But Pact military cooperation of a new type, which has generally been overlooked in the West, began to emerge in the mid-1970s. This consists of bilateral cooperation among East European armies, in which the Soviet Union appears to be only minimally involved. Such cooperation is particularly prevalent among the Northern Tier countries. For example, Polish officers attend the GDR's Friedrich Engels Military Academy, and Polish, Czechoslovak and East German forces train together -- without the presence of Soviet military units -- and use each other's facilities.[39] Such training significantly enhances the ability of these forces to operate independently of Soviet troops either in rear areas or on a seperate front.

Inspite of the progress which Moscow made in improving the functioning of the Pact as a military organization, major problems began to surface during the 1970s. First, while some Western commentators have suggested that modernization was proceeding apace in the East European forces,[40] the real situation was quite different. According to figures published by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with the notable exception of the GDR, military expenditures in region increased only gradually throughout the period; certainly not in sufficient amounts to cover even the minimal costs of expensive contemporary weapons systems.[41] This failure on the part of the East Europeans to allocate sufficient funds to cover the costs of contemporary weapons systems during the seventies is borne out by an analysis of their actual holdings.

The Air Forces

Most writers on the Pact point to the acquisition by East Europeans of MIG-23s and advanced Sukhoi aircraft during the seventies as an example of how these military forces are being updated. However, a careful review of East European holdings as of 1979 (see Table 1) suggests that while the Soviets were moving ahead to introduce the latest aircraft into their own forces in the region, with a few notable exceptions little was being done to up-grade the East European air forces with modern aircraft such as the MIG-23 and Sukhoi planes.

The Armies

At a time when there was talk of new tanks and other equipment being introduced in the East European inventories, the record shows (see table 1) that the T-54/55 remained the main battle tank in non-Soviet Pact forces.

The Navies

With the exception of East Berlin, which began a major naval build-up in the early seventies,[42] little was being done by other Pact leaderships to modernize their fleets. The vast majority of the Polish fleet was constructed in the late fifties and mid-sixties and little was being done to push new construction in the Bulgarian and Romanian navies.

Most weapons systems require considerable lead time and it could be argued that the delay between a push by Moscow and actual acquisition by the East Europeans of the weapons is related to this process. While the acquisition of new weapons may be somewhat influenced by this process, this does not appear to be a major problem in Eastern Europe. After all, the equipment was Soviet designed and since it was being introduced into front line Soviet units at this time, if a high enough priority had been assigned to its acquisition, it could have been obtained. It was clearly available.

The second major problem area for the Soviets during this period occurred in Poland.[43] First, in 1970 riots occurred in Gdansk and while the circumstances

are still unclear, the best available information indicates that the military was involved in the supression of demonstrations by workers. However, despite their involvement, the Polish military reportedly refused to go along with orders from one of Gomulka's representatives in the Gdansk area to use overwhelming force to put down the demonstrations.

This event had two important consequences for the Polish military. To begin with, it had a devastating demoralizing impact on the Polish officer corps and was the subject of considerable soul searching and debate within the armed forces. Second, the event showed not only that the military would not unquestionably follow the orders of the political leadership, but convinced the high command that the military should at all costs avoid involvement in internal Polish politics.

The 1976 crisis in Warsaw centered around price increases which led to work stoppages by workers in and around Warsaw. According to Polish sources, the Polish military played a key role in Gierek's decision to quickly back down. Jaruzelski's now famous statement "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers," convinced Gierek of the need to avoid a confrontation.[44]

Taken together, these two events showed that far from being a reliable tool in the hands of the Party leadership, the Polish military's utility in an internal crisis was limited. If it was to be successfully utilized at all, it would have to be carefully orchestrated.

By the end of the seventies, it must have been clear to Moscow that not only were the East Europeans not ~~doing their share in~~ modernizing their armed forces, but that serious question existed concerning the reliability of one of the Pact's key members.

1980-1985 - The Problems Increase

From the Soviet perspective, events in Eastern Europe over the past five years have expanded the problems Moscow faces in utilizing the East European

militaries for its own ends. In fact, the difficulties faced by the Kremlin have reached the point where the Soviets may have to consider some major changes in Pact strategy in the event of an East-West conflict in Europe.

The Polish Experience. The actions of the Polish military over the past five years have been far from reassuring to the Soviets. To begin with, during the August 1980 events, the Polish military remained neutral and refused to become involved in what was viewed as an internal political struggle. For example, Admiral Janczyszyn, commander of the Polish Navy, is reported to have stated at the time that he would not permit the use of Polish troops to put down strike activity by Polish shipyard workers, and instead called on the Party's Central Committee to approve the Gdansk accords.[45]

Throughout the fifteen month period preceding the declaration of martial law, the Polish military stayed in the background. Some Polish sources claim, for example, that Jaruzelski was offered the ~~Premiership~~ Prime Ministership at the time of Gierek's ouster, but turned it down. When he did accept it in February of 1981 as the internal political struggle was heating up in Poland, any possibility for him to find a compronise solution to the strike ended with the Bydgoszcz incident in March of that year. At that time, in an effort to gain official recognition, members of Rural Solidarity had been occupying government buildings. Shortly after Polish labor leader Lech Walesa met with General Jaruzelski, and hopes had risen over the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the country's problems, the police attacked those occupying the buildings seriously injuring a number of them.. The result was a further intensification of passions on both sides as Solidarity called for punishment of police officials. Walesa reportedly described the affair "as an obvious provocation against the Government of General Jaruzelski; he plainly did not mean that Solidarity members had acted provocatively, . ."[46] It is generally believed in Poland that the incident was staged by hardline elements within the security services and Polish leadership

-- perhaps with Soviet support -- to prevent any accomdation between the government/party and Solidarity.

Throughout the remainder of the year Poland fell further into internal disarray. The Party steadily lost cohesiveness and there was increasing talk of a full-scale takeover of the Party by liberal elements. Frustrated by its inability to get an increasingly beleagered government/party apparatus to live up to its promises, Solidarity became increasingly radicalized to the point where Walesa's leadership of the union was in serious question at the September, 1981 trade union congress. In fact, he succeeded in maintaining control, but only by the smallest of margins and after making a number of concessions to more radical elements in the union.

While we will probably never know exactly who was behind the declaration of martial law on December 13 (i.e., to what degree it was a Polish decision or the result of intense Soviet pressure), contrary to the general Western perception, military involvement was minimal. Regular military units were often not even aware of the declaration of martial law. Furthermore, this writer is not aware of a single incident in which regular military units were involved in the use of force against civilians. The task of implementing the more onerous aspects fell on the shoulders of the security forces -- in particular the dreaded ZOMOs. Military participation in the early days was limited to actions such as: 2-3 man patrols in major cities, the transportation of ZOMOs around the country (by the air force), for an occasional drive past key points in tanks or similar equipment in an effort to intimidate the populace. If the West misjudged events in Poland, it was not because it underestimated the ability of the Warsaw leadership to utilize the military in an internal crisis, it was a failure to recognize the tremendous build-up of security forces which had occurred during the six months prior to the declaration of martial law.

When it came to a crisis, Warsaw went out of its way to avoid utilizing

regular military units in a confrontational situation. The leadership was too unsure of how the soldiers would react if called upon to use force against other Poles. In short, it went out of its way to avoid testing the validity of Jaruzelski's 1976 statement that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers."

Since December 1981, the Polish military has been used in a variety of functions. First, in addition to General Jaruzelski and those immediately around him, a number of other senior Polish officers have taken on high level positions (e.g., General Piotrowski, the Minister of Mines and Energy). Second, they have acted as trouble shooters. For example, officers at the level of colonel were assigned to provincial governors who used them to help eliminate supply bottlenecks or deal with other logistical problems. Finally, they served on inspection teams which were assigned the task of ensuring that party and government bureaucrats throughout the country were carrying out the General's orders (they ~~usually~~ were not). While many of these officers returned to their barracks after martial law ended in July of 1983, large numbers are still active in the civilian bureaucracy. In fact, the outlook is for prolonged military presence in the civilian sphere. A return to complete civilian rule would put the same individuals who brought about the 1980 crisis back into power, something the general appears determined to avoid.

The Polish experience has a number of implications for the USSR. First, while the situation in Poland is clearly better than it was on December 12, 1981, to date Jaruzelski has not always done things the way the Soviets would prefer. He has resisted suggestions to return power to the party. Likewise, Poland has the strongest church in any communist country -- if not in all of Europe, the general has not cracked down as hard on dissidents as the Kremlin would prefer, agriculture remains predominately in private hands, the media is relatively open by communist standards and the universities retain a significant degree of autonomy. The lesson is that East European generals cannot always

be counted on to do Moscow's bidding.

Second, while senior military officers and the security organs were able to hold the line this time, the Kremlin must have continuing concerns over stability in Poland in a real crisis situation. After all, the 1981 take-over took place in the face of a largely passive populace. What if there is resistance next time and the internal security organs prove insufficient? What will the regular army do if called upon to use its weapons?

Finally, looking at Poland's key role in the Warsaw Pact (15 divisions with its own front), Moscow must be worried about the large number of officers who have been engaged in non-military activities. Such activities are likely to detract from the Polish military's combat readiness. Furthermore, the bitterness on the part of the average Pole over the events of the past four years as well as continuing support for the ideals of Solidarity are certain to have an important impact on morale and combat readiness.

Modernizing the East European Militaries. In spite of some efforts to modernize them, East European militaries appear to be falling further behind Soviet forces in the region.

Air Forces. At a time when the Soviet forces will soon have MIG-29s and SU-27s,[47] the East Europeans are far behind. As indicated in Table 2, the predominant aircraft in the region remains the MIG-21, and SU-7 although MIG-23s and SU-20s are beginning to make their appearance in East European inventories.

Armies. After carefully analyzing the state of Northern Tier forces, one writer has concluded that there are major disparities between Soviet and East European forces. Looking at the Polish army, this writer concludes:

> At best, the Polish Army would be hard-pressed to keep up with better organized and equipped Soviet forces and could not be expected to do well some of the very important things that Soviet units could do and Soviet doctrine requires.[48]

The Czechoslovak army is in somwhat better shape than the Polish, but

it too has serious shortcomings. All in all, "the Czechoslovak Peoples Army, like the Polish Peoples Army seems ill-structured and ill-equipped to perform a first echelon role."[49] Finally, even the East German army, which is the most modern of all East European militaries, is still inferior to Soviet forces in the region, which are "receiving the newest equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and air defense missiles of a much faster rate than the NVA."[50]

Navies. With the exception of the East German navy, all of the Pact fleets have serious deficiencies. While the largest, the Polish navy is quickly sinking into obsolescence. The Romanian navy is small and outdated, and the Bulgarian navy is also in need of new ships and equipment.

To the Soviets, the situation among the East European militaries must appear bleak indeed. The quality of their equipment, while improving, lags far behind that of Soviet forces. And while figures from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggest that East European military budgets are increasing,[51] this is not reflected in new weapons systems. One option for the Soviets would be to increase pressure on the East Europeans to purchase more modern weapons. Given the regions serious economic problems, -- Poland is only the most obvious case -- such an approach if carried out could have a serious impact on these countries economies. In view of the close tie between economic and political stability in the area, it could also have significant political ramifications as well. However much the Kremlin may prefer modern militaries in Eastern Europe, it is doubtful they are prepared to push the East Europeans in that direction if the result is likely to be increased political instability.

There is also some question as to whether the East Europeans -- with the exception of the East Germans -- will agree to a significant increase in military budgets. By and large they appear to have other priorities -- most particularly resolving internal economic difficulties while at the same time preventing a further deterioration in East-West relations. Recent East

European assertiveness on issues such as INF counterdeployments (only the East Germans and Czechoslovaks accepted the SS-12s and there are rumors that the move was opposed by almost all East European Pact members) as well as participation in the 1984 Olympics (the Romanians went and the Hungarians and Poles held out until the last minute) suggest that within limits the East Europeans are becoming increasingly willing to assert their independence.[52]

If the past forty years is any indication, the Soviets still have a long way to go before problems of political reliability will be overcome. The Hungarian revolt in 1956, the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, the Polish events in the seventies and eighties all raise questions concerning their reliability both at home and in an East-West conflict. And while the Soviets may attempt to deal with such problems by pushing cooperation among the various political apparatuses as one writer has suggested,[53] it is unlikely that they will [ever] overcome the problem in the forseeable future.

The Soviet Dilemma

The increasing technical gap between Soviet and East European weapons systems together with continuing questions concerning the latter's political reliability in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, present Soviet military planners with a number of problems.

Compensating for East European Forces. One of the major consequences of the Czechoslovak invasion in 1968 was the permanent stationing of five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia. The presence of these forces together with the modernization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe has to a degree helped compensate for shortcomings on the part of East European forces. Since 1968, however, the situation within the East European armies has worsened from Moscow's point of view. One way of dealing with this situation would be to station a greater number of Soviet troops in the region. Alternatively,

Moscow could also allocate some of its divisions from the Western regions of the Soviet Union for service in Europe in an emergency.

Both of these options have drawbacks. The first is likely to be resisted by the East Europeans and would be a matter of concern to the West Europeans who would be alarmed by the presence of greater numbers of Soviets troops in the area. It would complicate Moscow's efforts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its Western European allies and undercut the Kremlin's peace policy in Western Europe. The second alternative would create problems in a crisis situation. The mobilization and movement of such forces into position prior to the opening of hostilities would provide NATO with increased warning time.

Greater Reliance on Nuclear Weapons. Moscow could compensate for the reduced utility of the East Europeans by modifying Pact strategy to eliminate or shorten a conventional stage of a European conflict by moving more quickly to the use of theater nuclear weapons. Such a step would not only increase the danger of a central system exchange, it would almost certainly be picked up by the West during peace-time, help legitimize NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons in the minds of many West Europeans and create difficulties for Moscow's attempt to downplay the existence of a Soviet threat. To date, this writer is not aware of any movement toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons by the Soviets in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Conflicts must be short and successful. While there is no doubt that the Soviets can mobilize the East Eruopeans for an East-West conflict and assure their participation, potential problems with reliability place a premium on a short, successful campaign. Should the USSR suffer reverses, or become bogged down, problems with East European troops could quickly emerge. As a consequence, assuming the Soviets decide to utilize the East Europeans, Soviet military planners will be under strong pressure to pick exactly the right time and place to ensure the quick success of any operation gainst NATO.

This obviously limits flexibility in the planning of operations.

Ensuring the integration of Pact weapons systems. The increasingly obsolescent East European weapons systems will make combined arms operations more difficult. The Pact's continued reliance on a high level of exercises helps somewhat, but as one writer put it with reference to the less technical East Europeans, "the national armies are becoming rapidly less capable than their Soviet counterparts and less able to execute Soviet combined arms operations."[54]

Moscow could, of course, eliminate the discrepancy between its forces and those of its allies by supplying them with modern weapons free of charge. To date, however, the Soviets have not done so. As one East European specialist on national security questions put it in a conversation with the author, "We won't be supplied with the latest equipment for three reasons: first, the Soviets want to make money off of the sale of weapons and we don't have the hard currency. Second, they don't think we will do our part in an East-West conflict and don't want to waste the weapons. Third, they don't trust us and are afraid some of our pilots, for example, will defect to the West with the latest equipment." Assuming the trends outlined in this article continue, the Pact's difficulties in carrying out combined arms operations will grow.

Maintaining supply lines. Given the strong anti-Soviet sentiments throughout Eastern Europe, Moscow must also contend with potential problems in ensuring the security of its rear echelons in an East-West conflict. This is particularly true of Poland, where anti-Soviet feelings are particularly strong and through which Soviet forces in East Germany are normally resupplied. In a European conflict the Soviets could try to send supplies by sea as they did during the height of the Solidarity period, but in view of West German naval air and undersea capabilities, such an approach is fraught with dangers and uncertainties.

Keeping the Peace in Eastern Europe. The recent Polish experience shows that while the military can be useful in helping maintain order, serious questions remain not only about its readiness to carry out Moscow's will, but concerning its ability to keep the situation under control if serious bloodshed erupts as well. This means, first, that Moscow must continue to be prepared to use its own forces in a policing role in peacetime, and second, that disturbances in rear areas could not only cause serious logistical problems, but instability as a time when Soviet forces were engaged elsewhere.

Observers in the West have traditionally devoted a considerable amount of attention to NATO's deficiences, both political and technical. While such attention is appropriate and needed, there has been a tendency on the part of most Western analysts to either ignore the Pact's problems or at a minimum to downplay them. As this essay has tried to show, the problems for the Soviets are real and getting worse. It is doubtful, despite all of its problems, that many NATO generals would be prepared to trade their own forces for those of the other side.

It has often been observed that the Soviet soldier is not ten feet tall. This analysis indicates, however, that despite all of the attention and effort the Soviets have put into the Pact and its East European components, it is also not ten feet tall. In fact, recent trends suggest that relative to Soviet forces, its figurative height is decreasing. The problems for the Kremlin will continue and require actions on the part of the Soviets to deal with them. While it is not clear at this point how the Soviets will react, the situation is important enough to warrent more careful attention on the part of Western analysts than has hitherto been the case.

Table 1

Selected East European Air/Ground Holdings - 1979

Country	Air Force	Ground
Poland	MIG-17,21, Sukhoi -7; some Sukhoi 20	T-54/55
The GDR	MIG-17, 21	T-54/55
Czechoslovakia	MIG-17, 21; some 23s	T-54/55
Hungary	MIG-21	T-54/55
Bulgaria	MIG-17, 19, 21; some 23.	T-54/55
Romania	MIG-17, 21	T-54/55

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-80 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 14-16.

Table 2

Selected East European Air/Ground Holdings - 1984

Country	Air Force	Ground
Poland	MIG-17, 21; a few MIG-23s. SU-7; a few SU-20s being added	T-54/55, 70 T-72s; only 800 BMP-1 (1/2 of those required to meet Soviet norms), OT64 and obsolescent OT62
The GDR	MIG-21; a few MIG-23s	T-54/55, large number of T-72s. 40% of combat infantry vehicles are modern and artillery holdings adequate.
Czechoslovakia	MIG-15, 21; smattering of MIG-23s. SU-7.	T-54/55s, 100 T-72s.
Hungary	MIG-21; MIG-23s beginning to appear	T-54/55, with a few T-72s
Bulgaria	MIG-17, 21; a few 23s.	T-54/55, with a few T-72s. Combat infantry vehicles outdated and major shortfalls in artillery
Romania	MIG-17, 21; a few 23s. IAR-93s	Similar to Bulgaria.

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984-85 (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 24-28

Footnotes

[1]For a discussion of their origin from the Soviet point of view, see A. V. Antosyak, et. al., Zarozhdenie narodnykh armiy stran-uchasnits varshavskogo dogovora (Moskva, Izdatel'stvo nauka, 1975).

[2]See, for example, Peter Gosztony, Hitlers Fremde Heere (Dusseldorf, Econ Verlag, 1976).

[3]For an analysis of the Katyn Forest massacre see J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest (Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1962).

[4]Ignacy Blum, Z dziejów Wojska Polskiego w latach 1944-1948 (Warszawa, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1968), p. 180.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Lt. Col. Tadeusz Konecki, "Zawdowodowe Szkolnictwo Ludowego Wojska Polskiego w Fierwszym Powojennym Dziesiecioleciu," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny No. 2 (1974), 341.

[7]Jerzy Wiatr, "Sozio-politische Besonderheiten und Funktionen von Streitkraften in sozialistischen Landern" in Rene Konig, ed., Beitrage zur Militarsoziologie (Koln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968), 104.

[8]For Bulgaria, see Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypowski, Tarcza Pokoju (Warszawa, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1975), p. 240; for Hungary, Sandor Mucs and Erno Zagoni, Geschichte der Ungarischen Volksarmee (Berlin, Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1982), p. 170; for Czechoslovakia, Jan Liptak and Milan Spicak, "Die Tschechoslowakische Volksarmee in der Periode des beschleunigten Aufbaus einer Armee sozialistischen Typus," Militargeschichte Nr. 2, 1975, 189; and for Poland, Major Marian Jurek, "Dorobek XX-Lecia ludowego korpusu oficerskiego," Wojsko Ludowe, No. 7, 1964, 44.

[9]In addition in Poland the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of Ground Forces, the heads of all the service commanders of all four military districts were likewise former Soviet officers.

[10]Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 43.

[11]A. Semerdshiew, F. Christow, S. Penkow, Geschichte der Bulgarischen Volksarmee (Berlin, Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1977), pp. 193-194.

[12]A. Ross Johnson, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? (II) - The Military Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York, Praeger, 1976), 40.

Footnoes - 2

[13]A. Ross Johnson, Robert Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York, Crane Russak, 1982), p. 22.

[14]I. I. Yakubovskiy, ed., Boyevoyoe sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armiy (Moskva, Voyenizdat, 1975), pp. 90, 86.

[15]Ibid., p. 273.

[16]Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, p. 148.

[17]These figures were arrived at on the basis of data in Stephan Tiedtke, Die Warschauer Vertragsorganization (Munich, Oldenbourg, 1978), pp. 23-24.

[18]For Poland see Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and the Political Officer in the Polish and East German Armed Forces," Studies in Comparative Communism Winter, 1977, 393; for Czechoslovakia Col. Jan Liptak, et. al. Die Tschechoslowakische Volksarmee (Berlin, Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1979), 180; and for Bulgaria Semerdshiew, Christow and Penkow, Geschichte der Bulgarischen Volksarmee, p. 219.

[19]Liptak, et. al. pp. 164-5 and Autorenkollektiv des Deutschen Instituts fur Militargeschichte, Zeittafel zur Militargeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1949 bis 1968 (Berlin, Deutscher Militarverlag, 1969) p. 87.

[20]Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Westview, 1978), p. 152.

[21]A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), p. 262. Despite the abandonment of work in these areas, some of the East European states have continued to produce Soviet designed weapons under license (e.g., the Poles are building tanks and ships, the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks infantry equipment and artillery pieces.

[22]Herspring, "Technology and the Political Officer in the Polish and East German Armed Forces," 393. The lower educational level on the part of East German officers can be partially expalined by the fact that the East German military was not formally established until 1956.

[23]V. G. Kulikov, ed., Varshavskiy Dogovor - soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma (Moskva, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1980), pp. 274-279 and Jurek and Skrzypowski Tarcza Pokoju, pp. 338-348.

[24]N. N. Rodinov, et. al. , Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora, 1955-1976 (Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975), p. 75.

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[25]Johnson in Gati, The International Politics of Eastern Europe, p. 44.

[26]Robert W. Dean, "The Political Consolidation of the Czechoslovak Army," Radio Free Europe Research, Czechoslovakia/14, April 29, 1971, 15.

[27]Galia Golan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 183.

[28]Condoleezza Rice, "Warsaw Pact Reliability: The Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA)," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder, Westview, 1984), 135.

[29]A. Ross Johnson, "The Military in Eastern Europe -- Loyalty to Whom," paper prepared for a conference entitled, "Eastern Europe -- Stability or Recurrent Crisis?" By the Department of State at Arlie House, Virginia, November 13-15, 1976.

[30]Even in the primarily Hungarian areas, the Hungarian army was viewed as an occupying army by a hostile population and the army responded by trying to return to Hungary as soon as possible.

[31]K. Savinov, Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh (Moskva, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1980), p. 17.

[32]Kulikov, Varshavskiy Dogovor . . . p. 167.

[33]Savinov, Moguchiy faktor mira i stabil'nosti . . . p. 19.

[34]V. Kulikov, "Chetvert' veka no strazhe zavoevanniy sotsializma i mira," Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal No. 5, 1980, 26.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid.

[37]See, for example, Johnson in Gati, The International Politics of Eastern Europe, p. 51 and Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today," Survival, May-June 1974, 122-126.

[38]Material on Pact exercises is taken from Kulikov, Varshavskiy Dogovor, pp. 272-293.

[39]See, for example, the reference to GDR-Polish cooperation in a 1975 speech by General Heinz Hoffmann, the GDR Minister of National Defense, during the visit to East Germany by the then Polish Defense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski in Zolnierz Wolnosci March 14, 1975. See also the Polish report of the result of the visit in Ibid. March 15-16, 1975. There have been

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[39](cont.) numerous other references to widespread Polish-GDR military cooperation in Zolnierz Wolnosci and Volksarmee. Such cooperation, at least in the form of Polish officers attending the East German military academy does not appear to have been affected by events in Poland during the past five years.

[40]For example, John Erickson, "The Warsaw Pact - The Shape of Things to Come?" in Karen Dawisha and Philip Hansen, Soviet-East European Dilemmas (London, Holmes and Meier, 1981), 164 and Johnson, in Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, 265.

[41]Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Transfers, 1972-1982 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1984).

[42]For a detailed discussion of the East German naval build-up and a comparison of the Volksmarine with the Polish Navy, see Dale R. Herspring, "GDR Naval Build-up," Problems of Comunism (January-February), 1984, 54-62.

[43]The following description of the 1970 and 1976 events in Poland is taken from Johnson, Dean and Alexiev, East European Military Establishments . . . pp. 51-53.

[44]Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in East European Warsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces and Society Vol 6, No. 2 (Winter, 1980), 279.

[45]As recounted to the author by a number of Polish sources.

[46]Kevin Ruane, The Polish Challenge (London, British Broadcasting Corporation, 1982), p. 137-8.

[47]James H. Hansen, "Countering NATO's New Weapons. Soviet Concepts for War in Europe," International Defense Review Vol 17, Nr. 11, 1984, 1619.

[48]Col. Richard C. Martin, "Disparities in Modernization Between Warsaw Pact Armies Opposite NATO's Central Region," paper delivered at the Conference on "Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, October 23-24, 1984, p. 10.

[49]Ibid., p. 17

[50]Ibid., p. 19.

[51]Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures . . . 19-42.

[52]Ten years ago the idea of East European leaderships raising questions if not opposing the Soviets on a key security question such as INF counter-deployments would have been unthinkable.

[53]Christopher Jones, "The Political Administrations of the Warsaw Pact and the Reliability of the East-Bloc Armed Forces," in Nelson, Soviet Allies ?-97.

[54]Martin, Disparities in Modernization Between Warsaw Pact Armies . . . p. 4.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much. That is a very different view from that which we usually hear.

Let me ask you, Mr. Valenta, about your statement on Hungary. You said that Hungary devotes 15-percent of its GNP to defense. Is that correct? Or was it a 15-percent increase?

Mr. VALENTA. Well, this is not classified information or information of the U.S. Government, but, rather, it comes from a former prime minister of Hungary, in an interview which was conducted upon his arrival in the West. So he should be the one to know.

Senator PRESSLER. You made some very interesting statements, Mr. Herspring, on military units in Poland, particularly on how the Soviet military units might not have moved at the time. I had the impression, and as others did, that security forces carried out most of the activities.

What concrete evidence do you have that some of the Polish or Soviet units would not have acted?

Mr. HERSPRING. Well, I did not mean to suggest that the Soviet units might not have acted.

What I meant to suggest was it is clear that there was a high degree of concern on the part of the Polish military-political leadership concerning their own military's reliability. I have had numerous conversations with a number of Poles in responsible positions, who claim they spoke with members of military units on December 14, asking them what they were doing, and the soldiers responded "we're on maneuvers." When asked why they were imposing martial law, the soldiers reportedly looked at them and asked if they had lost their minds. In fact, many soldiers did not even know martial law had been declared until it was announced officially.

The kinds of things the soldiers did engage in—there were patrols around Warsaw and the major cities, and they used to drive tanks up and down the streets to intimidate people—were carefully structured to avoid or limit the chances of direct confrontation with the populace. Even in the incident in Gdansk, where the fences were smashed down by tanks, it is not clear that military units were involved.

The only incident that I am aware of where there is a possibility of force being used, was the Wujek mine incident, where there was apparently a mixed group of ZOMO's and, possibly some military. But, even that is a very murky incident.

Senator PRESSLER. You mentioned Romania, but I would like to address this to both of you.

Romania has pursued a relatively independent foreign policy in a variety of areas. It maintains the Patriotic Guards as a symbol. It participated in the summer Olympic games, and it has made its own pronouncements on intermediate range nuclear forces. What implications for the other Warsaw Pact nations do you see in Romania's continued push for flexibility? Also, will there be any effect on future U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations?

Mr. VALENTA. What you said about Romania is all true, and we know it. But, one thing we should keep in mind is that while they have displayed rather autonomous or sometimes even independent views on a number of foreign policy issues, on the basic security issues, they had to, or were coerced to agree with the Soviet Union. Even more important, their domestic system is one of the most re-

pressive, if not the most repressive, except for Albania, in Eastern Europe.

The question there is how long Mr. Ceaucescu or his successors can maintain this kind of system, in spite of his foreign policy deviation and ability to show occasional independence. I think we have to ask some hard questions here, and not accept the simplistic conclusion that because of those occasional expressions of independence, we should support the Ceaucescu regime under all circumstances.

It is a very tricky question which shows that nothing is very easy in Eastern Europe.

I'm sure that Dale would agree with me that Romania is not a strategically important, or the most strategically important country to the Soviet Union. It is located in an area which, to the Soviet mind, is less important in military terms than East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even Hungary. This might explain in part Romania's ability to pursue an autonomous policy within the Warsaw Pact.

Surely the Romanian Armed Forces are not very reliable. They are perhaps even less reliable than the Polish forces. It is hard to say.

But, I do believe that to the Kremlin it does not make such a great difference in strategic terms given a general conflict in East Europe. They already know that about this borderline reliability.

Mr. HERSPRING. Let me say just one thing.

To answer the specific thing you asked, the effect of Romania's "independence" on East Europeans, I think there is enough evidence that what the East Europeans do is hide behind the Romanians; for example, in pact meetings, where there is a push for unanimity. You have a number of unnamed other East European countries which will say "well, comrades, we would like to agree, but, you know, the Romanians feel this way and we therefore have to have a broader, more general thing." That works as a dynamic in a lot of pact councils.

Senator PRESSLER. What about Bulgaria in these sorts of discussions?

Mr. VALENTA. Bulgaria is traditionally a very pro-Soviet, pro-Russian country. It is linguistically, culturally, and religiously very similar to Russia. It is the only country which has not experienced any serious upheaval, and one can generalize and suggest that perhaps most of the upheavals which Hel and Dale were discussing occur in the northern tier of Eastern Europe, in countries which have had extensive cultural, historical, and socioeconomic ties with Western Europe, whereas in the Balkans, except for Yugoslavia, you have not had the massive upheavals of this sort, which were intended to bring about peaceful revolutionary change in the East European system.

But, even in Bulgaria, having said that, one finds unexplained phenomena, like the latest series of attacks on transportation means, bombings which might be related to the Turkish minority issue. Also, there are various rumors about Chivkov and his family which we do not have time to go into.

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It might be that, in a country where we least expect problems, there might be some serious problems in the future. History might defy itself. But that is as far as I can go now.

Senator PRESSLER. I want to thank you both very much. There may be additional written questions for the record. I think you have contributed a great deal here.

With that, I will call forth the next, and final, panel, which consists of Mr. David Holloway, Mr. Lawrence Caldwell, and Mr. Karen Dawisha.

We will take about a 3-minute break while our panelists seat themselves at the witness table.

[Pause.]

Senator PRESSLER. Unless someone has an airplane to catch quickly, we will hear first from Mr. Lawrence Caldwell.

Mr. Caldwell is a senior researcher at the Rand Corp. in California. He is also a professor of political science at Occidental College in Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and has served as a research assistant at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and has been the director of European studies at the National War College in Washington, DC. For two years he was a distinguished scholar in residence in the Department of Soviet Analysis at the CIA.

We welcome Mr. Caldwell.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE T. CALDWELL, THE RAND CORP.

Mr. CALDWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor, of course, to participate in these hearings. They clearly are timely and on a very important topic for U.S. foreign policy.

My simple answers to the set of questions that you passed out in advance are these. In my opinion, NATO, especially if you include Japan in the concept if not in the alliance itself, is and will continue to be the centerpiece of American foreign policy; second, that there is no "crisis of will" in the Warsaw Pact, although that alliance has difficulties of very substantial proportions; and, third, that we, that is, the United States, on the whole have weakened our own alliances while strengthening Soviet leverage over the Warsaw Pact by our past efforts to take advantage of those difficulties that do exist within the Warsaw Pact.

The dimensions of your topic that I follow most closely are Soviet foreign policy, military policy, arms control policy, United States-Soviet relations, and, like everybody else in this field, I have a particular interest in the dynamic leadership of Mr. Gorbachev.

I thought what I might do for you today is to look at the Warsaw Pact in the context of overall Soviet European policy as it might be seen by Mr. Gorbachev during his first days and weeks of leadership.

It seems to me, as I listened to the previous people in these hearings, that the policy objective implicit in what everyone has said so far today, and one that I share, is that we want to try to promote pluralism in Eastern Europe and we want to try to reduce Soviet controls over the Warsaw Pact and COMECON mechanisms. I

don't think there is very much dissent about those as the objectives of American policy.

The differences occur, it seems to me, in the means that we employ to those ends.

Here there has been a debate in American policy, and I think it will continue, whether it is best to try to reduce Soviet leverage and promote pluralism by improving Soviet-American relations or attempt to exploit the fissures, the divergencies that exist in Eastern Europe.

Although I am not going to answer that question, I think I can bring a perspective to it by looking at the overall Soviet policy in Europe.

GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS

Let me begin by saying that Mr. Gorbachev has already had some successes in Europe. He was lucky, in part. When he came to power in March, the Soviets had already laid on two very grand public occasions: the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact at the end of April, and at the end of June, they had the 40th anniversary of COMECON, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. Gorbachev was able to step right in to those ceremonial rolls, even though they had probably been laid on for Mr. Chernenko, and, in so doing, was able to communicate to the other allies in the Warsaw Pact and to the Soviet people with that same image of dynamic leadership that he has tried to portray to Western audiences since coming to power.

In addition, there is one other initiative he has taken in his European policy since he came into power in March. As you know, he scheduled a meeting with President Mitterrand of France before he meets with President Reagan in November.

I mentioned these initiatives both because they help to create this image of a dynamic new leader and because they suggest what I see to be the two sides, the two halves, of Soviet policy toward Europe.

I do not see any substantial evidence of debate or of dissent within the Soviet leadership over the policy that they have pursued over the last 15 years toward either Eastern or Western Europe. I should add that there was some evidence, some very slight evidence, back in May or June that suggested that some members of the Soviet leadership, undoubtedly below the level of the Politburo, felt that it was necessary to tighten the screws still further over those two sets of institutions, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. And, in fact, an article that appeared in Pravda on June 21 talked about stricter criteria for participation in the Soviet and East European alliances.

How do I see Soviet policy, then, the one that I think Mr. Gorbachev, at least in the short run, will continue to pursue?

The root of that policy is what the Soviets call in their propaganda as well as in their highest and most important state documents: "the Socialist bloc."

They have gotten a lot of leverage, a lot of mileage over the years out of having a Socialist bloc. Mr. Valenta mentioned here the necessity of having ideological legitimization not just for the

Soviet political leadership—and it performs that goal. One of the reasons for showing Gorbachev going to Warsaw for these two ceremonial occasions on Moscow television was to show the Soviet people that the Soviets were, in fact, in charge; that legitimizes Mr. Gorbachev's leadership. But, it was also to legitimize the leadership of the leaders in Eastern Europe who participate with the Soviets.

SOVIET ATTEMPTS AT CONFORMITY IN THE WARSAW PACT

Another bit of mileage that they get out of the Warsaw Pact, the Socialist bloc more generally, is that it provides an instrument for conformity with at least the broad outlines of Soviet policy.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that Mr. Valenta mentioned, the Soviets very quickly convened a large meeting of their Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, in March 1969. They were so worried about possible criticisms that that meeting lasted for only 2½ hours. And they launched a theme, which continued down well into the 1970's, that is, the theme of détente. The role of détente in Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact was: first, to set the agenda, to give them something they could talk about with their Warsaw Pact allies so they were not emphasizing, at least on public occasions, the divisive issues; and second, to provide a goal toward which they could all fall in and unite behind.

As détente began to deteriorate in the middle 1970's, the Soviets, without missing a beat, just shifted to a slightly different theme, and that is the theme of peace, the peace campaign.

As they have stressed both in their propaganda and again in state documents that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have deteriorated, they have made the centerpiece of their meetings within the Warsaw Pact and their meetings within COMECON the peace campaign. That is the response to the threat from NATO and from the United States.

So, in a sense, the deterioration of relations with the United States has provided a mechanism by which the Soviets have attempted to discipline their own bloc members.

Well, the net effect of this policy that goes back for 15 years, first the emphasis on détente and then the emphasis on the deterioration of détente or the threat of war, the net effect of that, it seems to me, has been to provide a common program in East-West relations. The effect of that has been to provide a lever by which the Soviets have at least attempted to define the limits of dissent within their Socialist bloc.

That is half of the picture of Soviet policy in Europe.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

The other half of the picture, as I see it, has to do with Western Europe. Here the Soviets have demonstrated a rather ambivalent attitude.

On the one hand, they have had in their quiver since the 1920's what I call the policy of "differentiated détente." When things weren't going well with one set of imperialist states or with the United States in the recent period, they would attempt to improve

relations with another capitalist, democratic state. The best example, of course, is De Gaulle's policy in the early 1960's, with the Ostpolitik in the mid to late 1960's.

What does that do for the Soviets?

What it does for the Soviets is enable them both to appear reasonable to some segments of public opinion in the West and, at the same time, in terms of legitimacy within their own bloc, to demonstrate their efforts at a peaceful kind of policy.

Now, the ambivalence and the dilemma comes when they have also tried, also going back to the 1920's, what I call a "grassroots campaign," where they try to speak directly to the American people and to the people in Western Europe. Mr. Sonnenfeldt made reference to that when he talked about the INF campaign. That was an example of a Soviet grassroots effort.

The war scare element in Soviet policy that we have seen, going back to 1980, again, I think, is, in part, a grassroots propaganda effort.

Now, the dilemma is this: If the Soviets, are going to emphasize trying to improve relations with the United States, they will have difficulty trying to continue to differentiate their policy with our NATO allies. At the same time, if the Soviets are trying to emphasize the threat of war, which helps them to discipline their own camp, their own Socialist bloc, they have difficulties—and I think very substantial difficulties—when they speak directly to the populations of Western Europe, in getting cooperation from President Reagan, President Carter, or their counterparts in Western Europe.

So, they have a dilemma, sort of a two-level dilemma. On the one hand, they can go for the grassroots, the propaganda. But if they do that, that reduces the possibility of cooperation with the Government. The second level is that they can go for the West European governments, but that complicates their relations with the United States.

Let me just conclude that notion by saying that in my judgment, the war scare campaign, as I have called it here, at least the emphasis that has appeared since 1980 in Soviet pronouncements on the danger of war, has had, in part, these purposes I have just described—dealing with the grassroots in Western Europe. But, also in part, it has to do with internal Soviet politics. But, since that is not your purpose here, I simply will not make reference to that.

Finally, then, what do I think the implications are for American policy? I see three.

The first is that the governments of Western Europe, represent in some way an alternative to improving United States-Soviet relations. If our relations continue to be strained with the Soviet Union, I think that we can count on additional efforts to differentiate détente, to drive wedges, as Mr. Herspring said; that is, to attempt to improve relations selectively with other members of the NATO alliance.

If the tensions become very great, as they well may over the next 3 to 5 years, over the question of the strategic defense initiative, my guess is that we could see the Soviets more likely to turn up the heat on the grassroots campaign, that element of their policy, to accept the strains that that would produce in American-Soviet relations, to accept the strains it would produce in relations at

least with conservative allies in NATO, in an effort to appeal to the populations and to try to drive politics leftward among our allies.

That is the first implication for policy that I see.

The second implication is that, ironically, improved relations with Moscow, in my judgment, would have the effect of reducing Soviet leverage in Eastern Europe. There are two sides to that argument which I stated a moment ago. One is that I don't think we have done very well in trying to take advantage of the fissures that appear in Eastern Europe. Second is that the Soviets have used this war scare, the danger of war, the threat of the United States and NATO since 1980 as a means of disciplining the agenda of the Warsaw Pact and trying to reduce the limits within which their allies can speak.

The third and final point I would make is this. If there is a crisis of will within the Warsaw Pact, United States efforts to exploit it seem to me almost certainly to strengthen the most ideological and orthodox elements in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet leadership, and to give a momentum to the most repressive impulse of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

Thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

Our second speaker on the geopolitical aspects of the Warsaw Pact's crisis of will is Mr. David Holloway.

He received a Ph.D. from Cambridge University and is currently a senior research associate at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. He has also taught at the University of Edinburgh and has held fellowships at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and with the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University.

He is the author of a variety of books, and we welcome him here.

Mr. Holloway.

STATEMENT OF DAVID HOLLOWAY, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Mr. HOLLOWAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important matter.

Like Mr. Sonnenfeldt, I have just stepped off an airplane and have not been able to prepare a written statement. But, with your permission, I would like to submit one for the record.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, and without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. HOLLOWAY. The title of your hearings asks, "Is NATO still the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy? Should it be?"

NATO: THE CENTERPIECE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

I think the first thing I would like to say is that it is still the centerpiece of Soviet foreign policy.

In the last 30 years, the Soviet Union has become a global power, has matched the United States in strategic nuclear forces, built up its military forces in the Far East, has deployed its navy on the oceans of the world, sent arms and advisers to various countries.

But, in spite of these changes, I think that Europe remains the most important region of the world for Soviet policy.

I returned just last night from a visit to China, and had discussions there with some military specialists, including the Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, and they expressed the view, which I agree with, that Europe, in fact, remains the most important strategic front for the Soviet Union notwithstanding the great buildup of forces in the Far East, a buildup which has not been made at the cost of Soviet forces in Europe.

I think that the reasons for Europe's importance to the Soviet Union are both political and military. The victory over Germany in the Second World War made it possible for Stalin to impose the Soviet model on the East European countries, and because the socialist countries of Eastern Europe still, in spite of the expansion of Soviet power, provide the clearest evidence for the claim that the future of the world belongs to socialism of the Soviet type, they occupy a very important place in the Soviet leaders' view of their own country and of its role in the world, its historic role.

Control over Eastern Europe, moreover, prevents the emergence of a powerful Germany that might threaten the Soviet Union or compete with it for influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Brezhnev reminded Dubcek, the Czech party leader, of the Soviet losses during the Second World War, and said, "At such a cost, the Soviet Union has gained security and the guarantee of that security is the post-war division of Europe, specifically the fact that Czechoslovakia is linked with the Soviet Union forever."

Similar sentiments appeared in the Soviet press during the crisis in Poland in 1980 and 1981. There is no sign that Soviet leaders have changed their attitude to the division of Europe and their control over Eastern Europe.

Moreover, that control gives the Soviet Union some important, significant military advantages in the area of greatest military confrontation with the Western powers and with its leading adversary, the United States. It gives it great defensive depth vis-a-vis NATO. If there were a conventional war in Europe, it would start at some distance from Soviet territory. It also provides a base from which to launch an attack on Western Europe in the event of war, and this is of value, especially in view of the stress that Soviet military policy and military doctrine put upon the offensive, on taking the offensive in any conflict.

I think that these military advantages have not diminished with the advent of nuclear weapons since strategic parity gives more importance to the military balance in Europe and Soviet policy now admits a conventional war in Europe is possible.

Mr. Herspring and Mr. Sonnenfeldt referred to this possibility, and it is something that appears in Soviet writings about military doctrine, though I am inclined to agree with Mr. Herspring that the Soviet fears about the reliability of its allies in the Warsaw Pact would put an immense premium on attempting to achieve any goal in such a war as quickly as possible, before the conflict could begin to affect the cohesion of the pact.

The Soviet Union dominates the pact. But, as Mr. Sonnenfeldt said, the pact is not a monolith. The Soviet Union carries about 80

percent of the pact's military burden, accounts for about 80 percent of its expenditure; compared with about 60 percent of NATO's costs borne by the United States. It provides 75 percent of the pact's troops. I am referring now not just to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe but to all Soviet forces. It provides 75 percent of the pact's troops, compared with about 42 percent of NATO's troops supplied by the United States.

The Soviet control of the pact rests mainly, I think, on the instruments or techniques it uses to control the institutions of the pact. It fills the most important positions with its own officers. It imposes a uniform doctrine on the member states. It controls the education of senior officers from all the member countries, except Romania.

Soviet control is not absolute, however, and the pact is not immune to the political and economic ailments that Eastern Europe has suffered.

Albania quit the pact in the 1960's. Romania has managed to evade the most important mechanisms of control. It has its own military doctrine of popular defense, its own system of education for senior officers. It does not allow pact exercises on its territories.

The economic difficulties in Eastern Europe have made military expenditure and burden-sharing a contentious issue, with the Soviet Union's allies not always responding to pressure to increase their military expenditure.

Political upheaval in Czechoslovakia and in Poland has also had profound effects on the armed forces of those countries, it may have weakened their fighting effectiveness, and it certainly raised doubts about their reliability. And, if the Soviet general staff takes the view that Mr. Herspring argued, namely that these forces might be unreliable, then this, I think, may reinforce them in their determination to try to achieve the goals of any campaign as quickly as possible.

However, I think that although the reliability of these forces may give the Soviet Union pause for thought and create problems for Soviet military planners, we cannot be sure that these troops would not fight, because the pressures of military discipline and the very fact of combat might overcome their undoubted political disaffection.

In the last 2 years, there have been signs of disagreement in the pact and unhappiness at the nature of the Soviet handling of the INF issue, and, in particular, at the Soviet response to NATO's INF deployment.

In January of last year, a Hungarian Politburo member wrote that the problems faced by Eastern European states "do not call for uniform solutions, but much more for methods that make optimal allowances for national characteristics"; and argued that even when East-West relations were deteriorating, there was still a possibility that individual socialist and capitalist countries could maintain good relations.

In the summer of last year, East Germany seemed to act in accord with this advice when it persisted with plans for Erich Honecker to visit West Germany, long after the Soviet Union had shown its displeasure. The visit was finally canceled, but not before Hungary and Romania had made clear their support for the East

German stand. Even Czechoslovakia, one of the most orthodox and rigid regimes in Eastern Europe, made public the fact that many of its citizens were unhappy about the stationing of Soviet operational tactical missiles in their country in response to the NATO deployment.

DIVERGENT FOREIGN POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

Now, I think a question arises about these signs, these more recent signs, of divergence in the foreign policies of the East European countries; that is, are they to be explained by specific circumstances or are they signs of a longer trend?

There are specific circumstances, I think, which help to explain them. One is the fact that the non-Soviet members of the pact have had an economic and political stake in good relations with the West and, in particular, with Western Europe, and have been unhappy about the pressures to break down detente in Europe, and, specifically, with the Soviet handling of the INF issue.

Moreover, the Soviet leadership has been weak and seen to be weak over the last few years, and this may have emboldened the East European leaders to assert what they saw as their own national interests, and more openly.

I think these disagreements do, in fact, reflect also a long-term trend. They arise from the different interests of ruling groups in Eastern Europe, and these different interests spring fundamentally from the search for economic and political viability at home.

Eastern European states have a stake in the existing division of Europe, the existing bloc structure, because their rule depends in significant measure on the Soviet military presence in the region. But, they also have sought a relaxation of tension and an expansion of economic and political ties with the West, to enable them to pursue domestic stability. Disbandment of the blocs would threaten their existence. But tighter cohesion and discipline restrict their room for maneuver in policy at home.

Of course, I am generalizing here about diverse states, but I believe the general argument holds that one should expect East European governments to pursue foreign policies in line with their national interests in this direction.

The Soviet Union, which has some interest not only in control of the region but also an interest in the stability or viability of these systems—as long as they do not undermine Soviet control—may accommodate, itself somewhat to this trend. If this does happen, I think the pact will tend to become more like an alliance, rather than be merely an instrument of Soviet domination.

Finally, I agree with Professor Caldwell that there really is no crisis of will in the Warsaw Pact, if by that is meant a crisis in the Soviet determination to retain control of the region. Moreover, there is no crisis in the Soviet military ability to do that, to maintain its domination.

A CRISIS OF RULE IN THE WARSAW PACT

What I think there is a crisis of rule. The Soviet Union may control the region, but it cannot insure the viability or legitimacy of the regimes there. The search for domestic viability tends to create

pressures for the rulers in Eastern Europe to pursue their own interests in foreign policy, within a limited framework.

Nor can the Soviet Union isolate the pact from the social, economic, and political conditions in the region, and these affect, as Mr. Herspring I think brought out very clearly, the reliability and readiness of the non-Soviet forces in the pact.

Although the Soviet Union is the dominant power in the pact, the non-Soviet forces do contribute nominally 55 divisions to the order of battle in Eastern Europe, compared with 31 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, and, therefore, are not a negligible factor in the military balance.

Yet, whatever problems the pact faces, the very fact that it was renewed earlier this year suggests that the Soviet Union believes that it suits its purposes in Eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole and that it does not have any better idea about how to conduct its military affairs in the region.

The problems that face the pact do constrain Soviet policy in Europe, both East and West. I think the very methods used by the Soviet Union to retain control of Eastern Europe greatly undermine Soviet policy toward Western Europe because they constantly recall to people in Western Europe the nature of Soviet power and the nature of Soviet rule.

I do not believe, however, that the problems on the military side are immediately exploitable in any significant way by the West. More interesting, I think, is the possibility of assertion of national interest by the non-Soviet members of the pact. This, I think, does create perhaps increasing opportunities for diplomatic and foreign policy measures to try to influence Soviet policy in Europe through the other members of the pact and to develop relations with the pact in such a way as to encourage movement toward a more open, equitable, and cooperative order in Europe.

[Mr. Holloway's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of David Holloway

The title of the Hearings asks: "Is NATO still the centerpiece of U.S. Foreign Policy? Should it Be?" Whatever it may be for the United States, Europe is still the centerpiece of Soviet foreign policy. In the last thirty years the Soviet Union has become a global power: it has matched the United States in strategic nuclear forces, deployed its Navy on the oceans of the world, built up its forces in the Far East, and sent arms and military advisers to many countries. But in spite of these dramatic changes, Europe remains the most important region of the world for Soviet foreign and defense policy. Notwithstanding the considerable build-up of Soviet forces in the Far East in the last twenty years, for example, Chinese military specialists still believe - as I do - that Europe remains the Soviet Union's most important strategic front in its rivalry with the United States.[1]

The reasons for Europe's importance to the Soviet Union are both political and military. Victory over Germany in the Second World War made it possible to impose the Soviet model of economic and political organization on Eastern Europe. Despite the growth of Soviet global power Eastern Europe provides the clearest evidence for Soviet Union's claim that its model of

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socialism will triumph throughout the world. For this reason, the socialist states of Eastern Europe occupy an important place in the Soviet leaders' view of their own country and of its role in the world.

Control over Eastern Europe yields more practical benefits as well. It prevents the emergence of a powerful Germany that might play its traditional roles of threatening the Soviet Union or competing with it for influence in Eastern Europe. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Brezhnev reminded Dubcek of Soviet losses during the Second World War: "at such a cost", he said, "the Soviet Union had gained security, and the guarantee of that security was the postwar division of Europe and, specifically, the fact that Czechoslovakia was linked with the Soviet Union 'forever'".[2] Similar sentiments were expressed during the crisis in Poland in 1980 and 1981, and there is no sign that Soviet leaders have changed their attitude since then.

The Soviet Union also derives significant military advantages from its control over Eastern Europe. If there were a conventional war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it would start at some distance from Soviet territory. The Soviet Union, by stationing its forces in Eastern Europe, has acquired great defensive depth vis-a-vis NATO, and also has a base from which to launch an attack on Western Europe in the event of war. This latter consideration is of particular value in view of the importance that Soviet military strategy gives to seizing the initiative, and the stress it lays upon the offensive as the primary form of military operation. The military advantages the Soviet Union derives from its position in Eastern Europe do not depend solely on the forces contributed by the other members of the Pact, nor have they diminished with the deployment of nuclear weapons on the continent. Strategic nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States gives new importance to the military balance in the European theatre, where Soviet

military doctrine now sees the possibility not only of a nuclear, but also of a conventional war.[3]

The Soviet Union is by far the largest military and economic power in the Warsaw Pact. If all Soviet expenditure and forces are counted, the Soviet Union carries more than eighty per cent of the Pact's military burden (compared with about sixty percent of NATO's costs borne by the United States) and provides seventy-five per cent of the Pact's troops (compared with forty-two per cent of NATO's troops supplied by the United States).[4] These facts alone would make the Soviet Union the dominant power in the Pact. But Soviet control of the Pact's military institutions rests mainly on more direct methods: it fills the most important positions with its own officers; it imposes a uniform military doctrine on the member states; it controls the education of senior officers from all the member countries except Romania.

Nevertheless, in spite of Soviet efforts, the Warsaw Pact is not a monolith. The political and economic ailments that have beset Eastern Europe over the last thirty years have affected the Pact in various ways.

First, political upheaval in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980-81) have had apparently profound effects on the armed forces of those countries, and may have weakened their fighting effectiveness. If the Soviet General Staff believes - as it may very well do - that these forces are not wholly reliable or effective, this may affect their military policy in Europe by making it imperative to avoid a long war and to achieve the goals of any campaign in Europe as quickly as possible. The reliability of military forces is difficult to assess in the abstract, however, and caution is needed in making judgements on this issue. Although the reliability of these forces may give the Soviet Union pause for thought, NATO cannot be sure that these forces would not fight effectively, since the pressures of military discipline and

training might well overcome the undoubted political disaffection that exists in Eastern Europe. Moreover, in combat it is likely that the natural reaction of troops when fired upon would be to fire back.

Second, East European economies have not been thriving in recent years, and military expenditure and burden-sharing have become a contentious issue within the Warsaw Pact. The non-Soviet members of the Pact have not always responded to Soviet pressure to increase their military expenditure, and the quality of the equipment in their forces has been declining as a result.[5]

Third, the Warsaw Pact was affected by splits and tensions in the international communist movement. Albania quit the Pact in the 1960s. Romania, in the pursuit of its own independence, has managed to evade some of the most important mechanisms of Soviet control: it has its own military doctrine of national defense, and its own system of education for senior officers. Moreover, it does not allow Pact exercises on its territory.

Fourth, disagreements have been caused in the Warsaw Pact by the increase in political tension in Europe as a result of the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces. In January 1984 Mátyás Szürös, the Hungarian Party Secretary responsible for foreign relations, wrote that the problems faced by Eastern European states "do not call for uniform solutions, but much more for methods that make optimum allowances for [national] characteristics". He noted that "relations between a particular socialist and capitalist country" could "flourish [even] when the general trend is one of deterioration of East-West relations and of a narrowing of contacts".[6] In the summer of 1984 East Germany acted in line with this assessment when it persisted with plans for Party leader Erich Honecker to visit West Germany long after the Soviet Union had shown its displeasure. That visit was finally cancelled, but not before Hungary and Romania had made clear their support for the East German stand.

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There are specific conjunctural reasons why such disagreements should have emerged in the recent years. The Soviet leadership was weak and uncertain during this period, and this may have emboldened the Eastern European leaders to assert their own interests in foreign policy. There have been signs that under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union will insist more emphatically on the primacy of "socialist internationalism" (in effect, Soviet control) over "national" interests in the foreign policy of the Pact. Second, in the 1970s, the years of detente, some of the Eastern European states developed an economic and political stake in good relations with the West, and in particular with Western Europe. As a result, they have been unhappy about the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations, and have tried to salvage some elements of detente in Europe. The Soviet handling of the INF issue, and in particular the Soviet response to the NATO deployment, seems to have caused some dismay in Eastern Europe: even Czechoslovakia, one of the most orthodox regimes, made public the fact that many of its citizens were unhappy about the stationing of Soviet operational-tactical missiles in their country in response to NATO's INF deployment.

But the disagreements over foreign policy also represent a long-term trend, I believe, since they arise from the different interests of ruling groups in Eastern Europe. The power of these groups rests not only on the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, but also on economic and political conditions in their own countries. East European ruling groups have a stake in the existing bloc structure insofar as their rule depends - in significant measure - on the Soviet military presence in the region. But they have also sought a relaxation of tension and an expansion of economic and political ties with the West in order to pursue economic growth and political stability at home. Disbandment of the blocs would threaten the power of these groups, but

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tighter bloc cohesion and discipline restricts their room for maneuver in seeking stability at home.

It is of course dangerous to generalize about the diverse states of Eastern Europe, and not all ruling elites have seen it to be in their interest to pursue closer ties with the West; nor have the different states pursued consistent policies over time. Nevertheless, most have believed that the relaxation of tension and the expansion of ties serve their economic and political interests. Because the Soviet Union has some interest in the stability and viability of the Eastern European regimes, it may try to accommodate such a trend - though only as long as that does not undermine Soviet control. Insofar as this does happen, the Pact will continue to become more like an alliance, rather than merely an instrument of Soviet domination.

What conclusions can be drawn from this brief survey?

First, there is no "crisis of will" in the Warsaw Pact, if by that is meant a weakening of the Soviet determination to dominate Eastern Europe. Nor is there a crisis of Soviet military power in the region: the Soviet Union is well able to maintain its dominant position there. The renewal of the Pact in March of this year suggests that the Soviet Union continues to see it as a more or less solid rock in the sea of its East European troubles, and as an instrument through which to try to prevent the emergence in Europe of threats to Soviet security.

Second, there is a "crisis of rule": the Soviet Union may control the region, but - as the political upheavals in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia show - it cannot ensure the viability or legitimacy of the regimes there. The search by the East European ruling elites for political viability creates pressure for them to pursue their own interests in foreign policy. In the 1970s this led to an expansion of political and economic ties with the West,

and especially with Western Europe; and in the early 1980s it has led to some resistance to the cutting back of those ties.

Third, social, economic and political conditions in Eastern Europe affect the reliability and readiness of the non-Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact, and this has potentially significant consequences for the military balance in Europe. Although the Soviet Union is by far the dominant power in the Pact, the non-Soviet forces contribute a nominal fifty-five divisions to the Pact order of battle, compared with thirty-one Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe. Yet these forces are, by and large, not as well equipped or as ready as the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and from the Soviet point of view the utility of some of them - especially of the Romanian forces - must be in doubt.

Fourth, the problems the Soviet Union faces in the Pact do constrain its policy in Europe. Doubts about the reliability of the non-Soviet forces may increase the uncertainties that Soviet military planners must deal with in thinking about war, and planning military operations, in Europe. In a more general way, the methods that the Soviet Union uses to dominate Eastern Europe are a constant reminder to people in the West of the harsh and dictatorial character of Soviet rule. This greatly reinforces the cohesion of NATO and undermines Soviet policy towards Western Europe, for the Soviet Union has consistently put greater priority on its control over Eastern Europe than it has on its efforts to weaken the cohesion of NATO. This is a very profound and important weakness in Soviet policy towards the West.

Fifth, it is very hard to see how NATO can exploit the potetial unreliability of the non-Soviet forces of the Pact in any immediate or significant way in order to undermine the cohesion of the Pact, given the Soviet Union's control over those forces. It is probably to the Western

advantage that the Soviet Union may be uncertain about how those forces would fight. But it may not be an unalloyed advantage, since the Soviet Union, if it felt its position weakening in Eastern Europe in the heat of a crisis, might resort to drastic military action to forestall the loss of its control over the region.

Sixth, from the Western point of view, the assertion of national interests in the foreign policies of the non-Soviet members of the Pact may prove more important, since it opens up opportunities for diplomatic measures to try to influence the political evolution of Europe in the direction of a more open, equitable and cooperative order in Europe. In spite of setbacks and disappointments, the Helsinki process has played some role in doing this, and a successful result to the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe could help to continue this trend. The West ought to develop its relations with the non-Soviet members of the Pact with this goal in mind, and to see recent divergences within the Pact as part of a process of the "Europeanization" of European security, which has been affecting both parts of Europe. This process springs from the desire of European states to retain some elements of detente on the continent, even after the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente. If sensibly managed, this process could lead to a less confrontational style of politics, and contribute to international security by enhancing the stability and security of this crucially important region.

NOTES.

1. This is based on recent discussions in Beijing.

2. Zdenek Mlynar, Nightfrost in Prague, New York: Karz Publications, 1980, p. 239.

3. See, for example, M.M. Kir'ian (ed.) Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i vooruzhennye sily, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982, pp. 312-313.

4. See David Holloway, 'The Warsaw Pact in Transition', in David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp (eds.) The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 37.

5. See Condoleezza Rice, 'Defense Burden-Sharing', in Holloway and Sharp (eds.) op. cit., pp. 59-86.

6. In Tarsadalmi Szemle, January 1984; quoted by Charles Gati, 'Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well', Problems of Communism, March-April 1985, p. 79.

Senator PRESSLER. Excuse me. I will have to interrupt you here. It is part of the ritual of the Senate. I have to vote. I will be back in about 5 minutes.

The committee will stand in recess until I return.

Excuse me, please.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator PRESSLER. I apologize for the delay. The immigration bill demanded my presence.

Mr. Holloway, would you please conclude.

Mr. HOLLOWAY. I had just concluded when you were called away, Senator.

Senator PRESSLER. Oh, fine.

I will now call on Ms. Karen Dawisha. She is professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. The author of several books and more than fifty articles on Soviet policy, her most recent book, "The Kremlin and the Prague Spring," has been described as a "classic" in the analysis of Soviet crisis management. She is the recipient of many fellowships and awards, including a Rockefeller International Relations Fellowship and a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship; and she has taught at universities in Europe and the United States. While teaching in England, she served as the Specialist Adviser on Soviet Policy to the British House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and as the editor of two books on Soviet policy written for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Most recently, she taught at Princeton University and was the director of the East European Study Group at the Council on Foreign Relations, by whom she has been commissioned to write a book on Eastern Europe, due to appear in the spring.

We welcome you here.

STATEMENT OF KAREN DAWISHA, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK

Ms. DAWISHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think in the interest of time I will keep my remarks as short as possible, particularly since I have already submitted a quite lengthy statement for the record, and also because I found myself in remarkable agreement with the views expressed by previous speakers.

One of the points that I made repeatedly in my submission and that I would like to stress here to you is that, although the title of the session that we are talking about today is "The Crisis of Will in the Warsaw Pact," I myself and previous speakers have said that we don't see any real crisis of will. Nor, I think, would we say that there is a current "hot crisis" anywhere in Eastern Europe in the sense that there is no imminent Soviet invasion of any particular country.

Looking at my paper, you would come to the conclusion that it is my view, and it is indeed my view, that once a crisis breaks out, it's already too late to think about what Western policy should be. I think that is the major reason why the academic community and other interested people welcome and should welcome hearings such as this, because it affords a particularly useful opportunity to think

and reflect about appropriate Western responses in times of crisis without having to be rushed into responses which are already too late once the crisis is upon us.

I use the words "being rushed into responses that are already too late," because it is my view and I think it is the view that David Holloway also expressed, that the Soviet Union's interest in Eastern Europe and its military position in Eastern Europe is preeminent.

In a time of crisis, the Soviet Union will prevail. Therefore, the challenge for the West is to adopt and to decide on strategies that it can pursue toward Eastern Europe which actually will prevent such crises.

In this sense, I think that I would agree with Helmut Sonnenfeldt when he says that we must avoid either the counsels of despair—those people who say that there is nothing that we can do about Eastern Europe—and those who say that we should agree with those who would counsel recklessness, those who would say that we can bring the Soviet Union to its knees if we promote actively measures which would bring crises in Eastern Europe.

So, hearings of this type and great reflection in the West about policies toward Eastern Europe are extremely important.

Why is it that our interests in Eastern Europe are not served by crises?

Why is it that the counsels of recklessness should not be heeded?

First of all, if we look at all of the crises, major crises, that have occurred in Eastern Europe since the imposition of Soviet control, since the Second World War—that is, 1956 in Hungary; 1961 in Berlin, 1968 in Czechoslovakia; 1981 in Poland—Western security was not enhanced by the fact of the crises or by the aftermath of these crises. In no case can we say that Western security interests, the interests of NATO as a whole, or the interests of any single member of NATO were enhanced by these crises.

That is the first point.

Second, the security interests of the East Europeans themselves were substantially undermined as a result of these crises. Soviet security interests prevailed. This is to say that Soviet security is predicated during times of crisis on East European insecurity. And although they would like to see develop in Eastern Europe a viable and stronger alliance, when push comes to shove and when they have to make a choice, they will protect their own specific security interests at the expense of other security interests in Eastern Europe.

In addition, East European aspirations for democratic transformation are very specifically undermined as a result of crises. We can find no example at all where domestic transformations in Eastern Europe were aided by crisis. And if, therefore, it is a fundamental objective of Western policy to seek the gradual establishment or improvement of the human rights situation and of democratic freedoms in Eastern Europe, crisis and the promotion of crisis are not the routes.

Finally, the Soviet Union itself is not weakened by crises in Eastern Europe. It has been pointed out by Al Haig in his memoirs that there were hard-liners on the National Security Council during the Polish crisis who had the view that we should promote crises in

Eastern Europe as a way of bringing the Soviet Union to its knees. But the Soviet Union has not been weakened by any round of crisis in Eastern Europe. It has not been transformed or evolved along lines that we might wish it to be. And neither has it proved to be weaker after a crisis than it was before the crisis. So, all of the basic hypotheses depended on by the counsels of recklessness are disproved by the historical record.

What, therefore, is required?

In the first place, cool-headed recognition in the West that the Soviet Union is in a position of overwhelming geopolitical preeminence in Eastern Europe. We may not agree with that. We certainly did not directly support it, and we do not even connive in it, but it is a fact.

Second, what we need to recognize is that the Soviet Union enjoys levers of control in Eastern Europe which go beyond the barrel of the gun. Its position in Eastern Europe is not secured only through the position of its own forces in East European countries. It has close and far-reaching interrelationships with party leaders, cultural establishments, and other political circles, and these levers of control will be difficult, if not impossible, to break through the promotion of crises.

[Ms. Dawisha's prepared statement follows:]

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION: FISSURE POINTS AND WESTERN OPPORTUNITIES (1)

DR. KAREN DAWISHA
PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK

There has been considerable debate, and much wishful thinking, in recent months about Yalta being "unfinished business."(2) Whatever the personal preferences of individual Americans might be, the fact remains, however, that the fate of Eastern Europe has not been, and is unlikely to become, a casus belli for the West. Indeed since the Second World War, the price paid for the considerable stability achieved in Europe and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been the de facto acceptance of unrepresentative regimes in Eastern Europe. The dilemma facing American and Western leaders lies, therefore, in framing policies which at a minimum maintain and enhance stability without appearing to endorse the negative aspects of these regimes. And optimally such policies should seek to promote and produce positive and constructive change inside Eastern Europe without putting stability at risk.

The formulation of such policies is made all the more difficult because although Eastern Europe is not a geographical region which most Americans would go to war for, it is nevertheless one of the most volatile and sensitive regions on the globe; and crises there could so easily escalate, enveloping first Germany, then spreading to engulf the rest of the NATO alliance,and threatening nuclear conflagration. The need, therefore, is for policies which balance the recognition of universal desires to promote constructive change inside Eastern Europe with the greater interest in maintaining regional security.

The need to give priority to security over change arises not because of a callous disregard for the moral

1. Portions of this paper will appear in a forthcoming study edited by Richard Vine, Director of the Atlantic Institute in Paris; and in my own book on Eastern Europe, due to be published by the Council on Foreign Relations in spring, 1986.

2. This phrase appears in the first sentence of a recent article by Zbigniew Brzezinski ("The Future of Yalta," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1984/85, pp.279-302) in which the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs argues in favor of policies designed to redraw the map of Europe.

necessity to promote policies in Eastern Europe which give greater attention to human rights and democratic freedoms. Rather, it is because previous experience has shown that the Soviet Union and local regimes cannot be 'forced' by the West to provide such rights and freedoms. The use of existing crises, or the promotion of crises through intrusive diplomatic and military policies of "roll-back" or "de-coupling" in Eastern Europe, has universally backfired. It took a decade before Hungary began to emerge from the political devastation wreaked by the 1956 Soviet invasion. Czechoslovakia has yet to emerge from the aftereffects of the 1968 intervention; and in Poland it is impossible to forecast when the population will once again enjoy any of the rights and freedoms accrued before the imposition of martial law. Soviet insecurity has produced invasions, not concessions.

But concessions have been forthcoming when Soviet control has not been directly challenged, and few would deny that the standard of living and the quality of life has improved for the vast majority of East Europeans in the last forty years. Such improvements are a testimony to the fact that the Soviet and East European elites are sensitive to the need to improve the viability, legitimacy and popularity of their rule, the lack of which has been the major source of all the many crises which have plagued the region since the war.

The dilemma for the Soviets is in increasing viability without losing control,(3) and the parallel requirement for U.S. policy, therefore, lies in encouraging the process of domestic transformation without threatening the wider stability between the two blocs. The pursuit by the Soviet Union and the United States of such parallel policies is not only feasible and realistic, but also consistent with the dual moral and military underpinnings of U.S. policy. It has often been said that for the U.S. East Central Europe is a target in search of a policy,(4) and in order for any policy to succeed a clearer understanding of Soviet and East European conceptions of their own security requirements and

3. The Soviet difficulty in maintaining such a balance between viability and control is discussed by John Campbell in his excellent contribution to Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, by Yale University Press, 1984, Chapter One.

4. Bennett Kovrig, "The United States: 'Peaceful Engagement' Revisited," in Charles Gati, ed., THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EASTERN EUROPE, New York: Praeger, 1976, p. 143.

also of the means used by the Soviet Union to maintain control in Eastern Europe is needed--both of which are discussed below, in sections which serve as a prelude to a much lengthier analysis of Western policies.

THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF EASTERN EUROPE

Former Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev uncategorically told the Dubcek government following the Soviet invasion in 1968 that the Soviets had been prepared to maintain their position in Eastern Europe even at the cost of a third world war. (5) Why do the Russians attach so much importance to the protection of their position in Eastern Europe?

First is the historical fact that the valleys and plains of Poland and Czechoslovakia have provided easy access to the Russian and Ukrainian heartland since Napoleonic times. Winston Churchill's initial support for granting Moscow a modified cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe lent credance to the Soviet view that steps had to be taken to prevent those routes from being used by any future aggressor as a dagger aimed at Russia's heartland.

Secondly the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe served to suppress both overt and latent conflicts in that region between states, nationalities, ethnic groups and religions. All of these conflicts had served as kindling for the flames of war which had regularly engulfed Europe as well as Russia both before and after the 1917 revolution. Although few Western governments mourned the passing of leaders with pro-Nazi sympathies in Bulgaria, Rumania, Slovakia or even Hungary when the Red Army took over after the war, it is well to remember that from the Soviet point of view Czechoslovakia and Poland, too, about whose fate the West was ostensibly much more concerned, had been extremely troublesome neighbors in the inter-war period, with Tomas Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia, accused by the Soviets of openly supporting White Russian efforts to topple Lenin and with the Poles, in but one of the many examples of the centuries old hostility between the two countries, directly engaging the Red Army in 1920. The Soviets see their presence in Eastern Europe, therefore, as providing both a defensive glacis against future Western ground attack and a stabilizer or pacifier of the troublesome Central European and Balkan rivalries which had in centuries past plagued Europe.

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5. According to the eyewitness account of a Czechoslovak Party Secretary who later emigrated and published his memoirs: Zdenek Mlynar, NACHTFROST, Koln: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1978, p. 301.

(4)

Thirdly, the ideological legitimacy of Soviet-style socialism is on the line in Eastern Europe, much more than it is in less developed socialist countries such as Cuba, Vietnam or Afghanistan. A substantial setback for socialism in an LDC could be justified ideologically, as it was in the cases of China and Albania, by saying that this was a basically semi-feudal society insufficiently developed to make the transition directly to socialism. No such convincing excuse could be mustered if socialism were to collapse in Poland, for example, although the continued strength of the Church and widespread links between Polish citizens and the Western Polish emigre community would allow Moscow to talk of `remnants of the bourgeois past aided by foreign subversion'.

The most damaging event of all would be the erosion or disintegration of socialism in the German Democratic Republic, long the staunchest of Moscow's supporters in Central Europe, representing the western-most extension of Soviet power and the very birthplace of Marxism, where the standard of living of its inhabitants has for years been higher than the Soviet Union's. The collapse of socialism, Soviet-style, anywhere in Central Europe would have the most serious implications not just for the vitality of communist rule elsewhere in the bloc but also for the legitimacy of Communist rule in the Soviet Union itself, exposing as it would the central core of Soviet ideology, namely the universality of the historical process and the irreversability of dialectical materialism, to be a sham.

Beyond its status as buffer, place d'armes, and barometer of socialism's waxing or waning fortunes, Eastern Europe exercises tremendous and contradictory symbolic importance in domestic Soviet intellectual and political life. The `arrival' of Soviet power throughout Eastern Europe, by fair means or foul, in the post-war era represented the most tangible proof to date of Moscow's superpower status. The concomitant refusal of Western leaders to accept de jure the post-war territorial changes they had been obliged to accept de facto served, therefore, as a rebuff not just to Moscow's control over the area but also to its broader global standing. As a result, the maintenance of its position in Eastern Europe and the achievement of Western recognition of that position has come to assume a special place in Soviet diplomatic strategy and explains the disproportionately greater time the Soviet Union puts into efforts, such as the Helsinki process, which would formally legitimize post-war realities.

In the realm of domestic Soviet intellectual life, the existence of friendly regimes in the very heartland of Europe promotes the continuation of debates which date back to the beginning of the nineteenth century and before about

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(5)

the appropriate cultural relationship Russia should seek with its European neighbors. The more negative and xenophobic variant sees the value of Eastern Europe as a sealant, hermetically closing the Russian border off from that area of the world--namely Europe--which has, since Slavophile times, served as an alternative cultural model, simultaneously producing split loyalties amongst the Russian intelligentsia and weakening the hold of central authority. On the other hand, the modern-day 'Westernizers' see Eastern Europe as part of Europe and its existence inside the Soviet bloc is welcomed by this group as a conduit promoting the necessary and positive cultural evolution of Russia. Eastern Europe, in this way, is seen by more liberally-minded Soviets as a green-house for the reform of their own system, a place where varying economic and political strategies for the amelioration of socialism's more negative aspects can be tested, under what could euphemistically be called controlled circumstances.

The division inside the Soviet Union between the contemporary 'Slavophils' and 'Westernizers' is not a horizontal one between elite and dissident, but rather a vertical one in which both the elites and the dissidents are split, although to be sure the experience of Soviet control of Eastern Europe would indicate that within the elite, the 'Slavophils' are not only predominant but are unstoppable in times of crisis. Indeed, during the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis Western intelligence sources noted that local Soviet party leaders were being faced with a significant increase in Russian nationalism against the Czechs; and in 1969, a samizdat publication appeared in Moscow rumored to have been written by a high Party official entitled "The National Shame of Great Russians" which acknowledged the power of Great Russian nationalism at the highest levels as a powerful motivator of the decision to invade.(6)

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6. The intelligence source is U.S. Department of State, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM, RSE-127, August 16, 1968 (declassified for the author under the Freedom of Information Act). The samizdat piece is reprinted in Stephen Cohen, ed., AN END TO SILENCE; UNCENSORED OPINION IN THE SOVIET UNION, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982, pp.293-6. The image of "Dual Russia" and the hold on contemporary political life that it continues to have is brilliantly discussed by Robert C. Tucker, THE SOVIET POLITICAL MIND, New York: W.W. Norton, 1966, Chapter Six.

6

EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

It is not surprising that East European views of their own security requirements are somewhat at odds with Moscow's. Even the most loyal bloc leader would chafe at the notion that some Soviet leaders see East Europe's primary functions as a defensive glacis, protecting Fortress Moscow and as an ideological glacier, freezing out foreign bacteria before they spread to threaten Fortress Marx. And there are, therefore, many points of divergence between Moscow and even its staunchest bloc allies.

If the Soviet Union sought after the war a cordon sanitaire to protect itself from any future security threats emanating from the west, the countries of Central Europe also sought guarantees of security from their own historically hostile neighbors. Confluence was achieved between certain of the Soviet and East European objectives with the demilitarization and division of Germany, but Moscow was unable to protect Eastern Europe from the other traditional source of insecurity--namely Russia itself. The Soviet control of Eastern Europe, therefore, designed to promote greater Soviet security became from the moment of its inception, the major source of insecurity in Eastern Europe. Indeed it is widely believed in Eastern Europe that Soviet security is predicated on East European insecurity and that Eastern Europe's value as a place d'armes and theater for forward military operations by the Soviet army relies on the openness of East European borders to armies from the east and therefore on East European vulnerability to resist any such encroachments.

The very perception of East European insecurity has hampered efforts by successive regimes throughout the post-war period to establish a popular basis of support amongst their own people. The fact that the vast majority of East European leaders are considered by their own people as serving Moscow's security interests over their own is a major impediment to the legitimization of these regimes and is therefore a fundamental source of instability. And it is a major irony that this instability, by producing, or contributing to the successive crises that have rocked the area in the last forty years, rebounds negatively to harm Soviet security. There is thus created a downward spiral of negative phenomena is which the Soviets promote their own security at the expense of East European regimes, which become more unstable as a result of this acquiescence. The failure to build domestic bases of support makes these regimes vulnerable to popular pressures, producing crises which they are too weak to manage alone. The Soviets, perceiving a marked increase in threats to their security take steps which involve extensive political and sometimes military interference. Such measures, which may remove the threat to Soviet security in the short run, do nothing either to improve the long-term viability of these regimes or, as a result, general security in Central Europe.

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But this overly pessimistic picture has to be balanced by acknowledging that over the past forty years all of the regimes in Eastern Europe have improved the bases of their domestic support, and although there exists nowhere any regime which meets Western standards of human rights and democratic freedoms, nevertheless all the regimes in Eastern Europe are probably less unstable now, and therefore less prone to crisis and collapse, than they were in the first years of direct Soviet control. It is also important to emphasize that Soviet control of Eastern Europe would simply collapse if there were not also some crucial points of convergence between Soviet and East European conceptions of security, and it is these common perspectives which give the Warsaw Pact whatever viability it enjoys as a true 'alliance'.

Agreement with, or at a minimum acquiescence to, the Soviet definition of security is primarily at the elite level in Eastern Europe, amongst what the Soviets euphemistically call 'realistic circles'. This agreement is based on the view that as long as NATO exists, there will be a need for a counter-balancing military organization. The legitimacy and viability of individual regimes rests too on Soviet support and backing, both bilaterally and internationally. This was the case, for example, with the GDR before 1970 when the absence of de jure international recognition made its very existence tenuous and dependent upon Soviet support. Beyond this rather special case, there is also the more universal fact that in the absence of a post-war peace treaty, it fell to Moscow to guarantee post-war territorial changes, not only between East and West but also within the Eastern bloc itself.

The post-war Polish annexation of eastern Silesia and the forcible expulsion of its German occupants, many of whom became citizens of the GDR, continues to be an issue in which there is broad coincidence of view between Warsaw and Moscow--even at the expense of another Pact ally. Indeed, despite their historical and continuing hostility toward the Russians, the Poles concede that never before in modern history have so many Poles lived within the boundaries of what is now an almost exclusively Polish state. Not since the centuries preceding the rein by the Teutonic Knights has German suzerainty over Baltic affairs been weaker; and Poland looks to Moscow to guarantee that weakness for the foreseeable future.

The Czechs too recognized the important Soviet role in the allied liberation from fascism, and in the expulsion of the Sudetan Germans who had governed during the war. The Czechs consistently sought, with Soviet backing, the renunciation ab initio of German claims to any Czech

territory, a demand which effects not only emigre claims for repatriation and reparations but which ends 'once and for all' the 'myth' of Germanic claims to Bohemia, claims which conceivably could emanate in the future from any German source--East or West. Equally, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets supported Czech dominance of the multi-national Czechoslavak state, at the particular expense of the Slovaks who with their lower educational and industrial levels and their history of Nazi collaboration quickly became a disgruntled minority. The very real loyalties the Czechs felt toward the Russians were crushed in 1968, however; and since then the Slovaks themselves--who (with the notable exception of Alexander Dubcek) had generally proved to be less interested than the Western-oriented Czechs in the liberal aspects of the Prague reform movement--have assumed under their own leader, Gustav Husak, a more dominant role in the newly-federated system.

The Hungarians and the Bulgarians each in their different ways have managed to extract certain benefits from their alliance with Moscow. The Hungarians, after recovering from the devastation of learning that they would not be allowed to go the way of neutral Austria, have managed to pursue moderate, steady reforms which have succeeded in making Budapest the pride of Eastern Europe. The Bulgarians, whose loyalties to Russia have always been the strongest in Eastern Europe because of the common bonds of language, religion and Slavic origins, now find their status and sovereignty in South-Central Europe uniquely enhanced and guaranteed after centuries of tutelage to stronger rulers in Vienna, Constantinople and Belgrade.

Of all the country members of the Warsaw Pact, it is perhaps only Rumania which has stood to gain little from the post-war division of Europe. Its eastern provinces forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union, and unlike Poland, receiving nothing in return, it is also constantly at loggerheads with its socialist neighbors over its poor treatment of ethnic minorities, such as Hungarians. But with a longer historical perspective, one also sees that of all the nationalities and nation-states of Eastern Europe, Rumania perhaps more than any other, including the Poles, has almost never been the master of its own fate. Its current role as maverick, while not in the same league, does nevertheless open up possibilities for Rumanian leaders to play a significant role on the world stage far beyond that country's demographic, economic, or military standing.

If certain national interests of the various East European states have been supported by the Soviet Union in its bid to construct a tenable alliance, the same is true of the narrower personal interests of the East European elite. Among them are of course many loyal and staunch communists who, we must assume, would choose to live in a socialist

sytem if as they say they had to do it all over again. This group's credentials often rest on loyalty rather than expertise, and many of them in Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, are regarded by more reform-minded, but not necessarily pro-Western, communists as an impediment to positive change. One such example was the leader of the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party, Walter Ulbricht, who in 1968 is reported to have become hysterical at a closed Pact enclave when Janos Kadar, the Hungarian Party chief, suggested that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would not be necessary. At one point, according to an eyewitness account, Ulbricht impatiently interrupted Kadar and shouted: "If you think, Comrade Kadar, that you are helping the cause of socialism with your objections..., then you are making a big mistake....Once the American-West German imperialists have got Czechoslovakia in their control then you will be the next to go, Comrade Kadar. But this is something you can't or won't understand!"(7)

A second group consists of a rather substantial, and perhaps growing, strata of professionally qualified but ideologically disengaged officials who seek high party and state positions in order to receive the perks and prerequisites of life at the top of the nomenklatura ladder. The excesses and corruption of the Gierek period in Poland are viewed throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union as an extreme example of a tendency which exists universally in the communist bloc.(8)

A third major group represents the expert, loyal, culturally sophisticated intelligentsia/elite, from whose ranks rise many of the economic reforms and cultural

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7. Quoted by Erwin Weit (EYEWITNESS, London: Andre Deutsch, 1973, p.201) who was Gomulka's interpreter at the July meeting in Warsaw when these remarks were made.

8. For a frank Polish account of the causes and origins of the crisis in Poland see the special issue of SISYPHUS; SOCIOLOGIAL STUDIES, Vol. 3, Warsaw, : Polish Scientific Publishers, 1982. The Soviet debates on the Polish crisis generally, but not universally, concluded that the causes lay in societal features, such as the strength of the Church, specific to Poland. However, there is evidence of a vigorous challenge to his view in which it is argued that not only was the crisis in Poland systemic, but that all Soviet-style systems will be prone to such crises unless there is wide-spread and thorough-going reform. Two examples of articles which have expressed such views are Ye. A. Ambartsumov, "V.I. Lenin's Analysis of the Causes of the 1921 Crisis and the Ways of Overcoming It," VOPROSY ISTORII, No. 4. April 1984, pp. 15-29; and A.P. Butenko, "Once More About the Contradictions of Socialism," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No. 2, February, 1984, pp. 124-129.

programs which are designed to serve indigenous national requirements and which therefore sometimes have the effect of forging closer links with Western Europe than Moscow might otherwise encourage. Kadar is the symbol of this group, but if the West's hopes for change through evolution in Eastern Europe are realistic, they would depend on the existence of a growing number of high level elites who share this perspective. Kadar's longevity in office is of course a testimony to his political skill, but is also an indication that Moscow values not only his acumen but is sensitive to the need to seek peaceful change and increase regime viability. Kadar's tenure is all the more remarkable when viewed against the backdrop of the last two decades during which Moscow first endorsed the 1969 Czechoslovak purge of over half the entire communist party bureaucracy; then cast aside East German Party boss Walter Ulbricht despite his proverbial "1000%" loyalty; and finally allowed Edward Gierek to tumble in Poland, even though in so doing it effectively ended the facade of communist party rule, eventually necessitating the first Soviet-sponsored military takeover of a communist country. And in the Soviet Union itself, first Andropov and then Gorbachev gave notice that time-servers and corrupt officials would no longer enjoy offical protection. It remains to be seen whether such efforts inside the U.S.S.R. bear any chance of success, although Gorbachev's statement that the process in the Soviet Union requires "very deep restructuring [in which] everyone has got to restructure things, restyle his whole way of working and thinking"(9) is a testimony to his appreciation of the enormity of the task at hand.

Strangely enough, it is the realization by East European leaders that they lack domestic popularity which gives them the most leverage with Moscow, insofar as they can resist the more unacceptable manifestations of loyalty (or servility) to Moscow by threatening that too close an open association with Soviet policy will only further decrease domestic popularity and may even lead the system to collapse. The Hungarians certainly would not have been able to implement many of the most radical aspects of their economic reforms without understanding at the highest levels in Moscow. Kadar's particularly glowing praise for "our friend" Yuri Andropov, when the latter was elected General Secretary, supports the widespread view that Andropov, who in many previous capacities had been responsible for Hungarian affairs, may have been one of the Soviet leaders to argue that too great an emphasis on overt displays of

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9. The edited transcript of Gorbachev's interview with TIME magazine, September 9, 1985, p. 29.

loyalty actually creates more problems for Soviet control than it solves.(10)

There have been very few leaders in either Eastern Europe or in Moscow, however, who have been able to perform this rather delicate balancing act, and the system of Soviet control has on many occasions threatened to collapse. The examples one could cite are numerous; and the reasons too are complex. But amongst them one could list sheer imcompetence on the part of the leadership (e.g. Novotny's accretion of power and Gierek's corruption); overwhelming pressure from the Soviet Union (as in the wide-spread purges of the early 1950s following the break with Tito); popular revolt (East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Poland, 1980-81); regime revolt (Yugoslavia, Rumania; and Czechoslovakia, 1968); pressure from the West (particularly the Hallstein doctrine aimed at isolating East Germany in the early 1960s and the policy of building bridges formulated in the mid-1960s to wean individual East European countries away from Soviet control); or any simultaneous or sequential combination of the above. In order to understand the dynamics of crisis, and the concomitant prerequisites for Western policy, the whole issue of the levers of Soviet control in Eastern Europe needs to be examined.

THE LEVERS OF CONTROL

De-Stalinization put a halt to many arbitrary practices in Eastern Europe. It virtually eliminated the direct and overt Soviet supervision of key ministries in every bloc capital. It led to the signature of all the bilateral and multilaternal defense agreements and treaties governing the status of Soviet forces in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany--with Soviet forces actually being withdrawn from Rumania and Czechoslovakia, never to return to Rumania and returning only by force of arms to Czechoslovakia in 1968. While Stalinist methods were harsher and more all-embracing than contemporary means, the Soviet presence is still substantial and is especially acute in the key area of security.

How does the Soviet Union use its various levers of control to ensure that its own, and not rival, views of security are protected and promoted in the bloc? Ever since

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10. As argued by Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline and Reform?" PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, January-February, 1983, p.22.

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the signature of the 1955 Treaty extablishing the Warsaw Pact, the East European regimes have accepted the Soviet argument that successful intelligence and counter-intelligence against NATO requires cooperation between the Soviet KGB and its East European counterparts. And since it is Eastern Europe which borders on the West, it is the East European regimes which act as hosts to their KGB colleagues. The substantial monitoring facilities along the entire border between Eastern and Western Europe are operated primarily by the Soviets; and while they are there ostensibly to eavesdrop on NATO, their capability to listen in on similar communications within East European countries is established and acknowledged by East European leaders themselves. Moreover, the acceptance of the need for cooperation in fact ensures both far greater Soviet access to bloc intelligence files than visa versa and also the presence in all the bloc capitals of Soviet intelligence officers assigned under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact to act as liaison officials.

This system would be inoperable without the active cooperation of the entire top strata within the East European intelligence community. Such cooperation is guaranteed not only by Soviet participation in the selection, training and promotion of key officials but also by maintaining a network of two-check employees who, while receiving one salary for their official work in sensitive East European ministries, receive another salary for reporting privately to Moscow. Certainly during the Prague Spring, despite the efforts of Josef Pavel, the Minister of Interior who was appointed without Soviet knowledge or approval, the whole carefully constructed system of liaison officers, monitoring stations, pro-Soviet deputy ministers, and two-check employees (estimated by one Czech official to include one-third of the entire apparat of the Prague central office of the Ministry of Interior in 1968) (11) frustrated the efforts of the Dubcek leadership to liberalize the system and explained why, on more than one occasion, Dubcek was awakened by calls from Brezhnev angrily complaining about some activity or publication about which Dubcek himself had not yet been informed.

While the Soviets were able to monitor events very closely in Czechoslovakia through the intelligence network, de-Stalinization meant that the KGB was no longer able itself to put an end to the reform movement. And when it became clear that the various 'organs of state administration' inside Czechoslovakia were themselves unwilling to take 'administrative action' repeatedly and publicly urged upon them by Moscow, then external military

11.According to Zdenek Mlynar, as interviewed by author, and quoted in Karen Dawisha, THE KREMLIN AND THE PRAGUE SPRING, Berkeley: California University Press, 1984, p. 53.

(13)

force was used. In Poland, twelve years later, an invasion was averted because pro-Soviet sympathies were not yet exhausted inside the sensitive ministries, with both the military and the police remaining hostile to Solidarity.

Ultimate Soviet control of Eastern Europe is, therefore, exercised against the backdrop of this threat of force. But the use of force, while excellent for the control of territory, is both inefficient and counter-productive for the control of populations over any length of time. And a further dilemma facing the Soviets is that the WTO and the other bilateral military relationships in the Pact have to be designed to present a credible military threat to NATO without giving East European armies individually or collectively the ability to defy the Soviet Union. Over time, a number of structures and measures have been evolved by the Soviets to suit these purposes. First of all, as with bloc intelligence cadres, all high-ranking East European military officers are trained in the Soviet Union, with promotion to the highest ranks strictly controlled by Moscow. The political loyalty and morale of East European military establishments is constantly monitored in Moscow and is under the direct control of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. At the first sign of dissent or crisis in any East European country, an MPA delegation almost inevitably appears to assess the extent to which the contagion has spread to the military, with the joint communique making the inevitable references to the fact that while 'subversion is at the forefront of imperialism's efforts to weaken the unity and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, such attempts are doomed to failure, since the unity of the socialist armies in the face of these latest provocations has never been higher'.

The Soviets do not count on assurances of loyalty alone, however. While the East European armies are equipped with all the latest conventional weaponry to fulfil their role against NATO, they are kept very short of ammunition and they operate with a command and communications structure which would be ineffective without Soviet control. Indeed, U.S. intelligence at the time of the 1980 Polish crisis calculated that Soviet control of the Polish military command structure, communications network and ammunition depots was so complete as to virtually preclude organized Polish military resistance to any Soviet invasion. And the status of forces agreements governing the movement of Soviet forces in Poland and other bloc states, on the other hand, allows Soviet troops to be mobilized and deployed within bloc countries without the prior approval of host governments. A situation is thereby created in which the Soviet military is freer and more capable of moving troops within East Europe than are the indigenous military establishments themselves.

While ultimate Soviet control, particularly in times of crisis, rests on the threat of force, it is the system of relationships between party, military and security leaders which remains the centerpiece of the Soviet Union's preeminent position in Eastern Europe. It is important to emphasize that the Soviet Union's influence on day-to-day issues is exercised not out of the barrel of a gun but primarily through wholly voluntary cooperation between elites within the Pact whose current and future status derives from and depends upon that cooperation. Western evaluations about future policies toward Eastern Europe must take into account, therefore, the fact that Soviet control of Eastern Europe has withstood all of the many and acute tests to which it has been subjected in the post-war period, and has done so not by increasing oppression universally but rather by allowing limited, but still increased, diversity while maintaining all of its options to use force in the event that the strong and subtle interconnections contructed over the last forty years prove insufficient.

THE FISSURE POINTS AND WESTERN OPTIONS

The challenge for the West lies in identifying the fissure points in the Soviet alliance and in channelling the growing diversity dealt with above along paths favorable to Western interests--without, however, so alarming Moscow as to produce a backlash, thereby ending any incipient reforms and producing a threat to European security as well. The successful pursuit of such a policy would meet the joint requirements of any Western policy--promoting general security in Europe and encouraging the evolution of East European regimes in ways which take account of popular aspirations and differing national characteristics. In this regard, it is important to stress from the outset that there is scant historical support for the notion, supposedly forwarded at the height of the Polish crisis by "hard-liners" within the Reagan administration, that the Soviet Union can be "brought to its knees" by promoting ever more costly cycles of collapse, crisis, and oppression in Eastern Europe.(12)

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12. Alexander Haig, in his memoirs, as excerpted in TIME, April 9, 1984, recounts that while administration hard-liners did not seek military confrontation, they did believe that the U.S. could "control Soviet behavior toward Poland...through the application of economic or trade sanctions that would `bring her to her knees'." Haig believed such views to be totally fallacious.

Such views, espoused in the apparent hope that the Soviet Union would simply decide that it cannot afford the burdens of empire fly in the face of two important facts--the first being that the Soviet Union has risen to meet every one of the considerable challenges to its security emanating from crises in Eastern Europe since 1945, incessantly reminding anyone who cared to listen that the blood of 20 million Russians was not sacrificed for nothing. And Soviet activism in the maintenance of its hold on Eastern Europe has been a feature of Soviet behavior even in times when the Soviet leadership has not been particularly robust elsewhere, with Soviet resolve demonstrated in Eastern Europe during the 1961 Berlin crisis, but lack of will shown in the simultaneous Congo crisis and the subsequent Cuban missile crisis. The second fact is that the no member of the Western Alliance, including the United States, has either the political will or the military capability (short of nuclear war) to take the kind of actions which would be required in order to challenge Soviet hegomony in Eastern Europe directly. Does anyone really suppose that a grain embargo, the witholding of most-favored-nation status, or bans on European exportation of parts for the gas pipeline are going to bring the Warsaw Pact to its knees? Such measures may be skillfully employed in siuations short of a major crisis in Eastern Europe, but to wait to use these measures until the crisis is out of our control makes the measures unequal to the situation and exposes the Western alliance to charges that it is unwilling and unable of making more than rhetorical flourishes to hide its own confusion and disarray.

What is required is a coordinated, inter-alliance effort to construct a policy toward Eastern Europe which encourages national diversity there while being cognisant of Soviet preeminence, particularly during times of crisis. And in the key and sensitive field of Soviet-East European security relations, greater efforts must be made to sensitize Western policy makers to subtle but important differences between Moscow and her Pact allies. In this respect, it would be advantageous to the West to recognize that within the bloc, it has been the East Europeans who have often pressured Moscow into being more forthcoming on issues of European security and detente.

East European pressure for measures which would enhance such security began with the formation of the Warsaw Pact itself, when the U.S.S.R. was obliged to concede in Article Eleven of the Treaty creating the Pact that "in the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty concerning collective security, the present

Treaty shall cease to have effect...."(13) The series of proposals forwarded in 1957 and 1958 by Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, would have established a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and produced limited withdrawals of foreign troops from the two Germanies and Poland. It is unfortunate that NATO responded negatively to this plan, without considering whether such a plan was the genuine result of East European pressure on Moscow and whether if implemented it would have produced a decreased Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.

East European pressure for enhanced European security surfaced again in the mid-1960s when the NATO military strategy of 'flexible response' and the political policy of 'building bridges' threatened to increase direct American military presence in Central Europe and trigger a concomitant Soviet response. The Soviet Union put great pressure on its East European allies to introduce more Soviet troops and to conduct joint maneuvers on their soil. In the midst of this build-up of pressure from Moscow, the East Europeans were able to obtain, at the 1967 Pact summit in Karlovy Vary, a unified call for the convening of a European Security Conference. The emerging reform movement in Czechoslovakia so alarmed Pact hardliners, however, that hopes of gaining a serious Soviet commitment to such a conference had to wait until after August 1968--by which time the Soviet military had succeeded in achieving the permanent stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia.(14) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe whose Final Act was signed in Helsinki in 1975 out of the era of East-West detente; and if Eastern Europe was not its major architect, it was surely its major beneficiary. The Helsinki process, both before the signing and in the subsequent review sessions, has provided East European diplomacy with its first tangible and independent status in Europe.

The importance accorded by the East Europeans to the Helsinki process and the subsequent review sessions, such as the one in Madrid, became more apparent in the summer of 1984, when several East European leaders began to complain that inter-European detente should not be negatively affected by the deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Indeed, it was argued that under such circumstances the 'small states' of Europe (whether NATO or WTO members) had the capability and the positive duty of bridging the gap

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13.UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES,1955, p. 32.

14. See Karen Dawisha, "Soviet Security and the Role of the Military: The 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis," BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 10, 1980., pp. 300-346.

between the superpowers. As stated by Matyas Szuros, the Hungarian Party Secretary responsible for foreign relations: "There are numerous examples to prove--and this is shown also by the experience of almost three years of work of the Madrid Conference as well--that we are dealing here essentially with a two-directional process: the great powers have the determining impact on events, and, simultaneously, the role of small countries in bridging differences of views and developing rational amd mutually acceptable compromises--altogether, in fostering the continuity of East-West dialogue--is increasing."(15) The Czechoslovak Party newspaper, RUDE PRAVO, issued an article in apparent response on March 30 which was highly critical of the foreign policy deviations of unnamed Warsaw Pact states. Szuros' reply, defending Hungary's "independent initiatives" was reprinted in the East German daily, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, on April 12, while an abridged verson of the more critical RUDE PRAVO article appeared in a Soviet publication days later, thereby marking the Soviet entry into the debate.(16) Soon after, the first deputy head of the CPSU's Department for Liaison with Ruling Workers and Communist Parties tried (without success) to put a halt to this argument by insisting that such analysis is both "artificial" and a "deviation from Marxism-Leninism."(17)

Moscow's problems with several of its East European allies, notably Hungary, Rumania and East Germany, have increased and not abated since the spring of 1985 and have focused on three key security issues, all of which represent fissure points within the bloc of potentially great significance for Western policy: namely Euro-missile deployment, inter-German cooperation, and most recently the renewal of the Warsaw Treaty. The furore in Western Europe over INF deployment was matched in Eastern Europe by a more muted but no less serious concern that the general pattern of increased deployment on both sides of the divide in Central Europe would undermine and even destroy any of the groundwork which had been laid since 1975 in the field of confidence building measures and force reductions. The East Europeans had been particularly keen to promote arms control talks in Europe, with Yuri Andropov, in one of the first

15. TARSADALMI SZEMLE, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 13-21, as reprinted in Ronald D. Asmus. EAST BERLIN AND MOSCOW; THE DOCUMENTATION OF A DISPUTE, RFE Occasional Papers, No. 1, Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1985, p. 21.

16. NOVOYE VREMYA, April 13, 1984.

17. O.V. Borisov, "Soyez novovo tipa," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, April, 1984, pp. 34-49. Borisov is generally regarded to be a pseudonym for Oleg Borisovich Rakhmanin, the first deputy head.

acts of his brief tenure, convening a bloc enclave in Prague early in 1983 which tied Moscow to arms control talks and bound Eastern Europe--much in the same way as Western Europe was bound by its own 'two-track' strategy---to the deployment of SS-20s in Czechoslovakia and East Germany if the talks were to fail. The East Germans were just as sensitive as their western counterparts to the historical implications of a "palisade of missiles" being erected between the two Germanies, and Honecker himself appealed directly to Kohl "in the name of the German people" for a halt in the deployment.(18) One can judge the East German reaction to the breakdown of talks and the beginning of deployments by Honecker's statement in November 1983 that while the leadership will do "what has to be done," nevertheless "these measures...did not evoke jubilation in our country."(19)

At every step, when relations between Moscow and Washington deteriorate, links between East and West Europe are also effected negatively. The same has been true for the 'special relationship' between the two Germanies. When Honecker appeared, in the summer of 1984, to endorse not only the Hungarian argument about the role of small states, but also did nothing to distance himself from West German talk of fostering a common German "identity", he was forced to 'postpone' (although not cancel) his visit to the FRG. In November, during the annual speech reviewing the year, Foreign Minister Gromyko pointedly warned "revanchists" (West Germans) and "semi-revanchists" (East Germans) "of all stripes, whereever they are" that "the German Reich burned to the ground in the fire of the Second World War. There is no return to it, nor will there be."(20) The deployment of intermediate range missiles in both Germanies, combined with the possibility of West German production of advanced armaments on its own soil, following the decision by the West European Union in summer 1984 to lift its ban,(21) provides further obstacles to the maintenance of even a modicum of detente in Europe. Even the otherwise optimistic

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18. Quoted in Asmus, op. cit., p. 18.

19. Speech by Erich Honecker delivered in East Berlin at the SED's seventh CC Plenum, 26-27 November 1983, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, November 26-27, 1983, quoted in Asmus, p. 19.

20. PRAVDA, November 6, 1984.

21.The extremely harsh official Soviet memorandum to the West German government is reprinted in Asmus, pp. 42-3.

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Hungarians appeared to distance themselves from expanded inter-German cooperation under these conditions by stating quite firmly that "in view of historical experiences, we fully understand and share the concern felt in this connection....For our part, we support all efforts and concrete steps that are designed to assure that war may never again be started on German soil."(22)

The debate within the bloc over the renewal of the Warsaw Treaty in the spring of 1985, while ultimately producing a renewal (despite rumors that the Rumanians and others had been holding out for a 5-year, rather than the agreed-to 30-year period), did produce a reaffirmation of East European resolve to pursue seperate and independent economic and political strategies. The Hungarian deputy foreign minister for Soviet Bloc relations, in an article which was once again reprinted in East Germany, pointedly stated that "the member states are independent and sovereign countries that, without exception, respect the principle of non-interference in each others internal affairs," adding that "anyone in touch with reality [no names supplied] will be cognisant of these [national] differences [in building socialism] and not see them as an 'aberration'."(23) Even Gorbachev, who is regarded in the West and in Eastern Europe as representing the best hope for reform and liberalization in Eastern Europe, conceded nothing to his bloc partners in his speech on the occasion of the treaty renewal. No mention was made of Soviet adherence to non-interference as a principle governing relations, with the new Soviet Party chief choosing instead to state that "relations are based on the full equality and comradely mutual assistance of sovereign states" who uphold "the principle of socialist internationalism,"(24) all code-words for what in the West is referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine giving Moscow the right, and even the duty to lend military "assistance" to any country where socialism is deemed to be threatened.

The Soviet Union is unlikely, therefore, to lessen its resolve to be the final arbiter, through the use of force or diplomatic pressure, of East European debates on their role in international affairs. But what the East Europeans can do and have done is to continue to bring pressure to bear on Moscow to keep detente alive in Europe. The success of these efforts is dependent upon the current status of

22. Matyas Szuros's speech at a rally on Hungarian Constitution Day, MTI August 21, 1984, in Asmus, p.70.

23. Istvan Roska, writing in NEPSZAVA, as reprinted in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, March 4, 1985.

24. PRAVDA, April 28, 1985.

Soviet-American relations above all, but hinges too upon the extent to which the West is able to, or wishes to, make genuine distinctions between the policies and interests of individual states within the Warsaw Pact. The unfortunate tendency to treat every East European state as exactly like every other East European states takes account neither of historical nor contemporary differences. Furthermore, a successful policy in the security field in particular depends upon our recognition that in times of crisis, Soviet security interests will prevail. What, therefore, is required are policies which are better calibrated to prevent crises from breaking out in the first place, but which also take cognisance of Eastern Europe's own aspirations.

What do the East European's themselves want in this regard? First, they uniformly point out in public and in private that the "resumption of dialogue between the two great powers would be an essential prerequisite for alleviating tension."(25) In addition, the fact that the system of institutions created since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 has continued to operate despite the poor relations between the superpowers is viewed as particularly "encouraging."(26) The quiet progress being made at the 35-nation Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe provides an example of the kind of multilateral diplomacy which provides the opportunity for strengthening East European independence, as well as keeping open the prospect that the final agreement will include both Western affirmation of the principle of the nonuse of force (with President Reagan's speech in Dublin in June 1984 signalling a shift toward the Soviet position) and Soviet agreement in any or all of the six specific areas outlined by the West--military information, annual forecasts of military activities, notificaion of military activities outside garrisions, observation of maneuvers, verification of compliance through inspection and establishment of hot-line communications links.(27) The acceptance of these proposals would be of great value to European security and of great interest to the East Europeans. Of particular importance to the East Europeans is the proposal involving notification of exercises 45 days in advance for any out-of-garrison activity involving 6,000 troopsor more, for the mobilization of 25,000 reservists and regular troops, or for any amphibious activity with 3000 combat soldiers. The change

25. "Common Goals, National Interests," an interview given by Matyas Szuros, MAGYAR HIRLAP, April 4, 1984 reprinted in Asmus, p. 28.

26. Matyas Szuros's speech on Hungarian National Day, MTI, August 21, 1984, in Asmus, p. 70.

27. See NEW YORK TIMES, March 25, 1985 for more details.

(21)

would certainly hamper the possibility not only of a surprise attack between East and West but also of a Soviet invasion of an East European state.

The careful and patient contruction of formal and informal networks of relationships which criss-cross and therefore gradually bind Europe more closely together is an aspiration shared by all Europeans, whether East or West. It is shared too by Dr. Brzezinski, whose views were quoted at the beginning of this article. The fundamental differences between his views and the views expressed here lie above all in the fact that he does not rule out the use, or promotion, or crises in Eastern Europe as an agent of apocolyptic change, and neither does he link the necessity for improved security in Europe with any real chance for increasing the parameters of independent action in Eastern Europe. And yet it has only been in times of non-crisis and only in periods of East-West cooperation that Eastern Europe has made any progress toward internal tranformation, thereby improving the stability and responsiveness of these regimes and in so doing, helping to eliminate a major source of insecurity.

Table 1

Selected East European Air/Ground Holdings - 1979

Country	Air Force	Ground
Poland	MIG-17,21, Sukhoi -7; some Sukhoi 20	T-54/55
The GDR	MIG-17, 21	T-54/55
Czechoslovakia	MIG-17, 21; some 23s	T-54/55
Hungary	MIG-21	T-54/55
Bulgaria	MIG-17, 19, 21; some 23.	T-54/55
Romania	MIG-17, 21	T-54/55

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-80 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 14-16.

Table 2

Selected East European Air/Ground Holdings - 1984

Country	Air Force	Ground
Poland	MIG-17, 21; a few MIG-23s. SU-7; a few SU-20s being added	T-54/55, 70 T-72s; only 800 BMP-1 (1/2 of those required to meet Soviet norms), OT64 and obsolescent OT62
The GDR	MIG-21; a few MIG-23s	T-54/55, large number of T-72s. 40% of combat infantry vehicles are modern and artillery holdings adequate.
Czechoslovakia	MIG-15, 21; smattering of MIG-23s. SU-7.	T-54/55s, 100 T-72s.
Hungary	MIG-21; MIG-23s beginning to appear	T-54/55, with a few T-72s
Bulgaria	MIG-17, 21; a few 23s.	T-54/55, with a few T-72s. Combat infantry vehicles outdated and major shortfalls in artillery
Romania	MIG-17, 21; a few 23s. IAR-93s	Similar to Bulgaria.

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984-85 (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 24-28

Ms. DAWISHA. It is my opinion that, in fact, Soviet levers of control are strengthened after crises and not weakened.

However, that does not mean that there are not substantial fissures in the Warsaw Pact alliance which provide opportunities for Western policy.

First of all, the East Europeans are concerned, as are, I think, the Soviets, about increasing the domestic viability of their own rule. David Holloway has talked about the fact that there is no crisis of will, but there is a crisis of rule. I think that is a very valid point and I would certainly support it.

What the East Europeans seek to do is to improve their relationships at low levels and intermediate levels with the West on all kinds of nonsecurity issues: Exchanges of academics and politicians; and increased trade.

Senator PRESSLER. Is that occurring? Is that occurring with academics and students? In the Warsaw Pact or in the socialist countries, do we find the most activity? Does it occur in Yugoslavia, which is not a part of the Warsaw Pact?

Ms. DAWISHA. The prime examples of cultural exchanges between the United States and Eastern Europe are with Poland and Hungary.

And these cultural exchanges are also significant between East and West Europe. That is seen by the East Europeans as a way of increasing their own domestic viability.

Senator PRESSLER. Do the East Germans do that?

Ms. DAWISHA. Oh, yes. Absolutely. And especially with the West Germans. That is very much a part of their special relationship.

Senator PRESSLER. What about in the scientific field? Often the United States will send bona fide students over to a socialist or Communist country, and we will get back a 40-year-old scientist, who is really over here to collect data, information, and patents. Is that not correct? Or, are they proper undergraduate students?

Ms. DAWISHA. Yes.

For example, I am a professor at the University of Maryland. At this moment, on the campus of the University of Maryland, there are over 140 citizens of the U.S.S.R. studying agriculture, and that number is matched by combined equal numbers from the East European countries.

Senator PRESSLER. How old are these students?

Ms. DAWISHA. Some of them have already first degrees, and so they tend not to be 18. But certainly most of them are under 30.

Senator PRESSLER. Are there any who are between 18 and 22?

Ms. DAWISHA. I wouldn't be able to answer that. But I certainly could find out that information for you.

Senator PRESSLER. Could you find that out and submit it?

Ms. DAWISHA. Sure. I'd be happy to.

The point that we are making here is that the cultural interactions which we may see as being peripheral to our relationship with the East Europeans are regarded by the East Europeans themselves as absolutely central. They see those cultural relations and political exchanges as crucial to establishing an independent status in Europe, in Europe, which is separate to the Soviet connection.

That is an extremely important aspect of East European cultural identity.

There are other aspects of the East European desire for viability which are also very, very important. The East Europeans, for example, while they have admittedly little leverage within the context of the Warsaw Pact, that is, in security relations, have much greater leverage when it comes to trade, aid, and economic relations. This has been dealt with in other testimony and is very thoroughly dealt with in my testimony.

Senator PRESSLER. I would also be curious, as to the numbers of students attending the University of Maryland who are from Eastern Europe.

It is a great State university to take as an example. I am interested in data from all the different countries in the Eastern bloc.

Ms. DAWISHA. You hear countries that call themselves socialist, the Socialist bloc.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, I am curious about that. Approximately what ages are those students? My observation has been that the students we get from the bloc countries are not really students; they are technology pickers.

Ms. DAWISHA. Sure.

I can certainly find that information out for you. If you are particularly interested in this, you might also want to elicit some testimony from the International Research Exchange Board, which is responsible for actually improving and maintaining cultural relations with these East European countries. They would have all of the data, not just for Maryland but of all the students who come and go, in and out of the United States.

[The information referred to follows:]

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DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
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301.454.2248

Honorable Larry Pressler
Chairman, European Affairs Subcommittee
United States Senate

October 9, 1985

Dear Senator Pressler:

Enclosed, please find the additional documentation that you requested during the course of my testimony. "East Bloc Students and Soviet Studies", prepared by my assistant, Thomas Bodie, presents not only general trends in the number and nature of students from East Europe and the Soviet Union, but also the status of Soviet Studies at the University of Maryland. Complete documentation was not immediately available, however. We have requested additional information from the International Research and Exchange Board, which we will include under separate cover should it arrive before the document submission deadline.

I hope we will have answered any questions you may have had, and once again, my thanks for the opportunity to participate in your hearings.

Sincerely,

Dr. Karen Dawisha
Prof. of Gov. & Politics
Univ. of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742

EAST BLOC STUDENTS AND SOVIET STUDIES

Thomas J. Bodie

The universities of the United States have always been attractive to students from other nations, and the University of Maryland at College Park is certainly no exception. During the 1983 - 84 school year, Maryland was host to 1,767 foreign students, a figure which represented a 12.8% increase over the previous year. (At this point, acknowledgement should be made to the Institute of International Education (IIE), since all figures in this report are drawn from their annual census of foregin students , published in Open Doors: 1983 - 84.) The number of foreign students at Maryland, however, is the only real statistic which is available. Due to the Buckley Amendment, a law passed by Congress, universities are prohibited from giving out personal data concerning student characteristics, e.g., age and nationality.

The broader picture suggests that the increasing influx of foreign students is a general trend throughout the country. While it is true that the rate of increase has leveled off, nonetheless, last year's figure of 338,894 foreign students indicated an increase of .6% over the previous year's figure. Of that number, 223, or .1%, were from the Soviet Union, and 1243, or .4% were from Eastern Europe. But here again, statistics concerning personal characteristics were not included. As a rule, the only statistics available about foreign student

personal characteristics are group statistics -- sex, marital status, and visa type.

What can be said about the University of Maryland with some authority is that there is a solid program aimed at increasing our knowledge of the Soviet Union. Students at the University may earn a Bachelor's Degree in Russian studies through the Russian Area Studies Program. Courses are offered in language and literature, government, economics, history, geography, philosophy, and sociology. Many of these departments offer graduate courses as well. The Department of Government and Politics and the School of Public Affairs both provide graduate training in the Soviet field, and are host to many visiting scholars from the East Bloc.

In addition, faculty specializing in Soviet Studies are actively involved in promoting knowledge of the Soviet Union's throughout the Washington area. Roundtables and seminars are but a few of the methods through which this takes place. The University, for example, under the auspices of the Center for International Development, will be host to Soviet specialists from East and West Europe, The United States, and Canada this autumn, for roundtable discussions on current events in the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the University has recently launched, in collaboration with other area colleges, a graduate workshop on Soviet affairs designed to improve the quality of graduate study. Activity in this field has been much aided by great improvements in the level of congressional funding, and the future of these programs depends on a continuation of this interest.

The University of Maryland has been actively involved in the education of students and citizens about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We welcome congressional interest and are committed to the constant improvement of our program.

Ms. DAWISHA. The important point here is that this European desire to increase its autonomy is dependent upon the state, both of Soviet-American relations and of detente as between East Europe and West Europe. When we do not have a good state of Soviet-American relations, these links close down. Equally as between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, security relations may be very difficult to promote; but when there is a condition of detente, low level cultural and political relations do flourish.

In particular, I think a point that I make very strongly in my paper that I would like to bring out here is that in the United States in particular but also in Western Europe, there is not great importance put on multilateral diplomacy, such as the Helsinki process or such as MBFR. But both of these processes are regarded by the East Europeans themselves as having paramount importance because they have specific interests to promote; namely, greater detente in Europe, and also because they see these multilateral fora as giving them the chance to assert their own independence and their own status as members of a broader European community and not just as a member of the Warsaw Pact.

So, when we think of the next round of review conferences for Helsinki, when we are talking about the current Stockholm conference, we should be very, very sensitive to the fact that this is not only a forum for scoring propaganda points between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it is also for the United States a major opportunity to give East European states a position in Europe itself.

Those are my points.

Senator PRESSLER. I thank you both very much. I think we have covered so many of the points, but let me see if there are some areas we have not discussed sufficiently.

I noted that you said you did not think the Soviet Union had been weakened by any of the past crises. Can you name any past crises in Warsaw Pact countries that have benefited the West? Have any crises produced positive changes in the geopolitical balance?

Ms. DAWISHA. Well, I will restate my case.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, please.

Perhaps I misquoted you. Is the Polish situation an example?

Ms. DAWISHA. I do not, myself, think that we can find any example.

In 1956 in Hungary, certainly the causes of Hungarian interests and Western interests were not promoted.

In 1961, the wall went up. That was a major, major setback for Western interests in central Europe.

In 1968, the cause of detente was set back by at least 2-years as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In 1980–81 the crisis in Poland broke out and we are still suffering the effects of that crisis.

So, I myself see no positive benefit for the West's geopolitical position in Central Europe as a result of crises.

Mr. HOLLOWAY. May I add to that, Senator?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

Mr. HOLLOWAY. I agree with that point. I think any crisis that stems from an internal social or political upheaval in one of these

countries tends to bring a Soviet crackdown and may even increase the Soviet presence in the area.

I would say the two cases where the West has benefited have been cases in which the leaders themselves of individual countries have pursued an independent policy; namely, Romania and, of course, before the pact was founded, Yugoslavia.

But these were not caused by severe internal crises in which the whole rule or political order was called into question.

Ms. DAWISHA. I think also we could say that there have been gains that the United States and NATO have made in the geopolitical position in Central Europe. The Austrian State Treaty in 1955, when Soviet forces withdrew, was a major gain for the West. But it did not come out of crisis.

I think that we can make gains, and I think we made specific and significant gains in the 1970's. But they did not come out of crises.

Senator PRESSLER. Ms. Dawisha, according to your written statement, as I understand it, you have criticized the West as using inappropriate means to handle crises in Eastern Europe. What measures should be used to respond to crises in Eastern Europe? When should they be applied?

Ms. DAWISHA. First of all, I don't think that the West should use military force and countermeasures because we have reason to believe, both from Brezhnev's statements and during previous crises from our intelligence that the Soviet Union would go to a Third World War if it felt its position in Eastern Europe were being directly challenged by Western countermeasures, military countermeasures.

I don't think that option is open to us.

My criticism of the West's policy has been that, when faced with the massing of Soviet troops in or around Poland, it is not appropriate to withdraw Aeroflot landing rights—not because we shouldn't seek to show our outrage, but that that is not something that will have any effect at all.

If the Soviet Union is going to take measure such as an invasion of Poland or such as putting military pressure on Poland, the fact that we talk about sanctions or withdrawal of most-favored-nation status or the withdrawal of Aeroflot, that may be all we can do, but those measures are too late.

I think that what we need to do is to, in a sense, entangle individual East European countries and the Soviet Union in a wide ranging set of interrelationships which will give them an interest in not escalating a crisis in the first place.

Senator PRESSLER. You call for greater calibration of policy in responding to crises. Exactly what do you mean by that term?

Ms. DAWISHA. The need for calibration became apparent when the Polish crisis was at its height. At that time, all of the considerable Western analysis took account only of the possibility of a Soviet invasion. So, when there was no invasion, but instead martial rule was imposed, we had no idea how to respond.

Our policy was not calibrated according to the multitude of levers of control that the Soviets and the East European military establishments have open to them to control domestic situations.

We have to be more aware of the fact that every crisis is not going to be responded to by the Soviet Union with a military invasion and that there are reserves of Soviet control inside these countries that they can call upon as a first resort.

In that sense, we have to be more aware of the depth of Soviet control and also the differences between these countries.

Senator PRESSLER. I do have some additional questions to submit to both of you in writing, which I will do. I am forced to go back to the floor at this point, but I want to thank you very much.

If you have any additional comments that you want to make, we will consider them for the record.

I thank you very much for your excellent testimony. I apologize for the voting interruptions. I will recess this committee at this time.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

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